Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 10, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #50

1. Opinion

Last week Harold Brown discussed with you the idea of putting the M-X missile in Minuteman silos. This idea has been gaining some support lately, given the difficulties that the Air Force is having in identifying a technically feasible and reasonably affordable mobile basing scheme.

The fact that something must eventually be done about Minuteman’s growing vulnerability seems clear. We have just completed an analysis of the potential impact of extending to 1985 the current SALT II modernization limits. The results support RAND’s presentation to you—Soviet difficulties in trying to achieve a high confidence attack capability against Minuteman would increase, but such limits would not significantly reduce the rate at which our confidence in the survivability of Minuteman is decaying.² And SALT II protocol limits would foreclose a matching ICBM hard-target capability raising all the political problems Senator Nunn indicated.

However, deploying the M–X missile in the Minuteman silos seems like a poor solution. While it would reduce the developing asymmetries in throw weight and hard-target kill capabilities, it also would increase crisis instability. By putting both sides’ knockout punch in a vulnerable position, there would be a premium on the side that starts first. Adopting a launch under attack strategy has significant problems too. Its credibility depends on public knowledge, but public knowledge will precipitate a heated political debate over whether this strategy is possible without predelegation of your authority to order nuclear attacks—a very sensitive matter.

For these reasons many pro defense and pro arms control legislators on the Hill are united against putting M–X missiles in silos. Indeed the program has survived politically because it has held out the possibility of being a survivable ICBM. There is great reluctance to spending billions on a new missile for an increasingly vulnerable basing mode.

The Air Force is continuing studies of possible mobile basing schemes for the M–X missiles and DDR&E is examining some exotic options for protecting ICBM. But the prospect is that we will have to learn to live with ICBM vulnerability.

We do not, however, have to accept an asymmetry on counterforce. There is a way to increase our counterforce capabilities without the instabilities of developing M–X in silos: we could develop the Trident II (D–5) missile as a survivable hard-target weapon. This program is still in early conceptual studies, but it seems clear that a highly effective hard-target kill capability can be achieved with an SLBM.

However, at present the Trident II missile program has very modest funding. The Navy has put off the start of a serious Trident II development program because it sees the total of $5–7 billion in required development funds as competing with other programs the Navy leadership values more, such as building new ships or buying new aircraft.

If a serious development effort were started now, the D–5 could be initially deployed in 1987 or 88—if high priority were given to the project, deployment could probably start a year or two sooner. Such a program would be consistent with SALT II. And an announcement that we are pursuing this—even only as an option—would go a long way to defuse the “counterforce debate” that Sam Nunn believes would be so damaging as SALT II ratification.

Even if we ultimately decide to forego an increase in missile hard-target kill capabilities, development of the Trident II missile would still have advantages. The throw weight of this missile is approximately the same as that of the M–X, and deployment of it would help reduce the growing throw weight asymmetry. Further, the Trident II missile (which is significantly larger than the Trident I) would make maximum use of each submarine. Thus allowing us the option of deploying fewer submarines overall—with lower costs, at least in the long run.

In view of these considerations, we should be cautious about the idea of putting M–X missiles in Minuteman silos—and look seriously at the possibility that development of the Trident II missile or an alternative option.³

2. Facts

A Look Into the Arms Trade Future

The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a book entitled Controlling Future Arms Trade.⁴ The book is part of the Council’s 1980’s Project which is designed to identify and analyze issues likely to be of international concern during the next 10 to 20 years. A number of interesting predictions were made in the book, including:

— The pattern of transfers in the 1980’s will conform less and less to the division of influence between East and West; the Soviet Union and the U.S. will increasingly sell arms to each other’s clients; clients will feel free to bargain between East and West. The existence of other Northern arms exporters will mean even greater latitude for arms recipients in choosing among exporters. A buyers market will, in short, continue to exist.

— The dominent impulse of developing nations’ arms plans for the coming decade is toward arms independence. More nations will be able to achieve weapons independence by indigenous production, although most countries will likely remain dependent on the superpowers for front-line weapons platforms such as high performance combat aircraft.

— The availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will represent the most notable change in conventional weaponry from the 1970’s. Perhaps 15 to 20 nations will become capable of producing their own PGMs.

— The international demand for high cost, low attrition combat aircraft such as the F–14 will diminish significantly in the 1980’s. This reduced demand will result in part because these aircraft are too costly to risk in combat against PGMs.

— There may be a greater willingness on the part of many producing nations to sell weapons abroad, particularly if they see their reluctance as only serving the benefit of other less scrupulous suppliers. The “high-technology, high-morality” nations, such as Germany and Japan, may well become more actively involved in the arms trade in the future. But this development is not inevitable. The Swedes appear steadfast in their high-morality posture.

— The 1980’s will probably see more trade in “threshhold” items that will further blur the already vague distinction between offense and defense, strategic and tactical, nuclear and conventional, e.g., the cruise missile.

— There will be a proliferation of “second-tier” producers, such as Italy, Yugoslavia, Israel and growth of co-producers.

— The 1980’s will see a further weakening of autonomous European production lines for combat aircraft. European industries will turn more and more to co-production and licensing arrangements with American aircraft industries. NATO standardization in the 1980’s is likely to be, therefore, two-tiered, with the U.S. taking the lead in major weapons platforms and increasing European collaboration in tactical missiles and other armaments.

I think you will be pleased to know that most of the recommendations contained in Controlling Future Arms Trade are found either in PD–13⁵ or the guidelines you have adopted for our discussions with the British, Germans, French and Soviets. Those that are not will be explored by my staff, including the one that follows:

— Actively encourage the transfer of weapons and systems which would improve defensive and strategic warning capabilities.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to national security policy.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/78. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed the top of the memorandum.
2. On February 23, Carter participated in a meeting in the White House Situation Room to discuss SALT with Mondale, Nunn, Secretary of Defense Brown, Brzezinski, Aaron, and Donald Rice, President of the RAND Corporation. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of the meeting were found.
3. Carter wrote beneath this paragraph: “This is something about which Harold should brief me—(by memo first) J.” In a March 13 memorandum, Brzezinski wrote Brown: “In connection with your discussion with the President of the idea of putting the M–X Missile in Minuteman silos, the President has asked for a memorandum from you about possible alternatives to M–X. Specifically, he would be interested in your views about the possibility of developing the Trident II (D–5) missile as a survivable hard target weapon. The memorandum should also surface other possible options, if any. We would also plan discussing this issue at a PRC.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/78).
4. Anne Hessing Cahn, et al., eds. Controlling Future Arms Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977).
5. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 33.