Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

30. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, August 17, 1977

SUBJECT

• PRM/NSC–10: Military Strategy and Force Posture Study (C)

(C) As Chairman of the PRC for PRM/NSC–10, I am transmitting to you the Study on Military Strategy and Force Posture.

(C) The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with my views about what has and has not been accomplished in the entire PRM/NSC–10 effort and to outline my plans for moving forward within DOD to develop both long-range planning and more immediate force posture programs.

(S) General Reactions

The Study is this Administration’s initial broad survey of alternate national military strategies. Such a broad zero-based policy review of the basic elements of the US national military posture provides an opportunity to challenge old canons and to advance new ideas.

The PRM/NSC–10 Study has made some useful contributions to this Administration’s thinking on defense policy.

Taken as a whole, PRM/NSC–10 made us pause and take a look at where we are and where we ought to consider going. It also makes clear that much remains to be done. The study was broad in scope; some of its limitations are a result of that. In particular, no single study can substitute for the detailed analyses that implement our particular policies. Thus, PRM/NSC–10 should be understood as a point of departure for thinking about how we should develop and use military forces and capabilities over an uncertain, complex future.

(TS) Net Assessment

This portion of PRM/NSC–10 focused on the trends in the long-term military, economic, and political competition with the Soviet Union. It is very useful in thinking about the broad, global issues. Its view of the current military balance in Europe seems to me to be too optimistic, although I think our NATO initiatives could improve this situation substantially over the next few years.

I agree with the study’s general thrust that the Soviets are effective competitors only in the military dimension, and that we need to think carefully about how to deal with this fact. Further, I strongly agree that, in developing a national strategy, we should exploit those areas where we have a competitive advantage, while limiting our competitor’s ability to take advantage of our vulnerabilities. In particular, we need to try to exploit our potential technological advantages in both conventional and strategic forces.

(TS) Strategy and Force Posture Study

This study has focused attention on the value of developing a strategy to guide the evolution of our military forces for the next decade and has raised a number of key military strategy issues.

I see the study as the first step in a process of refining our strategic choices and of eliciting initial policy guidance from you on key issues of military strategy. The study underlines the critical role of our Allies in implementing alternative US military strategies as well as potential Allied reactions to changes in US policies. This is particularly true in Europe where ours must be an alliance military strategy. It emphasizes the importance of concentrating not only on the early stages of conflict in Europe, but also on how long we fight and those crucial days of conflict termination. Explicit recognition is given to the possibility of a divergence in NATO and US military strategies, given the realities of NATO defense spending and the fact that NATO can currently sustain a conventional battle at projected consumption rates for less than 30 days. The study raises the question of operations outside Europe in a US–USSR conflict and highlights the peacetime functions of military forces in crisis management and local wars. The analysis of strategic forces begins with recognition that strategic nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of US and Allied military security, and defines US objectives and establishes alternative criteria through which they might be achieved. Specific issues addressed include the requirements for political sufficiency, a hard target kill capability, various levels of retaliatory capability in the face of Soviet offensive and defensive posture, and a strategic reserve force.

The Executive Summary conveys a picture of the scope and breadth of the report, and of the issues developed.

(S) Relationship of the Net Assessment and Strategy/Force Posture Study

The two major parts of PRM–10 were performed simultaneously. The Net Assessment portion was not available for use by the Force Posture Study group. A major consequence is that the notional AIMS are not directly related either to an approved set of overall national objectives or to a national strategy derived from the Net Assessment. In fact, as a consequence of the concurrency of the two portions of the PRM–10 effort, the alternative national strategies and the notional AIMS were developed on independent analytical frameworks; so there is no systemic interconnect between the two.

(TS) Limitations

There are a number of things which this study does not do, and, for the most part, never intended to do. These include the following:

a. The breadth and scope of the study effort required a high level of conceptual abstraction which makes it useful as a vehicle for identifying and considering military strategy issues. The study is not suitable as a basis for definitive selection of any particular strategy. Because they were selected to illuminate subsets of issues, none of the notional AIMS was intended to be, nor is, appropriate as an overall strategy to meet our national security needs.

b. The approach to the force posturing and costing required simplifying assumptions and rough estimates which preclude their use in definitive program and budget decisions.

c. The complexity of the study prevented in-depth examination of some of the significant issues relating to NATO that have been raised in Congress. Assumptions were made with respect to warning time, reinforcement and readiness requirements, Soviet build-up rates and warning indicators, and “lag time” for NATO decision. The implications of a full range of these assumptions must be considered because the differences could be quite substantial in terms of force requirements and costs.

d. The contingency assessment of our current military capabilities, summarized in Chapter 11 of the report, deals only with the narrow measure of relative force build-ups and is of limited value for predicting which force would prevail in actual combat.

e. The study did not call for the formulation of national objectives, and the response did not attempt to do so.

f. A wide range of significant military issues was not addressed, including: theater nuclear forces; strategic defensive and mobility forces; US–USSR industrial capacity/mobilization potential; and access to raw materials and energy resources.

g. Neither this study nor the Net Assessment dealt in any depth with the specific nature of the current and expected challenges from the Soviet Union. They were unable to deal, moreover, with the many uncertainties which the future competition will pose for both the US and the Soviet Union.

(S) Follow-on Work

Your guidance on the military strategy issues will provide the framework for my review of specific defense policies in the coming months. I will have begun within DOD a hard look ahead at the FY 1979 budget and will soon turn to formulate basic guidance for the 1980 budget. I am also looking at ways to strengthen DOD longer range planning. I believe we should try to add a true long-range planning function in the Defense Department. As things stand now, our horizon is limited to no more—and often less—than the service life of the major pieces of equipment we buy. We have a good idea of the next five years; things are less certain after that, and, for instance, even though the ships we buy may last for 20–30 years, we have no real plan approaching that duration. Doing so would give us the chance to be a bit less reactive to what happens in the world around us, and instead to think about where we would like to lead the world, and develop strategies to do this. We can do a better job of thinking through how we can adapt as the uncertainty of the future unfolds.

In a similar vein, just as the business world plans strategies for product markets, I think we may be able to plan strategies for the “businesses” of the Department of Defense. We will begin to look in the large for areas where we are (or could be) in a position—as the economists put it—of comparative advantage, and then try to build upon what we have today to move the competition in that direction.

In addition to initiating follow-on efforts to address the problems identified above as limitations, and developing a long-range planning function, I will also initiate study efforts to address specific topics including:

— Roles, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of theater nuclear forces;

— The forces and mechanisms appropriate for crisis management and potential local conflicts (with particular attention on potential crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf);

— The characteristics of a US Navy appropriate for its contribution in effective competition with the Soviet Union and management of US global interests in the future;

— Warsaw Pact capabilities, doctrine, and vulnerabilities associated with sustaining conventional conflict in Europe;

— Measures NATO could pre-plan to exploit various amounts of warning time which might be available; and

— Soviet doctrine, capabilities, and vulnerabilities associated with our taking initiatives outside Europe during a war in Europe.

(C) Beyond PRM–10

I believe our efforts to date have served to provide the essential framework for identifying the major military strategy issues on which your guidance will set the course for our future actions. There are now being set in motion the necessary activities along the lines outlined earlier in this memorandum to address those areas requiring greater study before decisions on a comprehensive national military strategy can be made.

I am prepared to discuss with you in further detail the considerations and implications of each of the military strategy issues.

Harold Brown

Attachment

Final Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Military Force Posture²

Washington, July 7, 1977

[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose. The purpose of the PRM–10 Force Postures Study is to elicit policy guidance from the President on key issues pertaining to national military strategy. The scope of this study is intentionally broad. It partakes of most, but exhausts none, of the numerous topics and factors which enter into the determination of national military strategy. It is designed to provide a solid basis for further detailed work on defense force structure and program issues, using either the interagency process or the normal PPBS decision process, as appropriate.

Approach. In order to develop alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS), Substrategy building blocks were constructed to identify a range of options in each of five analytical areas:

1. NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe (including the NATO Flanks and the North Atlantic).

2. Operations outside Europe during a NATO–WP war.

3. East Asia.

4. Peacekeeping activities and potential local wars.

5. US–USSR nuclear conflict.

The major issues in each analytical area, or conflict category, were isolated. Then, using this building block technique, the substrategies shown below were developed to focus on what the US should achieve as well as the threats to that achievement.

Summary of Substrategies

NATO–WP IN EUROPE	NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO–WP WAR	EAST ASIA	PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS	US–USSR NUCLEAR CONFLICT
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
OFFSETTING ATTACKS
DIRECT DEFENSE	INITIATIVES	INCREASED PRESENCE	HEAVY INTERVENTION	CLEAR SUPERIORITY
LIMIT LOSS	LIMITED ACTION	CURRENT PRESENCE	LIGHT INTERVENTION	RETAIN US FORCE ADVANTAGES
ELASTIC TRIPWIRE	MINIMAL EFFORT	REDUCED PRESENCE	LIMITED ACTION	MAINTAIN OVERALL FORCE BALANCE
TRIPWIRE		MODIFIED WITHDRAWAL	PROXY RELIANCE	ASSURED RETALIATION ONLY
		WITHDRAWAL

Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) were formulated from the analytical area substrategies by excluding unworkable combinations of substrategies. Eight final AIMS were selected for detailed evaluation in terms of their military, economic, political (both in technical and domestic) and arms control implications. Each AIMS addresses in a different way the major military issues facing the United States. The range of AIMS is intentionally broad so that they will provide a comprehensive analytical framework for evaluation of the major elements of defense policy.

The composition of the eight final AIMS in terms of their analytical area substrategies is shown in the table below:

ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES (AIMS)

AIMS	NATO/WP Conflict in Europe	Operations Outside Europe in US–USSR War	East Asia	Peacekeeping and Potential Local Wars	US–USSR Nuclear Conflict
E	Limit Loss: Hold 86–92 division threat at Weser-Lech w/30-day sustainability	Limited Action	Reduced Presence	Limited Action	Maintain Overall force balance
F		Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
G		Initiatives	Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Maintain Overall force balance
F (Variant)	Limit Loss: Hold 130 division threat at Weser-Lech w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
H	Direct Defense: Restore pre-war line against	Limited Action	Reduced Presence	Limited Action	Maintain Overall force balance
I	130 division threat w/90-day sustainability	Limited Action	Current Presence	Light Intervention	Retain US Force Advantages
J	Direct Defense: w/Indefinite sustainability	Initiatives	Current Presence	Heavy Intervention	Assured Retaliation only
K	Offsetting Attacks: Flank attack on Pact while holding in central Region against 130+ division threat w/indefinite sustainability	Initiatives	Increased Presence	Heavy Intervention	Clear Superiority

Each of these strategies has a specific rationale for linking building blocks into coherent AIMS, as summarized below.

AIMS E—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be achieved with somewhat reduced reliance on military force, but the US still would retain the capability to wage a major conventional war of short duration with the USSR. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. In conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days. (A defense which stabilizes along the Weser-Lech line yields to Pact forces about a quarter to a third of the FRG territory east of the Rhine River). In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met through a strategy achievable by approximately the current US military forces, but with a capability for sustained combat comparable to that of our NATO Allies. US nuclear capabilities would be somewhat enhanced; all present US advantages in strategic nuclear force balance indices would be retained, with the expectation of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. The nuclear threshold would be about the same as it is currently. As in AIMS E, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS E, the current programmed military deployments in East Asia, less land forces in Korea, would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS F Variant—This AIMS is based on the premise that US objectives can be met by a modest increase in US military capability and a substantial increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. This strategy is identical to AIMS F except that in a European war, sustainability is commensurate with that currently programmed for US forces, with a requisite increase in sustainability by our NATO Allies. In conjunction with the NATO Allies, the US would plan to have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 90 days, still involving loss of NATO territory. Both sides are assumed to have the capability to employ additional forces in Central Europe beyond the first month of conflict, so this AIMS requires more forces than AIMS F. AIMS F Variant requires forces at least comparable to those in the current US Five Year Defense Program, but in excess of those currently programmed by the NATO Allies.

AIMS G—This AIMS is based on the premise that achievement of US objectives both inside and outside Europe would be enhanced by a stronger conventional military capability outside Europe. US strategic nuclear capabilities would be somewhat reduced; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. The nuclear threshold in Europe, however, might be raised because of the enhanced conventional capabilities outside Europe. As in AIMS E and F, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to hold a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack at the Weser-Lech River line for about 30 days, thus involving loss of NATO territory. Contrary to previous AIMS, however, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside of Europe against the USSR. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be secured by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS H—This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while reduced reliance on military force is possible elsewhere. This raised threshold is assumed to permit a slight reduction of US nuclear capabilities; not all US advantages would be maintained, nor would an extensive, efficient hard-target kill capability be pursued. In Europe, and in conjunction with NATO Allies, the US would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. In addition, the US would maintain a limited capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. A reduced presence in East Asia (no US forces in Korea or the Philippines) would reduce the potential for certain regional involvements and would reduce, but not negate, the US ability to influence great power relationships there. Other global interests would be advanced primarily by diplomatic and economic efforts, and any limited military intervention would require drawing down forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS I—This AIMS is based on the premise that support of US objectives requires a raising of the NATO nuclear threshold through a stronger conventional defense, while maintaining approximately current capabilities outside Europe. The raised nuclear threshold would be accompanied by a slight increase in the current strategic nuclear levels. All present US strategic advantages would be retained, with assurance of a hard-target kill capability against all Soviet silos. As in AIMS H, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. (Two excursions, to size US war reserve stocks for 180 days and for an indefinite time, but without change to combat forces during those periods, were evaluated.) In addition, the US would maintain a limited air and naval capability to confront the Soviets worldwide in the event of European war. In contrast to AIMS H, essentially the current programmed military deployments in East Asia—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a moderate capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes.

AIMS J—This AIMS is based on the premise that decreased levels of strategic nuclear forces are desirable. A significant and sustainable conventional military capability permits such decreased nuclear dependence. Thus, US nuclear capabilities would be reduced to the level of assured retaliation only—the capability to substantially destroy Soviet economic and leadership resources—and minimal counter-military capability would be provided, with no attempt made to match or offset strategic force asymmetries in the Soviets’ favor. As in AIMS H and I, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would have the conventional capability to absorb a determined Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe and restore the pre-war borders within about 90 days. US war reserve stocks, however, would be sized to provide for indefinite combat to avoid NATO’s having to resort to nuclear weapons should the Pact be able to sustain the conflict beyond 90 days. Contrary to AIMS H and I, the US would maintain naval and air forces capable of taking conventional initiatives outside Europe against the USSR which would further enhance deterrence in Europe. In East Asia, approximately the current programmed military deployments—less land forces in Korea—would be retained. Other global interests would be advanced by a significant capability for unilateral military action without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes. This intervention capability would be capable of direct confrontation with Soviet forces if necessary.

AIMS M—This AIMS is based on the premise that significant, sustainable conventional power capable of responding to any Soviet conventional attack combined with clear US nuclear superiority is required to support achievement of US objectives. US nuclear capabilities and threshold would be raised to near maximum levels; US strategic capabilities would exceed that of the Soviets in all significant indices—forces, modernization, and options for major active defenses. Such a nuclear posture would be designed to deter Soviet first use and provide political leverage. Should Warsaw Pact aggression occur in Europe, the US, in conjunction with NATO Allies, would defend in Central Europe while the US would initiate an attack against less heavily defended Warsaw Pact territory on the flanks to secure negotiating leverage. Major conventional capability is also maintained elsewhere to assure fulfillment of US global interests with a high probability of success. This would call for an increased military presence in East Asia and a major intervention capability in other regions.

The range of general purpose forces estimated to accomplish each AIMS is shown in the table below:³

ESTIMATED FORCES FOR AIMS

AIMS	Army Divisions	Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings	Marine Amphibious Forces	Navy
				Aircraft Carriers	Surface Combatants
E	21–22	31–37	2–4 1/3	6–18	42–310
F	21–23	33–39	3–4 1/3	8–18	100–310
F (Variant)	25–27	36–42	3–4 1/3	10–18	204–310
G	26–27	51–57	4–4 2/3	12–21	121–366
H	33–42	36–42	3–4 1/3	9–23	190–366
I	33–42	38–44	4–4 1/3	12–23	211–365
J	35–48	53–62	4 2/3–5	14–25	245–407
M	39–57	63–74	5 2/3–6	24–28	374–454
End-FY78 Program	24	36	4	13	195

The range of estimated five year costs (total obligational authority) for each AIMS is shown in the chart below.⁴ The high end of the range is influenced both by the high range for force estimates but also by the rate at which the forces are procured. These cost estimates do not show the total cost to achieve a force posture, only that portion of the cost which would be obligated in the first five years. Nevertheless, these costs give an idea of the expense incurred by adoption of an AIMS.

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 30, PRM–10, 6 of 8, [1]. Top Secret.
2. Secret.
3. The JCS representative believes that given the limitations of the methodologies and assumptions used in preparing the illustrative force postures and costs that they are not appropriate to use in discussion of notional military strategies. Specifically, the estimate for Pact sustainability, which was used to derive the lower bounds for US land forces, has a high degree of uncertainty. The substantive issue of non-US NATO sustainability beyond 30 days is avoided by assuming full NATO sustainability. In addition, naval forces should be structured to provide a balanced, flexible force capable of dealing with all aspects of naval warfare. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Ibid.