Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

29. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 4, 1977, 2–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• PRM–10

PARTICIPANTS

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Dep Secretary Charles W. Duncan
  • David E. McGiffert

• JCS

  • Lt Gen William Y. Smith

• State

  • Dep Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Leslie H. Gelb

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Robert Bowie

• OMB

  • Bert Lance
  • Edward R. Jayne II

• OSTP

  • Frank Press
  • John M. Marcum

• NSC

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Samuel Huntington
  • Victor Utgoff (first half)
  • James Thomson (second half)

Dr. Brzezinski began the meeting by commenting that the President had laid down four rules to be followed in subsequent NSC meetings:

1. Attendance at these meetings is limited to the principal plus one. If additional people are to attend, special arrangements must be made beforehand.

2. Extensive notes will only be taken by an NSC designated notetaker.

3. These notes will be kept on file at the NSC for review when required.

4. In the event of decisions or directions for follow-on work, the notes will be disaggregated and each of the principals will be given that part of the record on those decisions that affect him.

Mr. Gelb commented that his experience as a reporter suggested that leaks will not be stopped by these procedures. Because of these procedures we will pay a very high price: people with legitimate access to this information will not be able to get it; and the people who have been on top of the problem with the real technical expertise will be cut out of the meetings. This was a problem under which the Nixon Administration suffered.

Secretary Brown indicated that this was a reasonable step and that in fact we had no choice in the matter. Admiral Turner asked Mr. Gelb how, given his experience, he would suggest we cut down on leaks. Mr. Gelb said that in 3½ years as a reporter he never had any trouble getting any information. Thus, there is no need for extensive restrictions.

In response, Dr. Brzezinski agreed that the price could be high, but that it is very important that the leaks be stopped; and experience to date suggests that the probability of leaks is correlated with the size of the meeting.

Dr. Brzezinski then stated that the purpose of the meeting was to agree on the basic findings of the PRM–10 study, and on the guidelines and objectives that it supports. These agreements will form the basis for a Presidential Directive on PRM–10.

Dr. Brzezinski asked for comments on Section I of the August 2, 1977 Agenda Paper (attached)—Findings. Mr. Keeny felt that the word “many” in the third tic overstated the trends, and he also wondered what the word “areas” meant. Secretary Brown indicated that the word “areas” meant both geographical and military spheres. After some discussion, Mr. Christopher proposed that the word “many” be replaced by the word “several.” This was agreed. General Smith indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that the statement in the third tic that adverse trends “can be halted in Europe in the early 80’s if the appropriate programs are carried out” was probably too strong.

Dr. Brzezinski then turned the discussion to Section II of the Agenda Paper—Guidelines. Secretary Brown felt that use of the word “overriding” to modify US interests in Guideline 2 confused the sentence and gave it an interventionist flavor. Dr. Huntington indicated that, to the contrary, “overriding” was intended to qualify the statement not make it an open-ended advocation of intervention. After some discussion the guideline was altered to read: To prevent or counter Soviet use of military force to gain influence over other societies where US interest dictate.

Mr. Gelb suggested that Guideline 5 was too open-ended. He wondered whether “values” referred to human rights. Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Brown both felt that it did. Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Gelb if he understood correctly that State wants us to inform the President that the State Department does not feel that human rights should be taken into account in US policy. (Laughter)

Secretary Brown felt that Guideline 6 was too restrictive; it suggested strongly that the goals of meeting our military needs is subordinate to the goal of staying within desired budgetary constraints. He said we should be thinking about balancing our military requirements against other national priorities. Language along these lines was accepted.

Dr. Brzezinski then asked whether there was any problem with the first five of the objectives stated under Strategic Forces in Section III. Mr. Gelb felt that in addition to reaffirming our goal of promoting nuclear stability, as in Objective 5, we should also reaffirm US policy not to acquire a capability for disarming first strike. Secretary Brown was not sure that the term “disarming first strike” was well defined; for example, some people might argue that the Mark 12A did not give us a disarming first strike capability while at the same time they might argue that the SS–18 gave the Soviets a disarming first strike capability. Dr. Brzezinski felt that Mr. Gelb’s proposal was not really an objective but rather should be part of Guideline 1 in Section II. This proposal was accepted.

Secretary Brown felt that paragraph 6A should be restricted by the introductory clause “with available forces” so that it would be clear that this paragraph did not constitute acquisition guidance. He also proposed ending the sentence with a statement similar to that at the end of paragraph 6B to the effect that the US would like to maximize resultant power relative to the enemy in a nuclear conflict. After extensive discussion on the wording at the end of the paragraph, the group finally agreed to language for paragraph 6A, stating that “if control of escalation fails, US policy is to terminate the conflict on favorable terms.”

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the Guidance Section, paragraph III B1. Secretary Brown felt that “essential equivalence” means more than simply balancing certain key indices. He thought the problem was more than one of numbers. In particular, he felt that the guidance should read that the US would “exceed or balance the Soviet Union in certain key indices and capabilities.” This change was accepted.

Dr. Brzezinski then turned the discussion to paragraph III B2, in which three alternative paragraphs were displayed. Dr. Brzezinski wondered why [1 line not declassified] for destruction. Secretary Brown felt that paragraph 2A was too specific. He believed that the President did not need to be so specific at this stage and that more work needed to be done on this question. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that paragraph 2B would be more acceptable if it were more specific: for example, it should state the sorts of targets that the Secretary of Defense should investigate; also, we should examine the utility of attacking [less than 1 line not declassified]. Mr. Gelb pointed out that NSDM 242² does not call for [2 lines not declassified] targets. Dr. Brzezinski stated that the NSDM 242 guidance was exactly what he wanted to reexamine. Secretary Brown pointed out that while in the past [2 lines not declassified]. Dr. Brzezinski said that, while we are all uncomfortable about this problem, we cannot avoid thinking about it. He also felt that paragraph 2B should contain language specifying illustrative percents of damage that should be studied. The language should not be restrictive, rather it should provide examples. The Secretary of Defense should consider the relative strategic advantages of targeting say 70% of the economic targets, [less than 1 line not declassified] and so forth. Secretary Brown stated that he was willing to look at soft military targets as well. Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Brown agreed that this work would be completed on about January 1, 1978. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that the NSC would provide more guidance on this study.

The discussion then turned to paragraph III B3. Secretary Brown proposed that the last sentence of the paragraph, the one reading “additional forces should not be acquired for this purpose,” should be scrapped. General Smith and Dr. Brzezinski agreed; and there were no objections to its elimination.

On paragraph III B4, Mr. Jayne pointed out that the last sentence, about maintaining “at least the current level of time urgent hard target kill capability,” was ambiguous. Secretary Brown interpreted the sentence to mean that if the Soviets can harden their targets more, then we will be forced to increase our capability to knock them out. In essence he thought the sentence said “don’t dismantle what you have got, but don’t make any big increases either.” Dr. Huntington indicated that that was the intent.

When the discussion turned to paragraph III B5, Dr. Brown objected to the language of the first sentence, which he felt would keep us from defending against air attack from Cuba. We want to do more than surveillance; we want to deny the Soviets a free ride. He proposed the addition of the words “and control” after surveillance and before “of US air space.” Mr. Keeny felt the statement was open-ended. But all agreed to insert the phrase.

On paragraph III B6, Dr. Brzezinski objected to the complexity of paragraph 6B. Following a suggestion of Mr. Christopher, the group agreed to add the phrase “subject to further analysis by the Secretary of Defense” before the sentence of paragraph 6A.

In discussing paragraph III B7, Admiral Turner proposed the addition of the words “and targeting capability” at the end of the sentence “The US will maintain a secure reserve force.” He pointed out that [1 line not declassified] after the first nuclear exchange. Dr. Press asked Admiral Turner whether he meant that we needed a damage assessment capability. In response, Admiral Turner said that you needed to know what you have done in your initial attack, what you have not done, and what you need to do with your reserve force. Dr. Brown felt that we have not even begun to think about this problem. Mr. Jayne and Mr. Keeny felt that to insert such language would be to make a major programmatic decision. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that an analysis was needed and one should be called for in the document. The NSC Staff was directed to draft appropriate language.

Having finished the strategic forces section, Dr. Brzezinski then turned to Section IV, General Purpose Forces. The group agreed to paragraph A1. Dr. Brzezinski said that paragraph A2 posed a difficult and serious issue. Dr. Brown explained the problem: do you buy forces separately for a contingency such as the Persian Gulf; or do you simply take the forces you need for the contingency from those you bought for NATO? But if you do not buy the forces separately, you will create a disfunction in the NATO force: that is, the NATO force will not be configured for a NATO war. In addition, just when you want to send the Persian Gulf force into action you find yourself drawing down on your NATO force at the time you least want to do it.

Mr. Gelb wondered whether it was not possible to buy some forces on a separate basis but not the others—such as logistical support, tactical air and navies. Secretary Brown felt that if you plan forces that way, you might not find much of a need for a navy. Mr. Gelb wondered whether there was not a difference between an add-on land capability and an add-on logistical or tactical air capability because the latter can be moved around much more rapidly than the former. Secretary Brown and General Smith agreed with that description but stated that there would be the risk of drawing down on forces that you required for the NATO contingency. Mr. Jayne felt that the issue was constrained by resources: we would like to have a lot of capability, but cannot afford it; we should take the issue to the President and tell him the price. Secretary Brown and General Smith felt that the price tag was not the whole story: there is the issue of how the forces are configured; for example if we want to fight outside of Europe, we don’t want all our Army units to be heavy.

Dr. Brzezinski felt that a serious issue in the future is the likelihood of our access to foreign bases. He said this might mean we need a larger air transport and naval capability then we have at present. Secretary Brown stated that such capability was included in the light intervention capability of the PRM–10 report. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that these capabilities be explicitly mentioned in the guidance, because this is an important issue over the long-term. Dr. Brown proposed the phrase “strategic mobility independent of overseas base support.” This language was accepted.

Mr. Gelb asked again whether we wanted to buy extra forces for the purposes of local wars. Dr. Brzezinski thought that we did; and he proposed that the Second Division might be used for this purpose.

On NATO, Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the group agree on points IV B1 and B2.

Secretary Brown raised an issue with regard to paragraph IV B4. He pointed out that present planning guidance called for 180 days of stock. He felt that such numbers as 90 days or 180 days were meaningless unless you also specified the consumption rates. He proposed that the first sentence of paragraph 4 be left vague; “in order for the US to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its Allies, the planning guidance will be reviewed following . . .” This proposal was accepted.

Discussion then moved to Section V, Further Studies. Secretary Brown wondered why all of the further studies must be military studies, when the PRM–10 report covered political, economic and other aspects as well. He felt that the whole section should be eliminated. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that the section simply read “further studies would be carried out under NSC direction.” Secretary Brown agreed. Secretary Brown pointed out that many of the studies would occur in any event since the Departments would want to undertake them. Dr. Brzezinski said that he took that as a given, but that the NSC may want to guide the studies. Secretary Brown felt that the studies should be listed in order of priority. He said that his Department was choking already on work. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that a working group would be convened later to discuss the matter.

In closing the meeting, Dr. Brzezinski stated that he believed it had accomplished a great deal.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council³

Washington, undated

SCC AGENDA PAPER

I. Findings

The studies authorized by PRM/NSC–10 have found that:

— A rough overall equivalence with some asymmetries exists in military capabilities between the US and the Soviet Union.

— The US remains significantly ahead of the USSR in most non-military aspects of national power.

— The trends in many areas have been against the US, but significant adverse trends in strategic forces and in conventional forces in Europe can be halted in the early 1980’s if appropriate programs are carried out.

— The US can capitalize on its advantages in economic power, diplomatic resources, technology, political-ideological action, and force projection capabilities, in countering adverse Soviet influence.

II. Guidelines

In view of these findings, in the current era of US-Soviet relations US strategy will be:

1. To maintain an overall balance of military power between the US and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies at least as favorable as that which now exists, taking into account the increasing relevance of conventional forces under conditions of essential strategic nuclear equivalence.

2. To prevent or counter Soviet use of military force to gain influence over other societies except where overriding US interests dictate otherwise.

3. To attempt to achieve the goals stated in paragraphs 1 and 2, in collaboration with our allies, through cooperation and agreements with the USSR when possible and through appropriate actions and programs when such agreements prove impossible.

4. To enlist the participation of the USSR in international institutions and to secure Soviet cooperation in achieving solutions to global economic, social, and resource problems.

5. To take political, economic, diplomatic and ideological initiatives in cooperation with our allies to reduce Soviet influence in and control over other societies where that influence adversely affects US interests or values.

6. Within approved budgetary constraints, to direct US military strategy and forces to the following goals.

III. Strategic Forces

A. Objectives

US strategic forces will be designed:

1. To deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US.

2. In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, to enhance deterrence of non-nuclear aggression, particularly by the Soviet Union against NATO and our Asian allies.

3. To insure that the Soviet Union cannot use strategic forces for political leverage and coercion and that the state of the strategic balance will not deter the US from taking conventional military actions where its interests dictate.

4. To maintain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union.

5. To promote nuclear stability, especially in times of crisis.

6a. If nuclear conflict occurs, to control escalation, provide options for flexible and limited retaliatory responses, limit damage to the extent possible and consistent with the objectives listed above, and terminate the conflict quickly on acceptable terms.

6b. If nuclear conflict occurs, to control escalation, provide options for flexible and limited retaliatory responses, limit damage to the extent possible and consistent with the objectives listed above, and terminate the conflict quickly on terms which maximize the resultant political, economic, and military power of the US relative to the enemy in the postwar period in order to preclude enemy domination.

B. Guidance

1. To ensure essential equivalence with the Soviet Union, the US will maintain nuclear force levels, within the context of any SALT agreement, that exceed or balance the Soviet Union in certain key indices. The balance in these indices can be achieved either by matching the Soviet Union in those measures or by exploiting US advantages which offset those enjoyed by the Soviets.

2a. The US will maintain the nuclear forces to destroy 70% of all identified Soviet economic recovery resources, [15 lines not declassified].

2b. The Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommend targeting criteria for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending the completion of this review, the US will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.

2c. The Secretary of Defense will review current targeting policy and recommend targeting criteria and acquisition policy for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending the completion of this review, the US will continue to employ forces according to NSDM 242.

3. [2 lines not declassified] Additional forces should not be acquired for this purpose; forces acquired for other purposes should have the characteristics necessary to respond flexibly.

4. The specific amount of hard-target kill capability the US should maintain and for what strategic purposes should receive further study by the Secretary of Defense. This review and the recommendations flowing therefrom should be submitted for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. Pending completion of this review, the US will maintain at least the current level of time-urgent hard-target kill capability.

5. The US will maintain the capability to provide attack warning and assessment and to insure adequate surveillance of US airspace. In addition, US R&D efforts in the area of active defenses should guard against possible Soviet technological breakthroughs or abrogation of the ABM Treaty and maintain those technology programs necessary to assess and respond to Soviet strategic defense initiatives, as appropriate.

6a. The US will continue to maintain a diversity of nuclear forces through the three legs of a TRIAD.

6b. The US will maintain a high overall level of invulnerability in its strategic force posture, with a diverse mix of systems designed to provide high condence [confidence?] of surviving attacks, penetrating defenses, and guarding against the technological breakthroughs by an adversary and unanticipated failure of one type of system to perform as required.

7. The US will maintain a secure reserve force. This force will be taken from those acquired for other purposes pending an analysis by the Secretary of Defense.

IV. General Purpose Forces

A. General

1. The US will maintain a level of general purpose forces, in conjunction with those of its allies, sufficient to wage a major conventional war with the USSR and its allies. Planning will focus on Europe, but also will provide for the defense of major US and allied interests outside of Europe, including the protection of lines of communication and access to critical raw materials vital to the economies of the US and its allies.

2a. In addition to the capability to prosecute a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, the US will maintain a light intervention force with a forcible entry capability (i.e., logistical support, moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces) for use anywhere in the world. These specific forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR and based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea. Forces needed beyond those maintained for such contingencies will be drawn from forces in CONUS that are oriented primarily toward the NATO/Warsaw Pact war but have flexibility for use elsewhere.

2b. The US will maintain a light intervention force with a forcible entry capability (i.e., logistical support, moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces) for use anywhere in the world. These specific forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR and based on an analysis of requirements in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Korea. Forces needed for these contingencies will be drawn from forces in CONUS that are oriented primarily toward the NATO/Warsaw Pact war but have flexibility for use elsewhere. Within these forces the US will maintain whatever special capability is required for intervention contingencies.

B. NATO

1. The US reaffirms NATO strategy as expressed in MC–14/3.⁴ Deterrence and defense in the NATO areas will continue to rely on a combination of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. US policy will emphasize the strengthening of conventional forces for deterrence and defense.

2. Consonant with present NATO strategy, including forward defense, the US is committed to having the capability, in conjunction with its allies, to stop a Warsaw Pact attack with minimum loss of territory and ultimately to restore prewar boundaries.

3. Consistent with the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, US forces, in conjunction with those of its NATO allies, will be capable of responding to a full spectrum of hostilities—from reinforced attack to war following a period of extensive mobilization—recognizing the need to seek, within resource constraints, an optimum mix of capabilities along the spectrum.

4. The US will plan on sustaining a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies for a minimum of 90 days. The ninety day planning guidance will be reviewed following (1) an evaluation of Warsaw Pact capabilities to sustain combat, (2) consultations with the NATO allies concerning their acceptance of this guidance goal, (3) a review of the relative trade-offs between early combat capability and capability to sustain extended conflict, and (4) an examination of the implications of alternative US/NATO mobilization and industrial preparedness postures.

5. US will meet its commitment to its allies to raise the level of defense spending by approximately 3% per year in real terms.

C. Asia

With the exception of the withdrawals from Korea directed in PD/NSC–12,⁵ the US will maintain approximately the current level of forces deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability, to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests and meet treaty commitments in the event of aggression.

V. Further Studies

To provide additional guidance, further studies will be carried out. The subjects to be studied will include, but not necessarily be limited to: nuclear targeting criteria; Soviet Union efficient hard-target-kill capability and the diversity and mutual reinforcement required in US strategic forces; the strategic implications of civil defense; the requirements of a secure reserve force; the purposes and structure of US theater nuclear forces; US force requirements for local wars; Persian Gulf security; Warsaw Pact and non-US NATO capability to sustain conventional conflict and the relative trade-offs for NATO between early combat capability and the capability to sustain extended conflict; US and Allied manpower and industrial mobilization capabilities; and the requirements for US maritime forces.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Huntington, Box 58, PRM–10: (SCC 8/4/77 Meeting): 7–8/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. National Security Decision Memorandum 242, “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” was signed by President Gerald Ford on January 17, 1974. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 31.
3. Secret.
4. On January 16, 1968, the NATO Defense Planning Committee adopted NATO’s Military Committee’s report, MC 14/3, as an overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. MC 14/3 stated that theater nuclear forces were meant to deter conventional attacks and, if deterrence failed, to respond to attacks and to confront the enemy with escalation of the conflict. (Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969 (Brussels: NATO, 1997), pp. 345–370)
5. Carter signed PD/NSC–12, “U.S. Policy in Korea,” on May 5, 1977. (Carter Library, Presidential Directives, PD–12)