Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

27. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 13, 1977

Secretary Brown opened the meeting by describing its purpose; i.e., to review that portion of the PRM–10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Review that deals with strategic forces. He noted that while the subject of strategic forces was not quite so sprawling as general purpose forces, it was still not quite so simple as some, included himself, pretended. He called attention to the paper prepared on this subject that focused on US objectives for strategic forces, namely:

— Deterrence of attack on US, its forces, and our Allies.

— The control of escalation and the limitation of damage to the degree possible if deterrence fails.

— Avoiding the perception of an imbalance in the strategic forces in order to inhibit efforts at coercion of the US and its Allies.

Secretary Brown noted that consideration of how to satisfy these objectives and the accompanying illustrative forces had produced a series of questions for consideration specifically:

— To what extent should US forces be procured to achieve these objectives; in particular, to avoid perceptions of a US/Soviet asymmetry that would have no military significance but could have political significance.

— What is needed to deter Soviet conventional and nuclear aggression.

— With relation to the first and second of these questions, the degree to which the US should procure hard target kill capability and the dangers to stability which might result. This was not simply a question of all or nothing, since we could want some hard target kill capability vice an efficient hard target kill capability (i.e., the ability to put all Soviet ICBMs at risk).

— How much defensive capability to limit damage should be procured since offensive forces cannot do this job.

— The need for a strategic reserve force.

— What our declaratory policy should be with respect to strategic forces.

— The relationship between strategic and general purpose forces.

He noted that we are now talking about parity in overall US/Soviet military capabilities in contrast to the situation in the early 1960’s where US had a clear strategic advantage. Among the issues that arise in the current situation are such things whether to have a Dyad or a Triad, how to respond to certain Soviet advantages, whether we should match them or somehow compensate for them, and furthermore, whether we should match them in military capability or simply in perceived capability. He noted that if we look at real scenarios, then such issues as command and control and attack assessment become as important, if not more important, than some of the actual numbers of strategic systems.

He then asked the various agency representatives what their views were of the current strategic situation and the issues under consideration.

Warren Christopher responded by focusing his comments on the political sufficiency question. He said that our goals should be overall equivalence in strategic forces, and that as long as we had overall equivalence, we could tolerate asymmetries in some particular measures. He said that in looking back to the time when we had true superiority in strategic systems, there was really no great change between that and today in terms of our ability to conduct foreign policy. This raised the question of even if we tried to buy superiority, whether it would justify the expense of buying it in terms of what it did for us. He said that the Chinese want us to be stronger, but that by and large as long as we maintain equivalence, we were able to carry out our foreign policy effectively. He noted that it was also important not to boast, but rather to be confident in proclaiming the situation of overall parity, since many countries would become concerned if we became more modest about our capabilities; therefore, we should speak confidently about them.

Charles Duncan concurred in this view and emphasized that we should have rough equivalence not only in perceived capability but in real capability—particularly in terms of our retaliatory capability in a second-strike situation. Secretary Brown noted that we all probably could agree on this general approach, but that the disagreement came in terms of how much insurance to have in some of these situations, how to count civil defense, etc.

Dave McGiffert indicated that he was particularly concerned about the question of hard target capability and the implications of our pursuing any efficient hard target capability in terms of stability. Secretary Brown noted that if the Soviets had a hard target capability, it would be destabilized. McGiffert responded that it would be more destabilizing if both had an efficient hard target capability. He noted that there were complications even if we pursued a limited hard target capability, since, even though it might be seen as limited by the Soviets, third countries may perceive it as a sign of weakness compared to the Soviets.

Secretary Brown noted that we could obtain a limited number of highly accurate weapons and not have an efficient hard target capability—which would complicate the plans of an attacker. He noted the problem, however, of how the other side might perceive the capability. [3 lines not declassified] But if the Soviets behave as we do and end up calculating 100% reliability and 100% kill probability, then in their eyes we would have an efficient hard target kill capability against their silos.

Randy Jayne noted that, as Dr. Brzezinski had mentioned with respect to general purpose forces, there was nothing wrong with having some ambiguities in terms of force capability. However, there was a question of how this was presented both internally and externally in terms of our saying what capability we do have.

Secretary Brown noted that there was a risk in overstating capability since the Soviets might respond with what they perceive to be a capability equal to our puffed-up capability and then the whole situation goes unstable. General Brown noted that he had trouble believing that the Soviets believe everything that they hear about US capabilities since they very closely follow what actually goes on in Congress and through the newspapers and that in reality we do not fool them with any public statements that might be exaggerated. Secretary Brown noted that while we do not fool them with the actual numbers, there still is uncertainty in their estimates of our capability and, in particular, how we would use it. General Brown concurred in this noting that some cases we do not even know ourselves how we would use it.

Secretary Brown then asked Robert Bowie to comment on how the Soviets see the strategic balance, how the rest of the world and, in particular, our European Allies see it, and what the Soviets are trying to do with their strategic systems. Bob Bowie indicated that the Soviets probably also think there is a rough balance in strategic systems at this time, and that our chief Allies also see the situation to be a rough equivalence in strategic systems. However, there is a strong difference of opinion on just what the Soviets are doing. He noted that the ongoing improvements in Soviet ICBM capability did not appear to us as reflecting an attitude of seeking assured destruction, but rather that they were seeking war-fighting capabilities; however, this is not necessarily how they see it. We assume that they should go for the types of weapons suitable for strategic objectives similar to ours; however, it is not clear just how they see the strategic situation.

Secretary Brown noted that if it is their idea that one must have war-fighting capability for deterrence, then they might not be deterred unless we also have war-fighting capability.

Bob Bowie noted that there are differences of views on this question. Some believe they might take more risks in their behavior if we do not counter such things as their improved war-fighting capability. Even if the Soviets achieve some superiority, they are still unlikely to see nuclear war as a desirable thing; nevertheless, from a political standpoint, they might see less risk in other activities. He noted that there are a fair number of people in the intelligence agencies who see the current situation in these terms.

Spurgeon Keeny noted that he agreed that the real purpose of strategic forces was to deter nuclear war, and the key to this was having assured retaliatory capability. At the same time, there was also a need to maintain a perceived balance in strategic forces such as currently existed. Secretary Brown injected that Soviets today had more capability in some areas. Keeny responded that both sides do—that no one is ahead in all individual categories. With respect to the Soviets’ obsession for improving their ICBM forces, he noted that some of the questions at issue went beyond assured destruction and into war-fighting capability on the US side as well. He noted that some of the Soviet talk and thinking about what we perceive as dangerous can also be found reflected in our own military forces and thinking.

Secretary Brown said that we have in our current defense guidance a directive that if deterrence fails, we should limit damage to the extent possible. He noted that our plans for damage limitation were based almost entirely upon the objective of limiting escalation. The objective is to give the Soviets an incentive not to wipe out population. However, we have no useful plan in military terms for actually limiting damage to the US. This may be true as well in the Soviet Union, but this is dubious in light of their large air defense system and their uncertain civil defense capability.

General Brown noted that the war planners would welcome some way to limit damage; however, it appears to defy solution to limit damage through weaponry given what we have and what they have. Secretary Brown noted that we are staying away from both active and passive defenses, whereas they are continuing to pursue such defenses except for ABM. However, there really may not be any significant difference in the damage limiting capability of the two sides.

Spurgeon Keeny commented that they had much the same problem as General Brown had described on their side with large yield weapons opposite them. Secretary Brown noted that our damage limiting capability was confined to limited targeting on the Soviet Union.

General Brown said that the latest C3 study indicated that the Soviets may not be able to distinguish between the limited attack and a full-scale attack on the Soviet Union. Secretary Brown offered the view that their very hard command and control indicates a concern about continuity during a war. While this would probably be useless in a full-scale war, the question is whether they think so. Spurgeon Keeny noted that we have an airborne command and control post from which someone could draw the same conclusions. Secretary Brown said that this was not meant simply to save the members of the Democratic Party. The important question was not that the Soviets would be able to succeed at saving the leadership but rather how they perceive the situation.

Bob Bowie said that he was impressed by the Soviet civil defense effort. [3 lines not declassified] the Soviets have a long-term civil defense program. [3 lines not declassified]

General Brown indicated that it was not our goal to match Soviet forces except in some areas, and that we had worked to offset certain Soviet capabilities and intended to continue to do so. He emphasized that we needed an adequate number of improved systems in order to maintain the balance in the light of the Soviet advances in recent years. On the political sufficiency point, while there was no distinct advantage in having superiority as opposed to equivalence, if it turns around and the Soviets achieve preponderance in strategic forces, we might suffer severe consequences. He emphasized that we needed to maintain the strategic balance, since otherwise the Soviets might ask us to leave Europe. He also emphasized the importance of a strategic reserve force; however, the size was debatable in that at present, the JCS had no fixed notion of what the size of this force should be. He noted that our hard-target kill capability is important to respond to selected attacks against the US and also in terms of the capability it gives us if deterrence fails. He indicated that there were other key elements that we needed to take into account such as command and control.

David Aaron indicated that he did not share the assessment that our superiority was of no use to us in the past. He noted that in the early 1960’s, we had a situation in terms of ground forces which was worse than today and, that as a consequence, our strategic nuclear superiority was an important factor.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that it was also an important factor in Cuba and permitted us to use our conventional forces with immunity. Secretary Brown noted that he was in on the Cuban situation and was skeptical as to the importance of our strategic superiority in that situation. Dr. Brzezinski questioned whether we would have gone into Cuba without such superiority and raised the question of how we would respond today if, for example, the Soviets took Berlin. Secretary Brown noted that Curtis LeMay had told the President at the time of the Cuban crisis that the Soviets would have the capability of killing tens of millions of Americans. Dr. Brzezinski responded that we could have killed 50 to 60 million Russians. The question was what would happen today if Brezhnev said he was going to take Berlin—would we simply say that we were going to talk. Secretary Brown said he continued to disagree, but that for now at least, it was simply an academic question.

David Aaron said that in the early 1960’s, the strategic situation was a function of two curves that were climbing at different rates. At the time, they had very little but were increasing in capability. He questioned whether this was the same as a situation in which both have a great deal of forces and whether it is deaths that matter on the two sides or hard-target kill capability or is it really the capability to limit damage. He indicated that nuclear weapons do not help Clausowitz out very much since there is very little political utility in a major nuclear exchange. He said we need to look at specific problems such as:

— What amount of hard-target capability we should have.

— What the response should be to the increasing vulnerability of the land-based ICBM force.

— The question of command and control which could be crucial and has not been focused on enough as well.

— The question of a reserve force.

He said that once we were through with these questions, then we should ask whether forces are equivalent on the two sides.

Warren Christopher indicated that what he had questioned was whether there was enough of an advantage in superiority for it to be worth the cost.

Secretary Brown noted that a fatality level of 100 million was much more significant than a fatality level of 10 million. David Aaron said that he was not arguing about the finite detail of questions such as these, but rather wondered whether we might still have a perceptions problem even if we solve our military and strategic problems. Secretary Brown noted that even if one side suffered 10 million casualties and another 100 million, there still might be deterrence, but deterrence was not as clear and certain when there was a substantial difference in fatalities. David Aaron noted that this emphasized the need for getting a good fix on civil defense.

Dr. Brzezinski, in reflecting on the discussion in the previous two meetings, noted that while we were generally confident about being equivalent with the Soviets in a large sense at the present time, we were concerned about certain trends where we did face some dangers. This emphasized the need for long-range force projections. In addition to the deterrence of Soviet attack on the US, we also wanted to prevent the Soviets from compelling others. In this sense, we needed an umbrella under which we could conduct limited military actions. For example, in the future we might need limited hard-target kill capability in the event of some type of nuclear exchange. He noted that it was most important that we buy an effective and credible countervalue capability and that we adopt a posture which concentrates on attacking Russian countervalue targets as opposed to all targets in the Soviet Union. Secretary Brown noted that this was more selective than even the neutron bomb.

[5 paragraphs (37 lines) not declassified]

David Aaron asked whether the Soviets show any priority for protecting great Russians as opposed to others. Bob Bowie said it was hard to say about that. Randy Jayne indicated that he thought the civil defense activity correlated with new construction. Dave McGiffert said that it was the situations in which the population walks into the countryside that really affected the results.

Spurgeon Keeny said that no one had really calculated what happens in terms of fatalities after the initial exchange. Bob Bowie said that Herman Kahn had done some assessment of this problem in his Country A-Country B studies and had indicated the view that he thought that people could survive. Secretary Brown said that was because Kahn stores his own sustenance.

Secretary Brown asked that in the time remaining that the group should talk about certain questions with respect to weapons systems, such as the question of the Triad versus a Dyad versus an augmented Triad, as well as the question of how sure we are of how our systems will actually perform. Dr. Brzezinski asked how sure the Soviets are about the performance of their systems. Secretary Brown said that both sides had similar problems in terms of the destruction of systems before launch, defensive actions, both passive and active, etc. He noted there was also the question of to what extent the creation of a new weapons system changed perceptions in a way that was favorable to us. Dr. Brzezinski raised the question whether this depends on what accuracy new systems might have. Secretary Brown noted that such questions affect both deterrence and hard-target capability.

Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that he thought that deterrence should focus on population and countervalue targets rather than on counterforce capability. He indicated that he thought that continuing to have a Triad made more sense since it permitted the US to mix the threat as well as to provide some selection in terms of lower level responses where the other side would not know where an attack might be coming from.

David Aaron asked whether the real Triad question was not simply what we should do about ICBM survivability as distinct from the hard-target question. He thought it made no sense to make a great investment in a force which was increasing in vulnerability. Secretary Brown said that in this context, a mobile ICBM made sense. In addition, as long as we get warning, the other side has to account for the possibility that we might launch under attack—systems that might not be as good because of their vulnerability were not necessarily useless. However, vulnerability does affect stability especially in situations of high tension. If both sides have good assurance that their systems will survive, then the situation is more stable.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

David Aaron wondered whether we would be satisfied with the answer of launch-on-warning in terms of stability and deterrence. There was also important command control questions. In any event, there was some question about whether it made any sense to put M–X in silos.

Secretary Brown indicated that we use to feel stronger than we feel now. In terms of Soviet actions, there was some question if the Soviets would count on us to not fire before they would take out our ICBMs. David Aaron noted that this is basically a question of the credibility of our posture.

Sam Huntington noted that our high level of readiness would tend to increase the Soviet perception that we might fire on warning. Secretary Brown agreed with this, noting that the current low state of readiness of Soviet strategic forces indicated that they are going to count on strategic warning. David Aaron indicated that there would be more value in putting our resources in better attack assessment capability or in command and control rather than put any more dollars into a force that is increasing in vulnerability.

Secretary Brown said that we could fill out the Minuteman II force with Minuteman IIIs and in 10 years probably do as well as the Soviets in terms of counterforce capability—but we are not going that way. George Brown noted that the M–X gave us advantage of not only an improvement in throw weight but also an improvement in accuracy.

Dr. Brzezinski indicated that we should look closer at the constraints that are currently in existence on US targeting. General Brown said that we are looking at 242 and the supporting documents, and that in his view the command and control side needed more emphasis. This is being done through WMCCS (Worldwide Military Command and Control System) and that we are making some progress in improving command and control—but that it is a very ambitious five-year plan that existed. Secretary Brown noted that the strategic part was only a piece of this.

General Brown indicated that WMCCS does provide some SIOP support, but that on the warning side, we did need to do more; specifically, we needed to look thoroughly at development of a capability to see at night from space.

Spurgeon Keeny said that the Soviet hard-target capability clearly is disturbing, although somewhat exaggerated. He said that hard-target capability does not buy us as much from an arms control or strategic standpoint and, that although this was a troublesome direction which Soviet forces were taking, it may be a manageable situation. In the context of the study, he tended to favor Substrategy 2 to be achieved with an augmented Dyad in which we would keep the fixed Minuteman sites but put future expenditures into our submarine-launched and airborne capability; in particular, ALCMs on aircraft and general improvements in the SLBM force. He noted that within the existing Minuteman force, we had available all the hard-target capability we would need for unforeseen contingencies and that we had the NS–20 and/or even the AIRS if we needed it. This would give us a substantial hard-target capability but not enough to wipe out the Soviet ICBM force.

Secretary Brown asked what we do when the Minuteman became 11 years old—whether we would then reopen the Minuteman line. Spurgeon Keeny responded that it would be better to reopen the Minuteman III line as opposed to building the M–X. He argued that to the extent that the emerging Soviet hard-target capability was real, it certainty would be unwise to put M–X in silos and mobile M–X created a serious problem of acceptability in this country as well as in terms of its impact on SALT.

General Brown indicated that the alternative basing approach for M–X might be acceptable. Spurgeon Keeny noted that this approach raised serious concerns about SALT compliance.

Secretary Brown noted that the M–X mobile question needs a lot more careful examination. He indicated that he had been of each mind with respect to mobiles and really did not know where he stood on this issue right now.

Randy Jayne noted that with respect to the Triad, the three legged beast had emerged as a result of concerns about vulnerability which may have been outgrown by now. For example, there was now no Soviet ABM threat. In addition, we do have potential for developing accurate SLBMs as well as having an airborne force with a capability that will keep us comfortable for some time. Thus, it may be that we will have a mix of forces that does not have requirement for equality in the Triad.

Secretary Brown noted that if we do go to a Dyad, it is clear that the force that will be dropped would be the ICBMs. However, this force had much better command and control than the submarines. Randy Jayne noted that we might be giving up something in perceptions if we talk about an augmented Dyad as opposed to a Triad; therefore, we should not apologize for the capabilities of our Minuteman force.

General Brown emphasized that under the ABM Treaty, while deployment was severely restricted, there were no constraints on testing and that the Soviet Union had continued a vigorous programming that was a cause for concern. Secretary Brown asked whether we were concerned that they might back out of the treaty to which General Brown replied, in the affirmative.

Dave McGiffert indicated that he was sympathetic with the views that David Aaron had expressed and that he did not see how from the Soviet point of view, they would be concerned about the risk of our launching vulnerable assets on warning as distinct from launching invulnerable assets on warning. Charles Duncan raised the question of how long the Minuteman IIIs would be viable. General Brown indicated that we were finding some cracks in the engines. Charles Duncan asked whether this could be fixed through maintenance to which General Brown answered that he thought so but that in some cases we may have to build new propulsion systems which could be done.

Duncan then raised the question of what the impact would be in the future when we would not have the cruise missile advantage we have today. Secretary Brown indicated that in terms of how things would look in 1990, the cruise missiles on B–52s would badly undercut the Soviet expenditure of 15 billion dollars a year on air defenses. Although cruise missiles do not add that much to existing bomber capability, a cruise missile force will be viable for a much longer period of time. In addition, cruise missiles on large cruise missile carriers would even further counter Soviet air defenses.

Duncan said that in the future, we would become very dependent on Trident. Secretary Brown noted that we would also be dependent on getting within 2500 km of Soviet targets with ALCMs. Spurgeon Keeny noted that these developments did not increase our hard-target capability but do increase our threat against the Soviet Union.

David Aaron asked why we don’t think in terms of a five to six thousand mile cruise missile. Secretary Brown indicated that he had been looking at this option and had found that with a vehicle of about 50,000 pounds, you could deliver a few megatons to intercontinental ranges. Such a vehicle could virtually fit in a beer truck, but it is prohibited in the current Geneva Joint Draft Text. General Brown recalled that we had a couple of squadrons of intercontinental cruise missiles in Maine, the SNARK. [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Brown indicated that this was just one of the number of new possibilities that should be looked at carefully and that by 1990 he thought we could come up with a number of new things of interest. David Aaron noted that in SALT, we were trying to get reductions and get control of new missile systems. Secretary Brown indicated that this was because of some concern about foreclosing options that could be of interest in the future. David Aaron noted that he was impressed by our ability to backtrack on such issues.

Spurgeon Keeny said that we should look at SALT as a vehicle for limiting the threat to strategic systems.

Secretary Brown noted there was a fundamental difference between the US and the Soviet Union with respect to the cruise missiles. The Soviet Union does not need cruise missiles, whereas the US needs cruise missiles as a way of negating Soviet air defense advantages; there was no particular advantage to the Soviets in putting cruise missiles on the Bison, the Bear, or the Backfire. He noted that improvements in command and control and targeting doctrine were also additional options for the 1980’s. He said that these issues were being studied in DOD, but that we would not try and subvert the process of interagency review of such issues.

Bob Bowie noted that in the longer term, we should look at the potential for Soviet actions that could be of concern.

Warren Christopher noted that from a foreign policy standpoint, that the State Department perceived some risk in moving from a Triad to a Dyad.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 28, INT Documents: #5000s–#5100s: 7–8/77. Top Secret. According to the Summary of Conclusions, the meeting began at 2 p.m. and took place in the White House Situation Room. The participants were Warren Christopher and David Gompert from the Department of State; Harold Brown, Charles Duncan, David McGiffert and Lynn Davis from the Department of Defense; George Brown and William Smith from the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert Bowie from the Central Intelligence Agency; Randy Jayne, from the Office of Management and Budget; Spurgeon Keeny and Robert Behr from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, Samuel Huntington, Victor Utgoff, and Roger Molander from the National Security Council. (Ibid.)