The President has asked for clearer charts on the strategic balance and
additional charts that portrayed the balance with and without SALT and with and without MX. DoD has
cooperated with the DCI in responding
to this request. As part of this effort, my staff developed the attached
strategic force comparisons that give a clear picture of the strategic
balance, the importance of SALT, and
the contribution of MX.
In particular, we include the results of various U.S. program responses
to the Soviet increases that the Intelligence community projects beyond
their SALT-limited forces in the
No-SALT case. These projected U.S.
program increases are derived from DoD judgments on force-planning, and
not from approved levels nor from Intelligence estimates. Thus, they are
not suitable for an NIE. But they are
critical to an understanding of the issues.
I believe the President will find these comparisons informative and
useful in any dealings with Congress.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense2
STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISONS
Summary
The charts that follow compare U.S. and Soviet central strategic
forces with and without a SALT II
agreement. In both cases, the contribution of MX to the strategic
balance is highlighted. We have used
[Page 853]
the “moderate” estimates of Soviet forces
contained in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).3
The moderate Soviet force with a new 10–RV ICBM is compared with currently programmed U.S. forces
for SALT-limited cases. For the
No-SALT cases, projected
Soviet forces are compared with two U.S. force alternatives: (1) a
minimum U.S. reaction that expands MX and retains all older systems;
and (2) a larger U.S. force buildup that includes extensive bomber
force modernization.
With SALT
- •
- Our current plans would retain the U.S. lead in warhead
numbers and arrest the negative trends in other static
indicators such as equivalent megatons and hard target
kill.
- •
- When compared with the static indicators, the U.S. position
would be somewhat more favorable in the balance of forces that
survive an initial counterforce exchange, particularly if forces
are on generated alert when the strategic conflict
begins.
- •
- The capability of surviving U.S. forces to retaliate against
economic and non-silo military targets in the Soviet Union would
increase steadily after 1981, due primarily to programmed
improvements in the submarine and bomber forces.
Without SALT
- •
- The Soviets are projected to increase their strategic forces
substantially if SALT II
limits are not observed. In the absence of a U.S. response, the
pre-exchange balance indicators would continue their current
adverse trend. The post-exchange balance would also shift to the
Soviets’ advantage. However, our capability to devastate Soviet
economic and non-silo military targets would degrade only
modestly from the SALT
case.
- •
- The U.S. could add to its planned strategic forces to deny the
Soviets a clear advantage in the strategic balance. However,
such programs would require substantial new funding for
increased strategic forces and production of nuclear materials,
just as would the Soviet increases beyond SALT levels.
MX
- •
- Deployment of MX in multiple protective shelters (MPS) would reverse currently
unfavorable trends in the strategic balance, with or without a
SALT II agreement. In the
No-SALT case, however,
this reversal would require a larger and more costly MX
program.
- •
- MX would present the Soviets with a difficult choice between
allocating a large number of ICBM warheads against MX shelters or employing them
against other valuable targets. MX would also provide a hedge
against potential Soviet advances in threats to the submarine
and bomber legs of the U.S. strategic triad.
Introduction
The assessments made on the following charts are defined as
follows:
Strategic Balance. For each case, two charts
assess the balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces at two
different stages of hypothetical nuclear conflict taking place
between 1979 and 1989:
- 1.
- The pre-exchange graph shows the
ratio of on-line U.S. and Soviet forces before the attack in
terms of warheads; equivalent megatons (EMT), which measures the
capability to destroy area targets; and hard target kill
(HTK), which measures
the capability to destroy hard point targets.
- 2.
- The post-exchange graph shows the
ratio of warheads and EMT
that can be withheld for use after a Soviet-initiated
counterforce exchange in which the strategic forces on both
sides and the facilities associated with the operational
control and employment of these forces are attacked. (The
remaining HTK is not shown
because most of the hard targets are attacked in the
counterforce exchange.) [6 lines not
declassified]
This assessment does not necessarily reflect the way in which the
Soviets would use their forces in a nuclear war. We do not
adequately understand Soviet strategy, tactics, and objectives in an
actual conflict. These may differ from our own. Neither does this
assessment reflect the precise manner in which our own forces are
targeted today. Moreover, it does not test the endurance of our
forces or our ability to command and control them during a nuclear
war.
U.S. Retaliatory Potential. For each case, the
third chart measures the potential of U.S. forces that remain after
the counterforce exchange to attack a comprehensive set of economic
and military targets in the Soviet Union. (Missile silos and other
military targets explicitly attacked in the previous counterforce
exchange are not included.) [2 lines not
declassified]
DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES UNDER SALT II
[chart not declassified]
Description: These charts assess the strategic
balance and the retaliatory potential of planned U.S. forces under
SALT II. (The NIE estimate for a Soviet force with a
new 10–RV ICBM is used, since it
provides
[Page 855]
more capability
against MX in shelters. A new 1–RV ICBM is projected as a slightly more likely
development.)
Observations:
- •
- The U.S. would retain a lead in pre-exchange (on-line)
warheads although this lead would become marginal in the mid
and late 80s. The Soviets would continue to lead in the
EMT and HTK measures.
- •
- The post-exchange balance is shown with U.S. forces on
day-to-day alert and Soviet forces with some SLBMs and bombers covertly
generated. The negative trends would be reversed in the mid
and late 80s because of programmed U.S. forces. The U.S.
advantage in warheads would be greater than in the
pre-exchange case. (The balance would appear more favorable
to the U.S. if the Soviets were to develop a 1–RV ICBM and forego the 10–RV
missile.)
- •
- The retaliatory potential of U.S. forces remaining after
the counterforce exchange would increase because of planned
modernization of U.S. bomber and submarine forces.
GENERATED ALERT FORCES UNDER SALT II
[chart not declassified]
Description: These charts show the
post-exchange balance and U.S. retaliatory potential if the war
evolves from a crisis that gives the U.S. and Soviets time to
generate their forces and achieve a higher degree of
survivability.
Observations:
- •
- The U.S. would enjoy an unambiguous post-exchange
advantage in warheads and even pull ahead in residual EMT after 1983. The advantages
are due to the large percentage of U.S. capability residing
in bomber and SLBM forces,
which achieve much higher alert rates when forces are
generated.
- •
- U.S. retaliatory potential would also be much higher than
in day-to-day alert because of the additional bomber and
SLBM forces available
on generated alert.
DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II
Reactive MX Program
[chart not declassified]
Description: [4 lines not
declassified]
Observations:
- •
- [2 lines not declassified]
- •
- [2 lines not declassified]
[Page 856]
GENERATED ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II
Reactive MX Program
[chart not declassified]
Description: [2 lines not
declassified]
Observations:
• [3 lines not declassified]
DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WITHOUT SALT II
Reactive MX Program Plus Bomber Force Expansion
[chart not declassified]
Description: [7 lines not
declassified]
Observations:
• [3 lines not declassified]
POST-EXCHANGE DAY-TO-DAY ALERT FORCES WITH AND WITHOUT
MX
[chart not declassified]
Description: These charts illustrate some of
the contributions of the MX program with or without SALT. (In 1989, the MX system is
assumed to consist of 200 missiles and 4600 shelters with SALT; [less than 1
line not declassified]
Observations:
[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
