198. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
Washington,
June 18,
1980
SUBJECT
- Continuity of Government/C3I
The SCC met on June 12 to review the
proposals for a new approach to continuity of government and survival of
the National Command Authority (see Summary of Conclusions at Tab B).
All agencies fully support the recommendations. I have prepared a
Presidential Directive which is drawn almost entirely from key language
in the recommendations made to the SCC
(Tab A).2 It spells out national objectives
and specific agency responsibilities under the supervision of a White
House Steering Group. (C)
This is the culmination of a long effort to improve our continuity of
government program and at the same time to remove vulnerabilities to the
National Command Authority for control of the military forces. President
Kennedy received a report in 1962 pointing out the system’s inadequacies
but did nothing to improve it. President Nixon received a review, NSSM–58, in 1970 with the same message
but failed to act.3 The proposed
Presidential Directive, mandating a new concept for survivability and a
program office to build and test it, is a step of enormous strategic
importance and of historical significance. (C)
An ad hoc group in the Executive Office of the President (NSC, OMB,
Hugh Carter, and the Military Office) has carried this project through
after the Federal Preparedness Agency and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) each failed
to deliver. Defense, State, and the DCI
have also been brought together to add the weight that FEMA cannot bring alone to this effort.
Because of his strong interest and support, you may want to mention this
to Hugh. He has helped my staff keep the momentum, and he will be
important in the follow-on work of the White House Steering Group.
(C)
[Page 849]
RECOMMENDATION:
In light of the unanimous recommendation of the SCC, sign the PD at Tab A.
(U)
Tab B
Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee
Meeting4
Washington,
June 12, 1980, 4–4:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
- Continuity of Government/C3I (U)
PARTICIPANTS
-
State
- Thomas Tracy, Assistant Secretary for
Administration
-
Defense
- Secretary Harold
Brown
- Robert Komer,
Under Secretary for Policy
- Daniel Murphy,
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Review
-
JCS
- Chairman General David
Jones
- Lt. General John Pustay
-
CIA
- Deputy Director Frank Carlucci
- [name not declassified], COG/C3I Study Group
-
OMB
- Randy Jayne,
Associate Director
- Robert Howard
-
FEMA
- Director John Macy
- Frank Camm, Associate Director
-
White House
- Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski
- Hugh Carter
- Marvin Beaman
-
NSC
- B. General William E.
Odom
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with brief remarks on the
background for the subject today, continuity of civil government and
survivable military C3I at the national level. The present system
has remained essentially unaltered since the 1950s. In the meantime,
Soviet capability has made it extremely vulnerable. The paper being
reviewed today proposes a new conceptual approach to survivability
and recommends steps for implementation. (S)
Dr. Brzezinski asked if there were any comments or reservations on
the basic paper and the approach it suggests. All agencies expressed
[Page 850]
full approval. Defense
and FEMA added that we should move
to implement it as rapidly as possible.5 (S)
Dr. Brzezinski next turned to three specific and unresolved issues in
the procedures and responsibilities for implementation. (C)
1. Covert Versus Overt Funding—In the
discussion of this budgeting question, DOD and JCS expressed
strong support for overt funding. CIA took no position. FEMA and OMB preferred
covert funding. Defense expressed concern that a covert approach
would force Defense to pay for the entire program because FEMA could not so easily bury the
money in its programs. (S)
OMB insisted that security of the
program is important and that it should be funded covertly in order
to avoid detailed public scrutiny by Congress. Defense pointed out
that FEMA can manage “black”
programs. Hugh Carter asked which approach would allow the program
to be implemented faster. Defense insisted that greater speed is
possible through overt funding. (S)
Defense proposed a compromise that the Joint Program Office work out
a solution to this funding issue. All agencies agreed. (C)
2. Joint Program Office—FEMA originally objected to the
concept of a Joint Program Office with Defense as the Executive
Agent. By defining more clearly the boundary between Defense and
FEMA program responsibilities,
compromise language was found to satisfy FEMA. Therefore, the concept of a Joint Program Office
was supported by all agencies. (S)
3. DCI/DOD Division of Management
Responsibilities—Defense and CIA disagreed on the division of program management
responsibilities for defining the new system. CIA insisted that the DCI, under Executive Order 12036,6 has the program responsibility through
the NFIB for survivability of all
intelligence systems and communications. Defense argued that the
Executive Order gives this authority to the Secretary of Defense.
OMB proposed compromise
language which retains the present modus
operandi between the DCI
and the Secretary of Defense on other disputed issues in
interpreting Executive Order 12036. Thus this issue was set aside.
(S)
With the above mentioned changes in the concept paper, all agencies
support a recommendation to the President that he direct the
implementation of the new approach as it is spelled out in the
responsibilities and implementation sections of the paper. (S)
