195. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Update on M–X (U)
I have recently informed you of several changes we have made in the detailed engineering design of the M–X basing arrangement,2 while remaining well within the scope of the basing decision you made [Page 838] last September. Because of the intense political interest in M–X and the importance of this system to our future strategic posture, I believe it would be useful to provide you some additional information, and update you on our current activities. (U)
The design upgrades are explained in the letter I sent to Committee Chairmen in Congress on April 29, 1980 (Enclosure 1). Essentially, we changed the missile transporter from an “integral” design, in which the missile and launch equipment are always mounted on the transporter, to a “non-integral” design, in which the missile, launcher, and ancillary equipment roll out of a van-like transporter into a shelter loading dock. This design change has two big advantages: it is cheaper, and it eliminates the requirement for a separate shield vehicle to cover the transporter. The new design cannot dash automatically from one shelter to another, but can dash into a choice of shelters from an alert posture on the road, if we come to believe at some future time that the Soviets have penetrated our screen of location uncertainty. Additionally, the new design is much more amenable to use of mass simulators, which we believe will probably be necessary. (S)
You will note that my letter to Chairman Stennis announced these changes in a low-key way;3 I wanted to let him know that we were doing everything possible to save costs and reduce the complexity of the system, without having the changes seem to amount to a new basing mode, which they do not. At this point, members from the affected states recognized that with the new dash method we could do away with the loop road, and use linear roads if we wished. Because the term “racetrack” had acquired pejorative connotations, it was easier for those members to support us if they could take the credit for “killing the racetrack.” Hence, the big headline in the Star. (U)
The land saving made possible through going from loop to linear layouts will probably be about 5%. Together with reduced spacing between shelters, the entire system as now planned will extend over about 20% less land and will require about 1000 miles less of road than originally thought. (U)
As we anticipated, the political opposition to M–X is quite strong and comes from a variety of quarters:
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- Those who don’t want any new missile system.
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- A small, highly vocal group that may not be totally opposed to new strategic forces, but doesn’t like our basing choice for M–X. Some of these advocate a new submarine-based system because they have no concern about SSBN (or SLBM) vulnerability.
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- Those who are greatly concerned about environmental impact in the desert states. These people team easily with the first two groups.
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- Some strongly pro-defense people, who believe that the Air Force’s vertical shelter recommendation was the best plan and the [Page 839] Administration watered it down. (General Lew Allen has been working hard to defuse this opposition. Enclosure 2 is a letter he wrote about three months ago on these issues. The same letter also anticipated the design change to the non-integral transporter.)
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- Last, and perhaps most important, the sincerely concerned citizens of Nevada and Utah. These residents have a long tradition of suspicion of federal activities in their areas. Most people in impacted areas are defense-minded and, to some extent, reluctant to fight defense programs. They are, however, very much concerned about the possible impact of M–X on their lives. They are most worried about the influx of people into their isolated communities; the inevitable change in life-style that will result; the possibility of boom-bust problems; and the impact on local mining and agriculture. Understandably, they tend to resolve their dilemma by adopting the arguments of the second and third groups.
I am taking every step possible to alleviate the real adverse effects and to inform the local people honestly of the scope and character of those problems we can’t completely eliminate. (The facts are frequently a lot less worrisome than rumors.) (U)
One major activity we are involved in, which you will hear more about in the future, is the “split basing” study to assess the additional costs and problems in locating one half of the system in Nevada and Utah and the other in New Mexico and Texas. I have already stated in some hearings that the extra cost of split basing may be prohibitive (perhaps $3–4 billion), but the members and Governors from Nevada and Utah insist that a thorough study be made. I recognize that Nevada/Utah elected officials must question this project with sufficient rigor to demonstrate to their constituencies that their interests are being cared for. I have promised an objective and complete analysis. (U)
We have found frequent visits out West by senior civilian officials and Air Force people, who are working there continuously, extremely helpful. A few weeks ago Bill Perry and David Aaron were on a two hour panel debate on M–X that was broadcast nationally on public TV. Since then, Bill has spent additional time in the Southwest, including attending some meetings in very small towns, getting to know the people and hearing their concerns first hand. (U)
I believe that all these activities are paying off. We have developed considerable feel for those actions we might have taken which would be totally unacceptable, and for areas where reasonable accommodations and compromises can be made. We have found, too, that some opposition melts away when our representatives describe to small citizen groups in situ the need for M–X, and the extensive analyses leading us to this particular design. We will continue to seek and accept all such educational opportunities as we forthrightly address citizen concerns. (U)
[Page 840]Naturally, many of those issues and others find able spokespersons in Congess, and we have a full plate of ongoing Congressional actions, but we still may need further White House assistance. (U)
The first of two important events in the coming months is publication in July of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in support of the deployment area selection and land acquisition. Following public hearings during the comment period, the final EIS is to be submitted in November, leading to a December decision and subsequent introduction of necessary land withdrawal legislation to Congress. Our schedule requires legislative action by mid-1981 in order to protect our 1986 IOC date. (U)
The second important event is the System Design Review, beginning next month and continuing through September, that will give us a more detailed look at the consequences and benefits of design decisions we have made since you authorized the start of full scale engineering development last September. (U)
In summary, I am pleased with engineering progress on the M–X program and am more confident than ever that we made the right basic decisions last year. We are still facing some battles to obtain a high degree of public and Congressional support, but we have a very vigorous program and I feel the situation is improving. Your continuing support has been most helpful. (U)