186. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner1

SUBJECT

  • Crisis Management

As you perhaps know, Bill Odom, Bob Gates, and Carl Smith convened to discuss your memorandum of May 7 on improving communications and other support for managing such incidents as the recent rescue mission. The following improvements will be made:

Two additional secure voice terminals will be installed in the Situation Room. One already exists.
A program for increasing the number of secure lines into the White House has been in progress for some time. As it is completed in the coming year, the number of secure lines into the Situation Room will increase above the present five by several. We have recently installed a new dial directory with a capacity for four additional lines. In emergencies we can divert circuits to use them now.

On your recommendation that an additional private circuit from NSA be installed in the White House, we do not have the space and personnel to support it in a mode separate from the present terminal in the Situation Room. In crises, therefore, we shall continue to use the present arrangement.

On maps, graphics, and other support, we shall be delighted with any additional resources you are willing to commit to this purpose. A secure video link in the Situation Room Conference Room allows us at present to look at maps, charts, and other graphics in the NMCC. When we have time, however, our procedures call for requests for actual maps and graphics from either CIA or DOD.

On the occasion of the rescue mission2 we did not take advantage of the extant facilities in the Situation Room Conference Room, but I believe that was an exception, not the rule. With those capabilities and planned improvements, the next occasion should prove easier to handle.

Zbigniew Brzezinski
[Page 813]

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)3

SUBJECT

  • Crisis Management

1. During the long meeting of the NSC the night the rescue mission aborted, vital communication with the Pentagon, State and CIA was carried out by Harold Brown and Cy Vance using the President’s secure telephone in the Oval Office and through Bob Gates passing information to me that he had received via the secure telephone in your office. I think you will agree that at a time when we were so dependent on real time information from the Pentagon, CIA and NSA, these arrangements did not serve us well. They were neither efficient nor, as it turned out, particularly accurate.

2. I know that you have had Bill Odom working to improve White House crisis management procedures, particularly with respect to nuclear conflict and other large scale operations. Nevertheless, in keeping with our conversation the week of the rescue attempt, I believe several inexpensive, easy to implement changes can be made to improve substantially communications to and from the SCC and the NSC during crises of a lower order of magnitude—such as the rescue attempt. These might include:

Installing a secure voice conference call capability in the Situation Room conference room. This would enable all of us to receive information directly and simultaneously from the NMCC, CIA and NSA, thus saving time and improving the accuracy of information received.
Providing for permanent direct secure voice channels from the Situation Room to the NMCC, the CIA Operations Center, and the State Department Operations Center. These would be helpful at any time, but I think you will agree could prove especially useful during a crisis situation. This would also leave available two or three or more regular secure voice channels for principals or staff to use.
Installation of another direct link between NSA and the Situation Room. The existing link is used for the transmission of routine NSA traffic. A second channel could be used for passage of information in extremely close hold situations (such as the rescue), bypassing staff [Page 814] both at NSA and, if you deemed appropriate, at the White House as well.
Arrangements should also be considered to improve CIA support to the Situation Room in terms of rapid provision of maps, graphics and satellite photography.

3. I recommend that you name a small, informal working group to look into these and perhaps other modest changes that might be made to improve communications into and out of the Situation Room during crises. Such a group might include those who are most familiar with the arrangements and could effect the changes without a lot of bureaucratic red tape. Obviously, your representative (presumably Bill Odom) should chair the group; Bob Gates would be my representative and perhaps it would be worthwhile to include Harold’s assistant, Carl Smith, and others you might deem appropriate. The group should act, in my view, as quickly as possible. If you think this idea has merit, please ask Bill to be in touch with Bob.4

Stansfield Turner
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 15, Crisis Management: 11/78–5/80. Secret. Drafted by Odom.
  2. Reference is to the failed April 24 attempt to rescue the U.S. Embassy personnel held hostage by Iranian revolutionaries since November 1979.
  3. Secret. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum: “WO. Reaction? It think it’s worthwhile. ZB. 5–7–80.”
  4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this paragraph and wrote: “WO proceed. ZB.”