Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

156. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 5, 1979

SUBJECT

• Strategic Aircraft Programs (U)

With the M–X decision process completed, the next big strategic force posture issue is the future of the air-breathing leg of the Triad. It ranks along with strategic C3I in importance and dependence on basic decisions about doctrine. By contrast the future of the SSBN force is not so pressing. In the early 1980s we shall have to decide on Trident II and the possible need for a smaller SSBN. But we should not enter the 1980s without a firm planning concept for strategic aircraft. (C)

The questions being asked now include the following:

— We shall definitely need a follow-on to the B–52 as a cruise missile carrier. But when and what design?

— Do we need a new manned penetrator? When? What design?

— What are the tanker implications?

— Should we design advanced strategic aircraft to accomplish other missions, like conventional bombing, sea-control, and bomber defense? (C)

The timing of fiscal constraints and technological opportunities is of concern. By 1984, M–X will be eating up a large piece of the strategic budget and there is some incentive to load a new strategic aircraft program into earlier years. This argument has been used on behalf of the FB–111 B/C and derivations of the B–1 design. On the other hand, living a bit longer on the B–52’s may permit us to exploit newer technology for the strategic aircraft fleet of the 1990s, especially interesting because the penetration problem is expected to get very severe. (C)

It is clear, whatever the course and timing chosen, we’ll want high-performance airframes. Base-escape requirements and the possibility of very long-legged Soviet air defenses² probably rule out the application of a wide-body commercial design as the cruise missile carrier for the late 1980s and 1990s. The Air Force can be expected to push for the inclusion of an effective penetrator. And it seems likely that tanker support aircraft (if needed) will have to be comparable to bombers/CMCs in base escape characteristics. (C)

As reported to you by Charlie Stebbins, the Air Staff is attempting a short study of all this intended to go to SecDef later this month. The rush results from CINCSAC pressing hard for the FB–111B that the Air Force is not keen about. (C)

This seems likely to be a major programmatic issue over the next year to which we must pay close attention for fiscal and political reasons. Even more important, like C3I, strategic aircraft are likely to be closely linked to doctrinal questions. Although we are not in a position simply to pronounce a strategic doctrine for the 1980s and 1990s (doctrine doesn’t get made that way anyhow), we can and should assure that the future of strategic aircraft is discussed in terms of future doctrinal perspectives. For example, what are the new implications of your three questions on stable deterrence, crisis bargaining and warfighting? How should our growing concern about endurance and reconstitution shape strategic aircraft design? Do capabilities for limited options present special requirements? What SALT III, etc., environment should we plan for? (C)

The Air Force, SAC, and other strategic aircraft advocates have long sensed the value of new doctrine in promoting their interests. The “flexibility” of manned aircraft is always featured in the relevant brochures. But when they get down to cases, these people generally think of strategic aircraft as dump trucks to carry megatonage into the USSR in a short, intense war having no aftermath of interest. Designers and force planners do not develop doctrine; they use it (or evade it) to rationalize “their thing.” (C)

We are in close touch with the Air Staff people currently working this problem, and with their OSD audiences. We can therefore track and influence the results. (C)

But we should take further steps:

— At an early BBV lunch you should raise the nexus of aircraft and doctrine.³

— We should follow the planned NSC meeting on C3I, “quick fixes”, and counterforces with a follow-on that addresses the content of “countervailing strategy” (Harold Brown’s felicitous name for the strategic doctrines you are pushing) and its implications for strategic aircraft.⁴

— We should then define the broad criteria that define future strategic aircraft posture. (C)

Unless General Ellis gains ground for his FB–111 B/C (some report that he is doing so), these ought not be big issues in the FY 81 budget. They should be quite significant for FY 82. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 6, B–1: 7/77–9/79. Confidential. Outside the System. Sent for information.
2. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to the portion of this paragraph that begins with “It is clear” and ends with “long-legged Soviet air defenses.”
3. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this point and wrote: “and ask what?”
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the right margin next to the portion of this point that begins with “addresses the content” and ends with “implications for strategic aircraft,” drew a line from this section to the bottom of the memorandum, and wrote: “this is interesting. What would it involve?”