Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

152. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 28, 1979

SUBJECT

• MX Basing (U)

Harold Brown has sent you the memo at Tab A recommending full scale development of the horizontal shelter/ground mobile MX basing scheme I briefed you on several weeks ago.² I also asked Stan Turner to provide his comments on the verifiability of the system—the result is at Tab B.³ While there is general agreement that we should proceed with this system, as you will see, Stan Turner continues to be concerned that the Soviets might try to defeat the MX system by sharply increasing their strategic forces. (S)

This material will be the basis for the NSC meeting that I propose you hold early next week. I believe that the basing decision must be made at that meeting or very shortly thereafter—an inconclusive meeting is likely to hurt our efforts to get the SALT II agreement ratified. In this meeting we must also agree on a unified position for answering critics of MX counterforce capability. (S)

I recommend that you read Harold’s 5 page cover memo (Tab A)—it summarizes the important points in his longer attachment. You should also read Stan Turner’s 3 page cover memo (Tab B). In reading this material you should keep the following points in mind:

— While DOD has done an excellent job of minimizing the concerns of the citizens of Utah and Nevada, opponents of the system are certain to try to block the system on environmental grounds. To defuse the considerable concerns already surfacing that you might simply allow this to happen, Lloyd Cutler and I believe that when you announce the MX decision, you should also state your intention to seek legislation to prevent environmental blocking of the system. Such a statement will underline your resolve to proceed. (C)

— Harold Brown believes that, beyond the perceptions issue, the primary advantage of matching the Soviets countersilo capability is to motivate them to go to smaller, mobile survivable ICBM’s. I believe that the primary advantage of survivable countersilo capability is to remove any potential Soviet advantages in a counterforce exchange. Such advantages might make the Soviets more willing to press their interests in any deep crisis, and thus increase the threat of nuclear war. (C)

— Stan Turner’s continuing concerns with the possibility that the Soviets might try to expand their forces to provide extra RV’s for targeting the MX system seem overblown. They obviously can expand their forces but I doubt that they will because (1) we can expand our MX force at lower cost, (2) if we do, their efforts will have gained them nothing, and in fact, (3) if they race us by deploying new silo based forces and we respond by expanding MX, the potential US advantage in any counterforce exchange becomes increasingly more significant. In the NSC meeting you may wish to briefly discuss this issue again—a consensus of your advisers on this issue would be useful. (C)

Finally, as part of our preparations for the upcoming decision, Hamilton Jordan’s office is working with my staff and DOD to develop a plan of action for announcing the decision. We believe—and Lloyd Cutler agrees—that you should make a short announcement yourself, and Harold and others should provide more detailed backup. We are therefore preparing a draft statement as well as other backup material. We will also provide a list of people you should call in advance of any public announcement. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 43, Missiles: 8–9/79. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed is Brown’s memorandum; see Document 150.
3. Attached but not printed is Turner’s memorandum; see Document 151.