Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

148. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Defense Budget (U)

I want to share my personal views with you on what course we should advise the President to take over the next few months as he responds to Congressional and inflationary pressures on the defense budget. (S)

With respect to the possibility of overall dollar adjustments, I suggest that we determine what kind of long-term budget strategy—defined in terms of specific programs—would best counter the adverse trends indicated by your recent paper on the military investment balance,² and that we attempt to conform any near-term (beginning FY 81) dollar adjustments to the long-term strategy. This should be done soon if we’re to have any impact on the effort initiated by Jim McIntyre’s August 3, 1979 memo to the President on “SALT and the Defense Budget.”³ (S)

With respect to what is bought with whatever overall dollar adjustments the President makes, it seems of vital importance that the additional monies be applied against our remaining highest priority strategic and tactical needs. My own view of which needs are the most important from among those identified in PD/NSC–18 and your subsequent Consolidated Guidance documents, is as follows:

—Strategic:	Highest—improve C3I; short-term fixes.
	Next highest—accelerate modernization (M–X IOC, cruise missile carrier development, ALCM IOC)
—TNF	Highest—improve C3I
	Next highest—accelerate theater nuclear forces modernization (including MRBM development)
—Non-NATO GPF	Highest—man, support and exercise the quick reaction contingency force; expand mobility (lift) capability.
—NATO GPF	Highest—accelerate ground force modernization (XM–1, 1FV). (TS)

I believe that applying monies against the above list of needs would be both militarily and politically defensible in that: (1) I am confident the list will prove to be consistent with the long-term budget strategy I mentioned earlier; and (2) since the list has been evolving since the earliest days of the Administration, it cannot be labeled as merely a reaction to the SALT TWO ratification debate. (TS)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 6, Defense Department: 8–9/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
2. See Document 145.
3. Not found.