Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

144. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth and Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 19, 1979

SUBJECT

• DOD’s Military Investment Balance Paper (S)

On 5 July, Harold Brown sent to the President a paper on the US-Soviet defense investment balance prepared by OSD’s Net Assessment Office.² We have reviewed that paper carefully and spoken at length with the authoring office and CIA analysts who supplied critical input data. For reasons developed below we believe the paper should be replaced by a short memo from Harold Brown to the President. (S)

The overall message of the OSD paper is valid. The USSR has been investing more in military strength than the US for at least a decade. Its military investment effort—that is, spending on military RDT&E, procurement, and construction—now exceeds ours by around 75%, measured in dollars. Moreover, there is no evidence that the steady growth of Soviet military investment will be reversed or slowed before the mid-1980s, if then. Unlike much defense spending on current operations and maintenance, investment accumulates over time and pays its returns in the future. (S)

The study concludes that the US will have to increase its defense investment spending markedly if we are to remain a competitive military power. This message implies a gloomier future for relative US power than the prevailing public view, and a much gloomier view than the President now holds. It calls for a major shift of federal spending priorities toward defense at a time when, not withstanding its commitment to growth in defense spending, the Administration faces sharply competing spending-related priorities, namely with respect to energy and inflation. (S)

However, as a contribution to understanding our defense predicament—which is how Harold describes the paper in his cover memo—the paper has substantive deficiencies. In particular, it underrates the US on a number of counts:

— It does not distinguish how much of past Soviet investment only permitted catching up with the US as opposed to surpassing us. Nor does it address the advantage to the USSR of being able to follow technological paths pioneered by the US, advantages given up as technology gaps are closed.

— It doesn’t appear to give adequate weight to US technological developments now in train that serve to devalue Soviet investments, e.g., cruise missiles vs. their air defenses.

— It doesn’t attempt to account for the fact that some Soviet military investment is directed against China, not NATO. While such resources can be redirected and we have an interest in the Sino-Soviet balance, some discounting of such Soviet efforts would seem reasonable. (S)

Were these and other substantive problems addressed, the main message of the paper probably would not change. But it would be more persuasive and the policy problem it poses more manageable. (S)

The paper suffers from being much too long. Harold suggests that the President read some 35 pages to get the essence of it; and OSD supplied an “executive summary” not much shorter. We think the study can be effectively summarized in no more than 3–5 pages.³ (S)

In addition, the paper contains no policy recommendations other than the general admonition to spend more. We believe the Secretary of Defense should accompany the bad news with a clear statement of his opinion about the message and its policy implications. (S)

The NSC should not block the communication of the message to the President. At the same time we should not forward difficult analytic material when Harold Brown has not been sufficiently explicit about its implications. (S)

We recommend that you ask Harold for a short (3–5 pages) memo to the President that does the following:

— Presents a crisp summary of the paper’s findings;

— Mentions the appropriate caveats;

— States Harold’s view of the findings and the implications he sees for US defense spending. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to Harold Brown at Tab A. (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Defense Brown⁴

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• DOD’s Study of the US–USSR Military Investment Balance (S)

I have reviewed the subject paper you sent to the President on 5 July. Although it’s an impressive piece of work and it presents an important message, the paper may characterize the defense investment imbalance too unfavorably and even the executive summary is much too long to ask the President to read. (S)

Because the message of this study is very important and disturbing, I urge you to prepare a short 3–5 page memo for the President that:

— crisply summarizes the study;

— states the appropriate caveats (our staffs have discussed the more important ones); and

— states your own view of the implications for our defense spending and policies. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 3, Defense (Items in the System): 7/79–6/80. Secret. Sent for action.
2. Not found.
3. For Brown’s summary, see the attachment to Document 145.
4. Secret.
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.