Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

126. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 26, 1979

SUBJECT

• The President’s M–X Basing Decision (U)

My present understanding is that the DOD will offer the President two options which it regards as acceptable: MPS and “Enhanced DIAD”. The latter may be called “Variant TRIAD” or some such, but it amounts to the same thing: foregoing any rebased ICBM and putting the strategic force modernization effort into the sea-based and air-breathing force elements. (TS)

The DOD will recommend rejecting several alternatives as unacceptable: All air-mobile combinations will be rejected because the 200 missile force is vastly too expensive, while smaller forces sized to a reasonable budget have much too little capability for the still very large outlay required. The truck/land mobile option boils down, evidently, to the road mobile version. I’m not sure how the argument will be made, but would expect it to be rejected because a) it depends on strategic warning when the threat of strategic surprise is too high for comfort, and b) the missile must be small (i.e., 4–5 RVs) to fit on a road-mobile truck. Off-road mobile truck, which could physically be designed to carry a larger missile (10 RVs), is probably out because it is just too big and destructive to operate off government land, even in crisis. (TS)

As I say, these are informed expectations, not firm advanced notice of what is coming. Harold Brown and Bill Perry will probably put their own spin on the recommendations and the analysis of each option. Moreover, the plan calls for them to make their recommendations only after the PRC has reacted to the full set of options. Hence, some cheap version of the air mobile option, e.g., 50–70 missiles in aircraft, 100–150 in silos, might be presented as “barely acceptable” under pressure and over the bitter opposition of the professionals. (TS)

Thinking through the politics of this decision is important not only because the President wants to come through it politically and wants it to help SALT, but the credibility of the decision is itself important to the national security, allied confidence, Soviet respect, etc. (TS)

Whatever his leaning, the President ought to give the most serious consideration to involving the Congressional leadership through consultation prior to the decision. (I know of no such effort so far by the White House.) Of course, Congress has been kept abreast of the proceedings inside DOD through OSD and Air Force channels. My impression is that this has softened opposition to MPS a great deal and perhaps even created some pressure for it, but these reports come from biased Air Force sources. In any case, the President has a right to a clear view of Congressional sentiment before he makes his decision. He would profit from such consultations. They could take off some of the political heat and make the final choice go down more easily, especially in relation to SALT ratification, by sharing the responsibility a bit. (TS)

I see four possible scenarios: one good, one marginal, and two disasters. They are influenced by my own judgment as to what is required for strategic security, and by my sense of the political setting.

1. Good Scenario: MPS

The President decides for the MPS option. He declares that we definitely need a new ICBM for essential equivalence, survivability, endurance, and flexibility. He notes that this is the most cost effective of the serious alternatives and probably half as costly as the equivalent air mobile option. He reports that his doubts about the verification problem have been largely laid to rest: We can make our MPS verifiable. With the same cooperation, a like Soviet system would also be verifiable.² Moreover, mobile alternatives the Soviets are likely to prefer and which cannot be simply denied the Soviets, i.e., truck, are likely to be even harder to verify. Only were we able to ban all kinds of land-mobile deployment modes—which is unrealistic—can we avoid the kinds of verification challenges requiring cooperation as in MPS. (TS)

Should the Soviets not be cooperative on verification modalities for MPS, or whatever mobile ICBM mode they choose, or should they otherwise give us serious concern about a breakout threat of more RVs to swamp our MPS target array in the later 1980s, then we would have to consider enlarging the number of shelter/aim points and building an ABM defense overlay (which could be very efficient because it could preferentially defend only full holes while the Soviets would have to attack all of them as though they were full and defended). (TS)

MPS basing would leave us the path of reducing land-based ICBMs in the future, first those in silos, and then those in mobile deployments. A major virtue of the MPS systems is that the number of missiles in it can be reduced without allowing the enemy to “gang up” on and thereby reduce the survivability of the remainder. The air and truck alternatives do not have this feature. (TS)

This scenario would draw fire from the Left, which doesn’t care about the basing much but wants to kill M–X (and will probably try to kill Trident 2, at least as a hard target weapon, if M–X is cancelled). The Right, of course wants to see M–X go forward and, even more perhaps, to victimize the President if it doesn’t; it cares less about the basing mode. As things stand now, this scenario would be a measurable, but not overwhelming, net plus for SALT ratification. The anti-SALT votes will not be changed; but their persuasiveness with the moderates will be lessened. The President will look like a man who can stand tall on defense, even over his own earlier feelings. There is no question that this perception would be good for SALT. He would have to comfort himself in a way that avoided the appearance of being pushed by the Pentagon into supporting M–X because of SALT. This would make him look vacillating to all and especially untrustworthy to pro-defense sentiment. (TS)

2. Marginal Scenario: Augmented DYAD.

In this scenario, the President would say he was, in essence, choosing to rebase ICBMs in what all agree to be the single most survivable basing mode, in SSBNs. Trident 2 would be our new ICBM and would be accelerated to, say, 1986.³ We would also speed up development of a) a cruise missile carrier,⁴ b) a follow-on ALCM, and c) a possible advanced penetrator aircraft for the very late 1980s.⁵ We would also stress improvements to C3I, basing, and transwar support to assure that the SSBN and air-breathing legs would be surviving, enduring, flexible, and inherently diversified. We would also keep most of the Minutemen in their silos for synergistic protection of aircraft, limited operations, and possible launch-on-warning. (TS)

The trouble with this scenario is that the headline would be “Carter Cancels M–X”. Many critics would contend that a combination of Soviet missile programs, Soviet hard bargaining at SALT, and disdain for US strategic power in the Administration had basically run the US out of the ICBM business while the Soviets remained comfortably in their silos.⁶ (TS)

Therefore, in addition to explaining what he would do to make the DYAD assuredly survivable, the President would have to explain what he was also doing to make the Soviets strategically uncomfortable in their silos. He would have to stress that the Trident 2 would definitely be a hard-target killer with his full support, both to meet warfighting objectives and to force the Soviets to worry about stability and ICBM reductions. In short, the President would have to stress not only that he is paying the “survivability tax” that the Soviets had imposed on us, but he is going to impose that tax on the Soviets in return. He might also hint that because of increased US reliance on SSBNs we would increase our submerged ASW capability and thereby give ourselves options to imperil Soviet SSBNs in some situations. (TS)

To borrow from boxing, this scenario involves fast footwork (evading the Soviet counter-silo threat) and counter-punching (purposely making Soviet silos vulnerable—you could also do that with MPS but it would not have to be emphasized politically). The major flaw in it is that the President would readily sign up for the fast footwork, but not believe in the necessity for counterpunching. And even if he said the right things, as the author of the statement that one SSBN can destroy all Soviet large and medium cities, he would not be believed. Politically, you have to start from a very credible stance on strategic issues to make this scenario viable. (TS)

I, for one, do believe that the DYAD scenario can be made to work politically and strategically, at home, with allies, and with the Soviets.⁷ But it requires a determination to follow through on the counter-punching elements (hard target kill and ASW), a tough campaign for future reductions in ICBMs, and a competitive thrust to our strategic behavior that I do not believe this Administration is up to. Therefore, I strongly recommend that this scenario not be adopted.⁸ It would draw tremendous fire from the Right and still face opposition to needed improvements from the Left. But I describe it to lay out the minimum essential conditions for making it work plausibly.

3. Disaster: DYAD without “Counterpunching”

The President is likely to face a political disaster, for SALT and his reelection prospects, if he opts for the DYAD and tries to sell it in terms of cost effectiveness, ease of verification, and avoidance of the strategic challenge to the Soviets represented by M–X in MPS. If he fails to stress and follow through on the counterpunching themes of the DYAD option, it will look like strategic appeasement. (TS)

4. Disaster: Air-mobile or Hybrids Thereof

The President may choose the air mobile concept over Harold’s objections or after persuading Harold to agree that it is a very poor third, but acceptable, choice. Much of the defense technical establishment, including the Air Force, is very likely to be hard against him. The budgeteers will shudder at the cost implications. And everyone will really doubt whether the President intends to follow through. This will look like an interim effort to make it seem like M–X is going forward, while avoiding selection of MPS. Some in the defense community might be willing to go along because they would believe that a new Administration would review the issue. In the meantime, we would at least keep moving on M–X. But these sentiments would clearly be the opposite of the strategic consensus that we need. (TS)

An equally bad variant on this disaster would occur if the President selected truck mobile. Over the long term, trucks are a sensible option to continue to explore, perhaps as a later 1980s adjunct to DYAD or MPS. But they are anything but an answer to the Minuteman survivability problem now, politically or strategically.⁹ (TS)

Therefore, the real options are MPS or DYAD, the latter accompanied by a very tough strategic line that will be extremely difficult to adopt or make convincing. (TS)

You should understand that the above judgments are informed by a fairly conventional appreciation of the technical and strategic arguments as DOD seems likely to present them, on one hand, and a very subjective view of what the political situation warrants, on the other. We know that the Congress wants urgently and SALT requires urgently a firm decision on ICBM basing. But I worry that our understanding of Congressional sentiment on a) how vital M–X per se is, and b) on the basing choices is not sufficiently firm to plot one of the two workable scenarios in political terms. (TS)

Suggesting now that the President is leaning against M–X and for DYAD (which he implied in his New York speech)¹⁰ has grave risks. The press is already onto this. What we should do is get a better sense of Congressional views on the basing options now, knowing that they won’t become firm until the President has begun consultations and made a decision.¹¹ (TS)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Ermarth, Box 6, MX Missiles: 4/79. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information.
2. Brzezinski underlined the word “cooperation” and drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.
3. Brzezinski underlined the words “to, say, 1986” and wrote “1) Trident II—accelerated—[illegible]” at the bottom of the page.
4. Brzezinski underlined the words “a) a cruise” and wrote “2) ALCM carrier” at the bottom of the page.
5. Brzezinski underlined the word “late” and wrote “3) [illegible]” at the bottom of the page.
6. Brzezinski drew a vertical line and wrote “some mix?” in the left margin next to this paragraph.
7. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.
8. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin next to this sentence.
9. Brzezinski underlined the word “now,” drew a vertical line and wrote “Why? The others are later” in the left margin next to this sentence.
10. Reference is to Carter’s April 25 remarks at the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, pp. 693–699)
11. Ermarth wrote a postscript at the bottom of the page: “Zbig, These are my own thoughts. Once DOD comes over with its 30 April report, I’m happy to work this problem jointly with Vic et al. F.”