Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IV, National Security Policy

106. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 2, 1978

SUBJECT

• The U.S. Defense Program

As background for our meeting Monday, this memorandum provides (1) a brief overview of the kind of defense the United States will have at various funding levels, and (2) a discussion of four selected issues of unusual importance: the future of strategic forces; the naval shipbuilding program; improving the capabilities of our Army divisions in Europe to meet the Warsaw Pact threat; and improving further the efficiency in the Department of Defense.²

I. Levels of Defense Effort

In preparing the FY 1980 Defense submission, alternative programs have been addressed at several levels, three of which I shall discuss here.

My three top priorities in developing the Defense program and budget have been: maintaining parity with the Soviet Union in strategic forces; increasing NATO’s capability to withstand a “blitzkreig” war with the Pact in Central Europe; and modernizing and increasing the readiness of forces. The basic level program, which would meet your 3% real growth goal, would produce total obligational authority of $138 billion for FY 1980 (124B$ of expenditures) and requires 3% per year growth thereafter. It would provide for a first step toward making those goals. That program, however, would still result in further deterioration of our relative military position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if they continue to increase their capability at the rate of the past decade.

Since the pace of Soviet military growth shows no sign of abating, I believe we must be prepared to continue to fund growth at no less than that rate. Though the strategic balance is still generally satisfactory today, it is much less so than five years ago. The Soviets are rapidly overtaking us and we must react strongly to assure essential equivalence. Furthermore, the conventional force balance in Europe today is not satisfactory. To maintain our naval forces near their present size into the 1990s requires action now, and their readiness and survivability need improvement now. In short, we should consider our 1980 defense budget as part of a longer-term program that will require increased effort, and consequently increased expenditures for defense, on our part as long as the Soviet Union continues on its current path.

The military balance resulting from our following the basic level program, even with its 3% growth, would almost certainly be less favorable in 1984 than it is now. In the strategic balance, our lead in almost all measures will have disappeared by the mid-1980s. There could well be a widespread perception that the Soviet Union had achieved at least some sort of marginal superiority in the strategic area by that time. We are uncertain about what, if any, practical effect such an advantage might have on the outcome of a strategic war. But such evidence as there is strongly suggests that many of the Soviet leaders believe otherwise with regard to both military utility and political intimidation. And the area of strategic thermonuclear war is one in which, because there is no experience, perceptions and doctrine are critical.

As for the conventional balance in Europe with a basic level program, the Pact would have an advantage in terms of equivalent forces of almost 2:1 over most of the early days of a NATO/Warsaw Pact mobilization. Additional armor and mechanization, together with prepositioning of U.S. equipment, and improvements on the part of our allies, may improve the situation slightly by the mid-1980s. We have also been making headway in improving rationalization, standardization and interoperability, with consequent gains in efficiency. We would remain ahead of the Soviets by most naval measures, especially in ASW.

I believe that maintaining at least the current military balance with the Soviet Union is an essential component (although not the only component) of our national security. The fiscal resources for the basic level program do not assure us of maintaining that balance, though with hard work and luck if our allies increase expenditures and efficiency of alliance efforts, we may be able to do so in conventional forces. There are many items that I have not been able to include in the basic program that are needed for confidence in maintaining the present balance. I have included most of these items in an enhanced level program, starting at a level of $144.5 billion for the 1980 budget, with expenditures of over $126 billion in FY 1980, and growing at 3.7% per year for the following four years. I believe a program at that level would give reasonable confidence assuming corresponding allied efforts of maintaining the existing balance (given the limits on the precision with which we can measure that balance). I also, for the sake of completeness, include a description of a program at a level below the basic. That decremented level, which as noted hereafter would force elimination of critically needed programs, would in my opinion result in military imbalance to a degree which would constitute a severe risk.

A. Basic Level

The basic level program would provide the following:

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

• 1054 ICBMs—550 MIRVd Minuteman IIIs, 450 single-RV Minuteman IIs, and 54 of the large single-RIV Tital IIs. Initial deployment of M–X in 1986. Interim mobile system (MM III) in 1983.

• 600–700 SLBMs through the late ’80s (all MIRVd after 1983), dropping to 400–500 in the early ’90s as Poseidon boats are retired. Five new Trident SSBNs funded between 1980 and 1984.

• 346 B–52s. Initial deployment of ALCMs in 1982, all 150 B–52Gs with 3000 ALCMs by 1989. First deployment of wide-body cruise missile carrier in 1987.

• Initial deployment in Europe of the ground-launched cruise missile in 1982, and of the long-range Pershing in 1984.

In General Purpose Forces:

• 19 active and 9 reserve Army and Marine divisions.

• Conversion of 3 light Active Army divisions to armored/mechanized by 1984, altering total U.S. force from 12 of these and 16 light to 15 armored/mechanized and 13 light.

• 9 new armored or mechanized battalions in the active Army by 1984.

• Prepositioned equipment in Europe for 3 more division equivalents (for a total of 5⅓) by 1984, and a further 3 (for a total of 8⅓) by 1986.

• Procurement of 90 XM–1 tanks per month (less than 40% of Soviet production) by 1983, and 50 IFV/CFVs per month (a quarter the Soviet rate) by 1980.

• 26 active and 12 reserve tactical air wings in the Air Force, 12 active (with 12 deployable carriers) and 2 reserve in the Navy, 3 active and 1 reserve in the Marine Corps, for a total of 56 wings.

• Funding during the 5-year period of 250 A–10s, 120 F–14s, 150 F–15s, 895 F–16s, and 453 F–18s, for a total of 1868 of these types (the Soviets produce tactical fighter and attack aircraft at the rate of 1200 per year).

• Funding during the 5-year period of 67 new ships, implying an eventual steady-state fleet size of about 350 ships, though the backlog of ships already funded will temporarily raise the current level of 470 to over 500 in the ’80s.

• Buy 20 KC–10s, modify civilian wide-bodied aircraft, stretch and add refueling to the C–141 fleet, give the C–5 wing longer life, and increase C–5 and C–141 utilization rates.

B. Enhanced Level

Here are some examples of increases in capability above the basic level program that the enhanced level offers.

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

• Eight instead of five Trident submarines begun in 1980–1984.

• Full operational capability for the B–52/cruise missile force (about 150 bombers with 3000 missiles) by FY 1987 instead of FY 1989.

• Two more Pave Paws radars to complete coverage against Soviet SLBM attack [less than 1 line not declassified]

• Development of an MRBM similar to the SS–20 that the Soviets are deploying.

Among other things, these changes would increase U.S. strategic warheads by about 20 percent by 1990. This could be important, since the Soviets may be able to reduce our current 2:1 advantage in warheads to about 1.3:1 by 1985, and could eliminate even this—our last static advantage—by 1990.

In Land Forces:

• Increase production of the XM–1 tank from 90 to 120 per month, and of the Army’s new armored personnel carrier from 50 to 105 per month. (Both these latter figures are still only about half the current corresponding Soviet rates.)

• The equivalent of four more 155mm battalions in Europe. (Since 1973, Pact artillery and rocket launchers in Eastern Europe have grown by 25 to 30 percent. This calls not only for more artillery on our part, but also for more armored personnel carriers to protect our troops.)

• Fifty percent more of our new Patriot SAMs in Europe by 1984 to counter growing Soviet offensive airpower (e.g., an increase of up to 60 percent since 1974 in payload that could be delivered 2000 n.mi. inside NATO territory.)

In Tactical Air Forces:

• An 80 percent increase in the number of sorties we could fly in Europe in the first 30 days, equivalent to a 10 percent to 15 percent increase for NATO as a whole in the first week, and about 35 percent in the first month. This could be very important—the Pact now outnumbers NATO in air-to-air capable fighters by about 25 percent, a figure likely to grow to about 50 percent by the mid-1980s. These sorties take on extra importance in light of the reliance we place on airpower to react rapidly to intense and localized Soviet armored thrusts.

• Accelerate production of the A–10 attack aircraft by 13%, and buy 50% more electronic countermeasures aircraft, 25% more air-to-air missiles, and 40% more precision-guided weapons.

• R&D for a new all-weather standoff attack system for the A–6, for a new short-range air-to-air missile, and for a new turbofan engine for tactical aircraft.

In Naval Forces:

• Twenty-seven more new ships for a five-year total of 94—a rate sufficient to sustain a 500-ship fleet in the long run—instead of the basic level of 67 new ships, which is enough to sustain only a 350-ship fleet.

• New 8” guns for DD–963 destroyers, for amphibious fire support. (At present, the United States has nothing larger than a 5” gun in the fleet.)

• Twenty percent more new P–3C patrol aircraft, our most cost-effective antisubmarine system.

• Clipper Bow—an active radar satellite for ocean surveillance—ready in 1983 instead of 1988.

In Mobility Forces:

• Modernization of our tactical aircraft force. (The aging C–130s cannot carry the tanks and self-propelled artillery on which our ground forces increasingly depend.)

• Twenty percent to 30 percent faster deployment from Central Europe to the flanks of NATO or the Persian Gulf, and far more rapid movement within countries having poorly developed ground transportation system (e.g., twice as fast in Iran).

• Provisions for higher utilization rates of our existing strategic airlift aircraft (C–5s and C–141s), and prepositioning of another division’s equipment in Europe by FY 1981 instead of FY 1982.

In Logistic Support and Readiness:

• The enhanced level would permit a number of actions to improve logistic support and readiness. Their cumulative effect could be vital in terms of real combat capability.

In my view, the program at the enhanced level would give us reasonable confidence of maintaining the relative position we hold today.

C. Decremented Level

In developing these alternative programs, we also investigated a decremented level, roughly 4% below the basic level program (e.g., roughly $133 billion) and growing thereafter at a slower rate (e.g., about 2%) than the basic program. Some of the important changes in dropping to that level would be:

In Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces:

• Slip the initial deployment of M–X by a year, and that of Trident II, the ground-launched cruise missile, and the antisatellite program by two years each. Eliminate the interim mobile MM III.

• Cancel the wide-bodied cruise missile carrier, airborne launch control for 200 Minuteman IIIs, 2 F–15 squadrons for continental air defense, Pershing II, and all R&D for a new manned bomber.

• Cut the B–52G alert rate from [less than 1 line not declassified] (roughly [number not declassified] fewer aircraft with [number not declassified] weapons would escape a surprise Soviet attack.)

In General Purpose Forces:

• Close the M–60 tank production line before the XM–1 starts (leaving us no surge capability), and cut the eventual XM–1 rate by a third—to 60/month, or about a quarter the Soviet T–72 rate. Delay start of IFV/CFV production until FY 81.

• Eliminate 2 of the 9 new armored/mechanized battalions, 3000 NATO-deployed support spaces, 3000 more support spaces for non-NATO, contingencies, a third of our 155mm guns for early use in NATO, and all 16 of the new electronic warfare and intelligence battalions planned as part of the LTDP (the Soviets now use 15–20 times as many jammers as has the U.S. Army, and roughly 50 times as many intercept location systems).

• Cancel the Roland surface-to-air missile program (an international project), the advanced scout helicopter program, and ¼-ton, 2½-ton, and 5-ton truck procurement, and buy 83 fewer UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters.

• In the Marine Corps, eliminate the XM–1 tank program, modernization of LVT–7 amphibious tractors, helicopter reliability improvements, and procurement of laser designators for precision guidance.

• In tactical air, eliminate one USAF wing, all three Navy carrier-based ELINT squadrons, all five USAF Special Operations squadrons, and half of the Marine Reserve A–4 squadrons.

• Cancel procurement of the GBU–15 electro-optical glide bomb, new Navy carrier-based cargo aircraft needed to replace obsolete C–1s, and cut the combined A–10 and F–16 production rate by 15%.

• End all V/STOL programs, including both the Navy’s exploratory program and the Marines’ AV–8B.

• End development of the EF–111A, the Air Force’s only radar jamming aircraft.

• End several advanced radar and reconnaissance programs.

• In naval forces, retire 42 ships early (thus prolonging instead of reversing the decrease in size of the fleet), and cut ready Marine amphibious lift to less than a Division/Wing team (i.e., 85%). (A dozen years ago Soviet lift was 6% of ours; it is 18% today; it would be 40% of ours by 1986 at this level.)

• Fund 3 fewer ships, do not modernize the missiles on our nuclear cruisers, cut P–3 procurement from 12 to 10, and do not buy anti-ship Tomahawk.

• End 5 major naval R&D programs (Captor, advanced lightweight torpedo, replacement for the P–3, the ASMD missile, and SIRCS).

• In mobility forces, end the KC–10 program, modernize only 60% (vs. all) of the C–141 fleet, and cut our overall strategic airlift capability (e.g., by 17% for a deployment to Iran).

• In R&D, cut real growth rates from 10% to 7% in basic research, and from 5% to 3% in exploratory development, through FY 81, with no real growth in later years.

• In C3, eliminate CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR airborne command posts, cancel the digital data link for AWACS, and defer 6 AWACS from FY 81/2 to the end of the NATO buy, have only four E–4Bs rather than 6, cancel the over-the-horizon radar project, slip the IOC of Navstar GPS by 2 years, and the IOC of the Clipper Bow radar ocean surveillance satellite by 3 years.

Though the roughly 4% reduction in funding from the basic to the decremented level may seem modest in comparison with the obvious havoc it would wreak in the defense program, I believe that what I have described above is realistic, and that though alternative kinds of reductions in R&D, procurement, or forces could be taken, they would be equally destructive of our military capability.

The decremented level illustrates the sensitivity of the defense program to its funding. However, I do not consider it a serious alternative. In my judgment, it would clearly mark a degree of military retrenchment by the United States which, in the face of the Soviet buildup, would prevent us from countering the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

II. Impact on Allied Perceptions—and Performance

In launching the Carter initiatives to strengthen NATO’s defense posture, we had two aims. One was to improve efficiency through rationalization. The other, and chief immediate aim, was to generate greater Allied contributions—without which U.S. defense budget increases alone would not do the job. But this required the United States, as the price of leadership, to commit itself as well to the same 3% real annual growth. So far this has worked. Nine countries—which together account for over 90% of Allied defense outlays—have pledged that they will achieve the 3% increase on average during 1979–83.

By the same token, if the United States again falls below 3% only eight months after the Washington Summit blessed the Long Term Defense Plan, it will inevitably invite—and in my judgment ensure—Allied cuts as well. We have no way of estimating the magnitude of such cuts: they will depend on each country’s political and economic situation. A conservative estimate is that the reduction would on the average amount to a cumulative decrease over five years in defense effort among our allies of $10–20 billion in 1977 dollars.

Nor can we specify the particular Allied programs that would be cut, except that most would necessarily be from readiness and defense investment, i.e., modernization rather than force size or people costs. Thus the cuts would inevitably delay, if not undermine, implementation of key LTDP measures, adversely affecting the long-term goal of rationalization, standardization and interoperability.

The impact on Allied perceptions of U.S. determination, while even less quantifiable, is likely to be still more serious. Having just taken the initiative in NATO and demonstrated vigorous leadership, we would again be seen as all too quickly changing course. Though our anti-inflationary rationale would be understandable to—and quickly adopted by—European elites, our move would also be interpreted, given our necessary attention to strategic forces and SALT II, as a lower level of concern and commitment about the NATO/WP balance than over the superpower strategic balance—whatever the cost to Europe. A corresponding perception would arise among the Japanese. It is doubtful that we could rebuild this momentum; even if we could, years would be required.

The likely reactions by Moscow, Peking, and Tokyo, as well as those of states friendly to us in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, would be a perception that the trend in the balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union, already of concern, now could be depended upon certainly to worsen. They would further question U.S. resolve—with obvious consequences for our foreign policy and our position in the world.

III. Domestic Considerations

The international political implications of not following through on the 3% pledge thus are obvious and dramatic. The domestic political implications may not be as immediately visible, but they probably would be significant.

One reason for the success you have had in meeting criticism of the B–1 decision, the nuclear carrier veto, the Korean ground forces withdrawal, and other similar actions has been the ability to counter charges that these actions were evidence that this Administration is soft on defense. You and I have been able to counter these charges by stating consistently that you were committed to real growth in the defense budget after years of neglect. Critics were left to argue about the choices among individual programs, but not about the needed overall level of defense spending.

If you now decide not to approve 3% real growth for FY 1980, these critics—both in and out of Congress—would have their positions considerably strengthened. Particularly distressed would be those members of Congress (of both parties) who have supported our most controversial program decisions on the basis of the commitment to overall real growth.

One of the more immediate results of this would be to make it more difficult to obtain Congressional and public support for a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. It would give ammunition to the opponents on an issue whose very complexity forces many of the public to form an opinion on it simply according to their general confidence in the judgment and commitment reflected in our national security policy. I believe it would also seriously complicate the ability of the JCS—whose attitudes also are influenced by their perception of the quality of the commitment of defense, as evidence in tangible ways—to support such agreements. Though (with one or two possible exceptions) they would in my judgment not declare against a SALT agreement, the quality of the support they would give under Congressional questioning would be seriously eroded. And even one defection among the Chiefs would greatly aid opponents.

Every recent poll I have seen shows broad, and growing, public support for a real increase in the United States defense effort. There has been wide editorial support, lately even from commentators not usually friendly to defense. The election results earlier this month, although somewhat mixed, also I believe in general reflect this support. Your public statements have consistently recognized defense needs, avoiding adverse effects from that trend. Without an increase in defense spending at the 3% level, which has been committed to and urged on our allies, the issue of credibility will certainly be raised, as it has been already even by such a socially-sensitive paper as the Washington Post.³

At the same time, there is no question that reducing the level of real growth in defense spending will help—although marginally—in meeting a reduced-deficit target (although as I have pointed out often, Defense has shrunk dramatically as a portion of the federal budget from what it was fifteen years ago, and cannot be held responsible for the current deficit problem). To some degree it might make it much easier for other departments and constituencies to accept program reductions, though I doubt that they would ever acquiesce; at the same time, probably many overlapping and conflicting claims would be made against any supposed “defense dividend.” As you know, a decision among ten such claimants would produce nine infuriated losers and one ingrate.

In summary, excluding national security needs, which I believe to be the central issue, and considering only the political questions, I believe that while cutting the defense figure would ease slightly a tough budget problem, it would be of only marginal help, and not enough to offset the many negative consequences of such an action. In the overall political picture, I suspect that while a visible shift away from defense would give short-term satisfaction to some constituencies (although they would probably continue to complain that the shift was only a token), over the next few years the majority of the American public will weigh steadfastness on defense as a virtue and an extremely important one.

IV. Conclusion

I have planned the defense program in light of the needs of the future—a future which our actions now are shaping—as well as in light of present contingencies. I have built it with my eye on the defense programs we need, not a particular budget figure—but not of course without paying attention to realistic constraints on resources. The difficult task has not been to build a program to reach the range of a 3% annual real growth budget level. Rather, it has been to cut enough important programs in order to reduce it down to that level, yet retain an overall program which I can assure you will provide adequately for the security of the United States.

The programs presented here are as they have been balanced by me, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and our staffs. Not every item is sacrosanct, and each is open to your questioning. But the programs have been assembled at each level into what I consider a coherent whole. There may be particular items included at any level which for reasons of policy you may decide not to include. In the event that you do, I would have to rebalance the overall program at that level to take account of such omission.

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Utgoff, Box 157, Budget, 1/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not printed are an undated chart prepared in the Department of Defense entitled “Department of Defense—YOA & Outlay Summaries” and undated papers prepared in the Department of Defense on several specific issues.
2. Carter attended a meeting on defense appropriations on Monday, December 4, from 9 to 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary.) No minutes of the meeting were found.
3. Reference is to Art Pine and Edward Walsh, “Carter Seen Wavering on Defense Rise,” Washington Post, November 29, 1978, p. A1.