Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

62. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 12, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Report for 1977: A Critical Self-Appraisal

I. THE INHERITANCE

The international position of the United States at the end of 1976 was not good.

Our Allies were uneasy about our constancy, our will, and our ability to lead. Our adversaries were openly speculating about the political consequences of “the general crisis of capitalism.” The Third World was generally hostile or disappointed. The American public distrusted our policies and deplored the apparent lack of moral content in our actions and goals.

More generally, there was a widespread sense abroad that the United States was fearful of global change, indifferent to the newly surfacing aspirations of mankind, and thus unable to exercise creative leadership, designed to propel historical change in the right directions.

More specifically,

—The Europeans—though the overall relationship with Europe had been improving since the 1973 “Year of Europe” fiasco² and the energy-related political crisis of 1974—were uneasy that the United States was not genuinely in favor of European unity. There was a feeling that the U.S. ranked its relations with the Soviet Union above those with its Allies. The two Economic Summits³ had not succeeded in restoring a sense of confidence that the Western States could overcome their economic difficulties, either individually or in concert. That economic woe was compounded by uncertainty over the course of domestic European politics, especially in southern Europe. The fact that the Republican administration had seemed to be writing Portugal off as lost compounded European anxieties.

—The Soviets were projecting a sense of confidence, flushed with recent success in Angola, and were capitalizing on the centrality which the Soviet-American relationship had apparently acquired in U.S. foreign policy to seek a condominium arrangement over the heads of U.S. Allies.

—Relations with the countries of Eastern Europe were at a generally low ebb. The previous Administration tended to see policy toward these countries as a subordinate to that followed toward the USSR. President Ford’s comments on Eastern Europe during the television debate further reinforced the feeling that little concern and attention was devoted to Eastern Europe.⁴

—Our bilateral relations with the PRC were eroding. Trade had declined from the 1974 high. Government-facilitated scientific and cultural exchanges were fewer in 1976 than in 1975.

—In the Middle East, the Arabs were perplexed by the U.S. failure to move beyond initial step-by-step arrangements undertaken after the 1973 war. Virtually no movement toward accommodation had taken place since the Sinai II Agreement of 1975.⁵ The severe war in Lebanon had diverted attention from the peacemaking process.

—The Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle presented a specific problem. Turkey remained deeply embittered, and fearful that the new Administration would echo the pro-Greek position of the Congress. Greece had withdrawn its forces from NATO (though in practice this meant little);⁶ the Turkish DCA was stalled in Congress;⁷ and both the Cyprus intercommunal discussions and Greek-Turkish negotiations were not moving.

—The United States was badly out of tune with the Third World, with little awareness of the need for economic, political and social change or sympathy for ideological diversity. There was overemphasis on realpolitik and an exaggerated preoccupation with the Soviet threat. Through the Third World, there was a pervasive feeling of anti-Americanism.

• The Latin Americans were resentful of continued neglect, and fearful about the consequences of the emphasis being placed by Washington on the U.S.-Brazilian relationship. We had failed to come to grips with the Panama problem.

• The Africans were openly hostile to our policies, to the point that Nigeria even cancelled an official visit by the U.S. Secretary of State,⁸ though the Lusaka speech⁹ was beginning to make a turn-around. The burden of our misadventure in Angola was still very heavy.

• In South Asia, we were still laboring under the heritage of the Nixon “tilt” of 1971¹⁰ and personal animosities between American and Indian leadership. The Indians were veering ever closer to the Soviet Union.

• There was no comprehensive approach to Third World economic problems. While the UNGA Seventh Special Session¹¹ had removed some of the worst pressure, CIEC showed little prospect of success,¹² and the Nairobi UNCTAD meeting had been a debacle.¹³

• In the United Nations we were largely isolated and ineffective; the attitude of the Administration in the wake of the Moynihan era did little to stem the downward trend of U.S. opinion toward the United Nations.

—Various global issues were simply on the back burner. Many believed, both at home and abroad, that the Indian explosion¹⁴ proved that the nuclear horse had already left the barn and it was too late to slam the door. In addition, the U.S. was the world’s number one arms merchant and showed no signs of diminishing its aggressive sales effort. Finally, with respect to human rights, the image of the United States abroad was that of a nation primarily concerned with might and money, only involved with human rights when these happened to coincide with other interests.

—International economic issues. By year’s end, the cautious optimism of the summer had given way to growing concern about a slowdown in world economic growth. The Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN), launched in 1973, were moving at a snail’s pace despite commitments of the principal trading countries to a more energetic negotiating effort.¹⁵ At home, protectionist pressures from sectors impacted by imports were on the rise. Finally, OPEC announced in late December a 5–10% price increase on oil, an action which would adversely affect trade flows and payments balances in 1977.¹⁶

World opinion reflected these criticisms and concerns. Here is a brief sampling:

—If the Carter Administration gives more consideration to the views and worries of Allies and friendly countries, “it will be worth much more than Kissinger’s ‘Year of Europe’ . . .” (Frankfurter Neue Press, January, 1977)

—The “greatest task facing Japan, the U.S. and Europe this year is to establish a new cooperative structure . . .” (Tokyo’s Sankei, January, 1977)

—“There has been a feeling among the Allies that if Kissinger’s policy was flawed, it was his emphasis on the Soviet relationship. They have long suspected that he went further than necessary to be friendly with the Muscovites. In this lies Carter’s opportunity.” (Joseph Harsh in the Christian Science Monitor, December, 1976)

—“The USSR . . . has silently forged a formidable war machine. Will the West be so irresponsible as to let it do this? This is the great question on the eve of the inauguration of the new U.S. President . . .” (Paris’ Aurore, January, 1977)

—Kissinger, because of his step-by-step approach, “was able to set aside the most difficult issues between Egypt and Israel and select the manageable ones for negotiation. His successor will not be able to do so. There now is a consensus in the area that there is no room for further small steps.” (Henry Tanner in the New York Times, December, 1976)

—“There can be no greater tonic to the Third World countries than the knowledge that we have, at last, come to the end of the Kissinger era. We hope that Mr. Carter . . . will display a refreshing readiness to see African problems in far more clear-cut terms of principle than those at any time reflected in the posture of the State Department during Kissinger’s tenure.” (The New Nigerian, January, 1977)

—“We think the realities of world politics give Latin America a position not very high in President Carter’s priorities.” However, “following a policy of indifference . . . anything concrete or substantive that Carter would do would at least be something . . .” (El Universal, Caracas, January, 1977)

—“Jimmy Carter has promised to make life much more difficult for would-be buyers of arms from the U.S. . . . But a man with Mr. Carter’s commitments on cutting unemployment is going to find it very hard to cut foreign (arms) sales, too.” (Financial Times of London, January 1977)

—“. . . the seeming indifferences of the last Administration to such value (human rights) contribute to the declined confidence in the foreign policy and, eventually to its loss at the polls.” (The Washington Post, January, 1977)

II. YOUR RESPONSE

U.S. foreign policy was clearly in need of broad renovation. Your Administration recognized the need to move on a wide front, to deal with a variety of complex issues—thus making a break with the predominant pattern of U.S. foreign policy in previous years. That pattern had largely involved a heavy concentration on the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with most other aspects of foreign policy being derivative of that relationship.

Instead, the new Administration accepted the reality of complexity and of change, and it placed emphasis not so much on maneuver, but on building new relationships with friends, with adversaries, with the developing world, even with the whole world—in the hope thereby of renovating the existing international system. In so doing, it was motivated by the following central objectives:

1. To engage Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced democracies in closer political cooperation, thereby also promoting wider macro-economic coordination among them.

2. To weave a worldwide web of bilateral, political, and, where appropriate, economic cooperation with the new emerging regional powers, thereby extending our earlier reliance on Atlanticism to include such newly influential countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, Indonesia in a wider pattern of international cooperation.

3. To exploit the foregoing in the development of more accommodating North-South relations, both political and economic, thereby reducing the hostility toward the United States that in recent years had developed within the Third World.

4. To push U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks into strategic arms reduction talks, and to widen the scope of American-Soviet collaboration by engaging the Soviet Union in a wider pattern of negotiating relationships, thereby making detente both more comprehensive and reciprocal.

5. To normalize U.S.-Chinese relations in order to preserve the U.S.-Chinese relationship as a major stabilizing factor in the global power balance.¹⁷

6. To seek a comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement, without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the reentry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East would be difficult to avoid.

7. To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa and to forge closer cooperation with the moderate black African countries.

8. To restrict the level of global armaments and to inhibit nuclear proliferation through international agreements as well as unilateral U.S. acts.

9. To enhance global sensitivity to human rights through pertinent U.S. actions, comments, and example, thereby also seizing the ideological initiative.

10. To renovate the U.S. and NATO defense posture in keeping with the requirements posed by the Soviet arms buildup.

The basic premise of the foregoing was that the United States should undertake to play in the world as constructive a role as the one that it did play shortly after World War II, but in a vastly changed context. The new Administration felt that the U.S. should help in the shaping of a new international system that cannot be confined to the developed countries but must involve increasingly the entire international community of more than 150 nation-states. Unlike the years 1945–1950, this should call not for American dictation but for more subtle inspiration and cooperative leadership on a much wider front.

[Omitted here is Section III. Policy Performance and Evaluation.]

IV. AN OVERVIEW

It is probably fair and not only self-serving to conclude that the first year in foreign policy was a relative success. Progress has been made toward deeper and more structural improvements in regard to a number of key regional, bilateral or global problems. The Administration has not gone for quick successes or band-aids; on the contrary, it has undertaken responses which are potentially of a more structural and enduring kind. The real payoffs will come later but they are likely to last longer.

Our accomplishments and our shortcomings can perhaps be best summarized in a brief table:

Our pluses:

—U.S. again identified at home and abroad with moral values, generating some genuine progress regarding human rights;

—Shaped a new agenda for international action on neglected areas of human rights, non-proliferation, arms restraint;

—More emphasis on the centrality of Alliance relations in U.S. foreign policy and on the priority of North-South accommodation;

—Explicit U.S. support for European unity and progress on NATO military renovation;

—Novel emphasis on importance of bilateral relations with France, India and new regional influentials; underscoring our respect for diversity;

—Generation of genuine momentum for comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

—Identification with African states and liberation leaders in the search for a solution to the Southern African conflict—preemption of Soviet influence in that area.

—Panama Canal treaties and new maturity in our relations with Latin America;

—Arms sales for the first time under control and substantive talks underway with Allies and Soviets;

—An active policy to inhibit nuclear proliferation, including the initiation of INFCE;¹⁸

—The initiation of a wide spectrum of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, even while deemphasizing the primacy of U.S.-Soviet relations in U.S. foreign policy;

—Determined efforts to scale down U.S.-Soviet nuclear armaments, to halt qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry; and to obtain a CTB;

—Positive U.S. interest in East European independence and respect for human rights, without subordination to U.S.-Soviet relations;

—Enhancement of U.S. long-range rapid reaction military capability;

—Energetic pursuit of the MTN, joint efforts against inflation, and stimulation of economic growth.

Our minuses:

—Unnecessary friction with some friendly states over nuclear non-proliferation;

—Stimulation of fear of U.S. unilateralism and unpredictability;

—Uncertainty about how we reconcile detente and Alliance security;

—Lack of adequate preparation of the Soviets for our new approach;

—Underestimation of domestic reaction to some aspects of our Middle Eastern policy;

—Absence of concrete economic initiatives on the North-South front;

—Seeming disinterest in the Far East;

—Some loss of credibility in the energy and non-proliferation areas;

—Seeming softness in our policy regarding Soviet assertiveness;

—Except for the Notre Dame address, inadequate articulation of our broad foreign policy assumptions and priorities.

With the above in mind, it is noteworthy to note the nature of the criticism that has lately been directed at this Administration’s foreign policy. Almost none of it entails any specific or concrete charge. The Administration is neither condemned for any particular major failure (such as the Bay of Pigs) nor for any particular misdeed (destabilization of Chile, or the fruitless enterprise in Angola, or the ineptitude regarding Cyprus). In contrast, it is criticized more generally for a lack of cohesion, for absence of clearcut priorities, or for shortcomings on the level of tactical execution.

Some of these charges may, in fact, be justified. It is probably true that in the first year we undertook too much and thus could not deliver enough. At the same time, what we undertook was in some respects a response to what we inherited. Thus, in a sense, the generalized charge of lack of cohesion involves in some measure an acknowledgment that there has been an absence of specific failures or misdeeds.

Our own self-criticism—in addition to the ones made earlier—would tend to be of a different nature: we probably did overstate our determination to pursue a different and more ambitious SALT agreement than we are now prepared to accept, and we may have thereby created the false impression in Moscow that being tough with the Carter Administration in fact pays off. We may have at times overstated the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, thereby again stimulating fears in Western Europe that the United States is preparing to cut a deal with the Soviet Union not entirely in keeping with European interests. We probably have not put enough emphasis on our relations with China, and we have failed to exploit the Chinese end of the U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle in order to advance our own interests. We did occasionally act with insufficient consistency in regard to the Middle East, and in retrospect the U.S.-Soviet statement was both too explicit and implied more than was either intended or necessary.¹⁹

More generally, there is also the wider issue of the total impression created by our foreign policy. In this connection, it might be useful to look at alternative U.S. foreign policies in terms of four types, each based on certain basic preferences and assumptions. I could call them, to emphasize that they are part of a spectrum (with exaggerations at the edges), the liberal/liberal model; the liberal; the conservative; and the conservative/conservative. In a condensed fashion, the foregoing can be represented as follows:²⁰

Liberal2	Liberal	Conservative	Conservative2
Basic Priority: Detente	Basic Priority: Close relations with Allies and	Basic Priority: Balance of power	Basic Priority: Primarily anti-communism
Emphasis on	Third World
SALT and arms		Anti-Soviet focus	Anti-Soviet
control	Both competition		emphasis
	as well as accom-	Pro-Chinese
Clear-cut	modation with		Anti-Chinese
preference for	the Soviets	Suspicious of
defense cuts		SALT and arms	Anti SALT and
	Moderate	control	arms control
Eagerness to	toughness on
accommodate	SALT	Indifferent to	Hard on Cuba
with Cuba		Cuba
	Normalization		Hard on Vietnam
	with China	Indifferent to Vietnam
Eagerness to accommodate	Caution on Cuba and Vietnam	5–10% real growth per	10–15% per annum real
Vietnam		|annum in defense	growth in Defense
	Moderate in-		spending
Settle regional	creases—under	Pro B-1
conflicts together	5% per annum—		Foreign aid only
with Soviets	in the defense	Pro human rights	for political and
	budget	in Communist	predominantly
Be nice to the		regimes	anti-communist
Third World	Pro human rights		purposes
	generally	Indifferent to
Discontinue arms		LDCs	Generally
exports	Limited and		anti-LDC
	pragmatic in-	Inclined to keep
Hit hard the con-	volvement of So-	Soviet Union out	Pro South Africa
servative regimes	viets in solution	of regional
on the issue of	of regional	solutions	Pro human rights
human rights	conflict		in Communist
(but ignore viola-		Suspicious of	regimes
tions by radical		Panama Canal
regimes)		Treaty	Anti Panama Canal Treaty

By and large, at the risk of some simplification, it can be said that the conservative2 position can be identified with Senator Goldwater; the conservative position with Senator Jackson and Henry Kissinger; the liberal policy position has been on the whole characteristic of your Administration; the liberal2 posture has been associated with McGovern.

However, lately on a number of issues the dividing line between your stand and the liberal2 position has become blurred, and in some respects, your foreign policy has appeared to some people as increasingly fitting the liberal2 model. Some have the impression that accommodation with the Soviet Union is your primary objective; that we wish to settle regional problems by working primarily with the Soviet Union, that we are not sensitive to Allied concerns; and that we are harder on human rights only when they are violated by conservative regimes.

Foreign policy to a large extent is a matter of nuance and tone. Given the shifts in public opinion within the United States, I think it would be useful for you to adopt occasionally a tone which would place you more precisely within the liberal model and even at times leaning toward the conservative model. Needless to say, my own judgment is that the liberal model corresponds best to the nature of global change and provides the more fruitful approach for a creative American role in the world. Our ability to adopt that posture, however, will be greatly weakened politically if we are seen as primarily following a liberal2 approach; we can even gain some political support if, from time to time, we seem to be adopting a somewhat tougher conservative posture, especially on such matters as the Soviet role in the world, Cuban “neocolonialism”, or on human rights.

V. THIS YEAR’S PRIORITIES

A recent review with the Vice President has yielded the following priorities for the next year:

Must Win Issues (Presidential)

—Progress in Middle East negotiations

—Ratification of Panama Canal Treaties

—SALT/CTB

High Priority (Presidential)

—Defense Decisions during Congressional review of the Budget (e.g., M–X ) and a Presidential Address on Defense Issues

—International Economic and Trade Policy (including East-West Trade)

—Trip to Latin America, Africa

—NATO/Economic Summits and follow-on

—Nuclear Non-Proliferation Legislation

—Human Rights

—Arms Sales

In addition to supporting you on these Presidential Priority Agenda items, my staff will be bringing to your attention decisions on gray area systems initiatives, intelligence charters, and Indian Ocean arms limits. There are three other matters that are emergency or high priority issues requiring a national strategy and your attention.

—International economic issues: in particular, a defense of the dollar, a continued freeze on oil prices, coordinated stimulation of the world economy, MTN agreement (this year), and commodity agreements. These issues may come to have a very important and difficult political dimension in our relations with West Germany and the oil producing countries.

—China. We need to find ways to maintain momentum on that aspect of our relations where we have common concerns—global security issues deriving from Soviet efforts to expand their influence. I will be suggesting that in the spring, about the time of a SALT agreement, I should visit Peking.²¹ The Chinese have explicitly asked for such a visit and it would help balance a SALT agreement politically both in China and at home. Subsequently, I believe the Vice President should visit China later this year after the Congressional elections.²² We can offer the Chinese little else but visits, until concrete progress on normalization opens up.

—Soviet Union. We have invested a great deal of effort in the expansion of the U.S.-Soviet negotiating relationships. Some of these have been moving forward in a promising fashion. There is thus some real hope for a more stable and more generally reciprocal U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the same time, either by design or simply as a response to an apparent opportunity, the Soviets have stepped up their efforts to exploit African turbulence to their own advantage. The Soviet/Cuban military presence in Ethiopia is particularly dangerous and could then produce a reaction in this country which could jeopardize not only SALT but the wider fabric of the emerging U.S.-Soviet relationship. Accordingly, at some early opportunity, you should communicate your concerns to Brezhnev, emphasizing to him that there is no such thing as a selective or compartmentalized detente.

—Greece and Turkey. The new Ecevit Government opens up the prospect of real progress on Cyprus and the Aegean.²³ However, for Congressional reasons related to Panama, we don’t want to move too quickly. We need a quiet planning session with the Turks to map a coordinated strategy with respect to progress on Cyprus and associated progress on the Turkish DCA.

Bearing in mind last year’s experience, as well as our overall appraisal, it might also be noteworthy in this connection to note the following. We confront a danger of an alliance developing for the purpose of stalemating our foreign policy as a whole. The linkage of such issues as Panama, SALT and the Middle East, not to mention priority issues of the second order, or a crisis in Ethiopia, could generate a coalition which might effectively make the case for a “tougher” foreign policy. Different constituencies would emphasize different aspects but the total effect could be one of stalemate. Accordingly, you should:

—Somewhat toughen your rhetoric on foreign policy issues, emphasizing more the theme of national security and human rights.

—Stand firm in the negotiating process in SALT by insisting on Soviet concessions regarding Backfire and the numerical aggregates. Also, adopt a delaying posture regarding China, CTB and MBFR, and stay away from definitely sensitive areas of international politics (i.e., Cuba and Vietnam, which give us nothing and cost a great deal).

—Concentrate on Panama, and on other steps toward peace in the Middle East, so that ratification of the Panama Treaties and peace progress in the Middle East would represent tangible accomplishments before we plunge last into SALT.

—Give a pro-defense speech some time this winter.

[Omitted here is the annex entitled “Record of Goals and Actions.”]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Outside the System File, Box 49, Chron: 1/78. Secret; Eyes Only for the President. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to the President under a January 13 cover memorandum, noting that he, Aaron, and the NSC Staff had prepared it and suggesting that parts of the memorandum might be shared with top congressional leaders and a “friendly columnist.” He also recommended that the President provide a copy to Rosalynn Carter, as he believed the First Lady would “find it informative.” The President wrote “no” on the cover memorandum next to the recommendation that the memorandum be shared with congressional leaders and the press; however, he underlined Rosalynn’s name and wrote “ok” in the margin. The First Lady added the following notation: “Zbig, I made very few comments but found it very interesting. I’d think some of it could be presented to press. R.” In the top right-hand corner of the cover memorandum, the President wrote: “Zbig—I read it all & agree with most of it.”
2. Reference is to Kissinger’s April 23, 1973, address entitled “The Year of Europe,” which he delivered before the annual meeting of Associated Press editors in New York. In it, Kissinger proposed the promulgation of a new Atlantic Charter and the articulation of common objectives. For the text of the address, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 8.
3. References are to the November 1975 Economic Summit at Rambouillet, France and the June 1976 Economic Summit at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico. For documentation on both summits, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 91–152.
4. Reference is to the October 6, 1976, Presidential debate in San Francisco; see Document 11. During the discussion on Eastern Europe and the Helsinki Agreement, Ford asserted: “There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford administration.” When asked by Frankel to clarify his remarks, Ford added: “I don’t believe, Mr. Frankel, that the Yugoslavians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don’t believe that the Romanians consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. I don’t believe the Poles consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union. Each of these countries is independent, autonomous; it has it own territorial integrity. And the United States does not concede that those countries are under the domination of the Soviet Union.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book III, pp. 2416–2417)
5. Reference is to the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, commonly known as Sinai II, signed on September 1, 1975. For the text of the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 226.
6. The Government of Greece withdrew military forces from NATO in early August 1974; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 20.
7. Reference is to the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which remained stalled in Congress as late as September 1976. During a September 29, 1976, meeting with Caglayangil, Kissinger indicated that the Turkish Government would “obtain nothing” until after the Presidential election. (Ibid., Document 246)
8. The Government of Nigeria rescinded an invitation for Kissinger to visit Nigeria during his April–May 1976 African trip. (John Darnton, “Nigeria Cancels Invitation to Kissinger,” The New York Times, April 8, 1976, p. 8) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 212.
9. Reference is to Kissinger’s April 27, 1976, address in Lusaka, Zambia, in which he discussed U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. For the text of the address, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 77.
10. Reference is to the Nixon administration’s “tilt” toward Pakistan during the 1971 political crisis and subsequent war between India and Pakistan, which had developed as a result of the crisis.
11. The UN General Assembly Seventh Special Session took place in New York September 1–16, 1975, and focused upon development and international economic cooperation, including food assistance. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–14, Part I, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976, Documents 27–29 and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Documents 117, 124, 286, and 295–299.
12. See footnote 8, Document 6.
13. See footnote 7, Document 47.
14. Reference is to the May 1974 Indian nuclear explosion.
15. See footnote 11, Document 29.
16. OPEC announced the price increase at the OPEC Oil Ministers meeting at Doha, Qatar, December 15–17. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 113.
17. In the left-hand margin next to this point, the President wrote: “While protecting Taiwan/US critical relationships.”
18. See footnote 3, Document 56.
19. The U.S.-Soviet joint statement on the Middle East and on the reconvening of the Geneva Conference was released on October 1. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 120.
20. In the left-hand margin next to the table, the First Lady wrote: “I don’t think this should be released to the press.”
21. Brzezinski traveled to Beijing in late May 1978. For the memoranda of conversation of Brzezinski’s meetings with Chinese officials, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 108–111.
22. Mondale did not visit China until August 1979.
23. Ecevit served as Prime Minister of Turkey from June to July 1977, whereupon he was succeeded by Demirel. Following a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly in late December 1977, Demirel resigned, and Koruturk appointed Ecevit as Prime Minister. Ecevit won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly on January 17, 1978. Documentation on these developments is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.