Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

151. Address by Secretary of State Muskie¹

New York, July 7, 1980

The Costs of Leadership

I welcome this opportunity to address the Foreign Policy Association and to raise with you an issue of fundamental and long-term importance to our nation. It is a matter that cuts across all aspects of our foreign policy. It will decide whether the United States can have an effective, affirmative foreign policy in the years ahead—or be left simply to wring our hands and react to crises.

The issue is this: Are we willing to commit sufficient resources to the defense of our interests and the promotion of our ideals abroad? The issue was raised again by the decision last week on Capitol Hill to lop off still more of the funds we budget to help other countries bolster their security, develop their economies, and help their people to survive.² In less than 90 days, FY 1980 will be over. We’ve gone all this time with no aid appropriation for 1980. We’ve limped along at last year’s spending levels. The practical effect has been deep cuts in critical programs and projects. Now we have a supplemental appropriation. It belatedly funds a few of the most urgent activities—but then excludes all the others. This is not a solution. It has simply prolonged much of the problem.

Consider just a few examples of what we are forced to neglect because of the delay and the deletions I have mentioned.

• There is currently a serious shortage in Export-Import Bank lending authority, a vehicle to promote American trade. That means fewer American jobs and reduced American profits.

• Foreign military credit sales are curtailed—credits that could have been used in areas of the world important to our security. Can anyone look at Soviet activism in the world and conclude that this is the time to neglect the security needs of our friends?

• The international military education and training program—a program that increases the professionalism of military officers in developing countries—has been cut by 25%.

• We are funding international narcotics control efforts at 20% below the amount approved earlier by a conference of the House and Senate. This is not a large program, but it serves our interests by attacking the drug problem that costs the American people billions each year in crime, in lost health, and in ravaged lives.

• We have to absorb serious cuts in the Agency for International Development’s (AID) programs to promote food production, rural development, and nutrition. Projects in the Caribbean, in Kenya, and in North Yemen are among those in jeopardy.

• The multilateral programs are especially hard hit. Only 16% of what we owe the World Bank has been approved. Funding for the African Development Fund would drop 40% from the budgeted amount—inviting interpretations that America’s concern for this important African institution is waning and reversing the steady improvement in our relations with Africa under President Carter. There is also a serious deficiency in funds for the Asian Development Bank.

When we fall short in our contributions to these banks, development—and people—suffer. Our influence in the banks suffers. Our ability to get others to contribute suffers. Ultimately, our diplomacy suffers. Our contributions to the banks are not simply invented by the Administration; they are negotiated. The Carter Administration has been scrupulous about consulting the Congress at every stage of those negotiations. When the funds are then cut, developing countries lose help they desperately need. And in the process, other contributors—our allies and friends—lose confidence in America’s word.

I am not here simply to mourn the fate of a single aid bill, though in these times that would be cause enough for concern. What concerns me even more is a pattern. There is no lack of rhetoric calling for more American leadership in the world—leadership we must continue to provide. But if we are to continue to lead, then we must be prepared to pay the costs that leadership requires.

Humanitarian Concerns

If this declining trend in foreign assistance persists, we will contribute to a human tragedy of massive proportions. For we should always keep in mind that these programs work to help people. Let me cite just a few examples.

• Between 1966 and 1972, AID helped design 250 clean water systems in rural villages in Thailand. The program was successful and continued by the Thai Government. Now 800 villages are served. As a result, water-borne disease—a major Third World killer—has declined. At the same time, incomes have climbed and village life is more stable.

• In another case, AID started a credit system in Colombia enabling small farmers to take advantage of land reform. In a 15-year span, almost 35,000 small farms in Colombia have been financed. AID has sponsored similar programs throughout the Third World.

• An AID program in rural Guatemala has stressed improved teacher training and better school equipment. Through this program, the dropout rate in participating rural schools has been cut by over 30%.

Viewed from a distance no single project is dramatic. But for the people helped, even small projects are transforming lives. And the cumulative global impact is profound.

Impact on U.S. Interests

Let me emphasize that these programs involve far more than our humanitarian instincts. They bear strongly on our national interests. For the fact is that we have a deep and growing stake in developing countries. We cannot get along without them—as trading partners and markets; as sources of essential materials; as necessary partners in efforts to address pollution and population, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and countless other issues touching all of our lives. We want them to progress because we care about people. We also want them to succeed because our own economic health is bound up with theirs.

Our economic support funds—a central element in our security assistance—have been essential to our efforts to help strengthen the economies of such friends as Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. These funds also have provided major support for our effort to help bring stability and peaceful change to southern Africa.

There is nothing mysterious about the purpose of our international programs. It is an approach that makes sense in the world just as it does in our businesses, our families, or in any other aspect of our lives. Anticipating a problem and dealing with it is invariably safer and cheaper than waiting for crisis to erupt.

It is in our interest to do all we can now to counter the conditions that are likely to drive people to desperation later. It costs less to invest now in clean water systems than to work later at curing the diseases caused by foul water. It is prudent to help people toward agricultural self-sufficiency, instead of offering later the emergency programs needed to sustain life against drought and famine. We would rather send technicians abroad to help grow crops than send soldiers to fight the wars that can result when people are hungry and susceptible to exploitation by others. So let there be no mistake. By slashing these international programs we are not saving money. We are merely postponing and dramatically raising the costs that one day will come due.

These programs are important for another reason. With them, we have an opportunity to influence events in crucial areas of the world. Without them, our power to shape events is drastically diminished. All of us are concerned—and rightly so—that we not slip into military weakness. We are steadily modernizing our military posture. Yet cutting back our other international programs contributes to another kind of weakness, every bit as dangerous. It cuts back our arsenal of influence. Our support for liberty in the world—our defense of American and Western interests—cannot be mounted with military weapons alone. The battle for American influence in the world requires more than rockets, certainly more than rhetoric. It requires the resources that make our diplomacy effective.

Consequences

What are the likely consequences for America if we lack those resources? The first consequence is American isolation. We need healthy trading partners. We need access to facilities and resources. We need the support of others in helping to achieve peaceful alternatives to regional conflicts. We need political support—whether it be in resisting terrorism in Iran or aggression in Afghanistan. But we cannot expect the cooperation and support of others on issues of importance to us if we are unprepared to offer concrete support on matters of importance to them—particularly their own economic development and social progress.

Isolation would be only one consequence. Declining American aid, and declining American influence, would also help the Soviets exploit internal instability—in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and in many other places where the Soviets are prepared to exploit tensions to expand their power and to limit Western influence. Nothing that I know of the American people suggests to me that they want to give the Soviets this kind of free ride. I believe the American people want their nation to resist Soviet expansionism—not only militarily but by helping other nations defend their freedom and feed their people. I believe the American people want their nation to be actively involved in the world.

Finally, the decline of American aid and influence would hamper our efforts to settle dangerous disputes and build peaceful, democratic solutions.

Let me give you an example. Over the past 3 years, many in the Congress fought bitterly against President Carter’s Rhodesian policy. President Carter—courageously and almost alone—insisted that the United States actively support Britain’s effort to bring a democratically elected government to Rhodesia. Fortunately President Carter prevailed against bitter opposition. In fact, his refusal to compromise prematurely on Rhodesia helped bring to an end a bloody civil war in that country. The result has been good for the people of Zimbabwe and bad for the Soviets, who sought to exploit turmoil there.

Consider another case. We have been trying for a year and more to strengthen the center in Nicaragua to help moderates there resist extremist solutions. Every time we tried to appropriate the funds necessary to support our efforts in Nicaragua, the effort was defeated. Finally, Congress has acted to make possible $75 million needed to fulfill our commitment.³ But in the delay, we suffered a loss of credibility. The willingness of the United States to work for democracy was called into question throughout the region.

The point is this: Those most concerned about Soviet and Cuban activism in the world should be the strongest supporters of our efforts to support the moderate transition from repressive tyranny to democratic development. For by failing to support the alternatives to radicalism, we help radicalism to breed.

This continuing assault on foreign assistance is not only short sighted; it is dangerous to American interests. For it threatens the capacity of the United States to play a positive role in the world, to compete effectively with the Soviets, to encourage emerging—and threatened—democracies. It threatens to strip America of all its instruments except the instruments of destruction.

I believe that the American people, if they have the facts, will understand what is at stake. I believe they will understand that a generous investment in security assistance and economic development abroad is necessary to a strong America.

I am not new to this issue. Twenty-two years ago I made my support for international assistance a centerpiece of my first Senate campaign.⁴ And I am fully prepared to press the message until it gets through.

I think it is time for a healthy national debate on this subject. And I invite you, as citizens vitally concerned with America’s role in the world, to contribute to that debate. The price of silence could be growing isolation and even irrelevance for America. That is a price no American should want us to pay.

1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, August 1980, pp. 28–29. Muskie delivered his address before the Foreign Policy Association.
2. Presumable reference to House and Senate approval on July 2 of supplemental foreign assistance appropriations for FY 1980. The House rejected a proposal to add $528 million in foreign aid. (Martin Tolchin, “Congress Approves $16.9 billion In Added Appropriations for 1980,” The New York Times, July 3, 1980, pp. A–1, D–14) Muskie had earlier criticized congressional inaction on the appropriations bill during a June 13 news conference, noting that the lack of activity allowed the Soviet Union to take advantage of “the doors of opportunity to spread their influence.” (“Muskie: Congress Jeopardizing Policy by Not Approving Aid Bill,” The Washington Post, June 14, 1980, p. A–11)
3. The administration had proposed $75 million in aid for Nicaragua in November 1979 as part of a broader assistance package to Central America and the Caribbean. During a May 19, 1980, White House briefing for members of Congress, the President noted that the Senate had, that day, approved the supplementary development allocation for Central America. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 942) The President signed into law the authorizing legislation for the Special Central American Assistance Act (H.R. 6081; P.L. 96–257) on May 31.
4. Muskie, a former Governor of Maine, defeated Republican Senator Frederick Payne in 1958.