96. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 25, 1972, 12:50-1:15 a.m.1 2
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
- Winston Lord, NSC Staff
- Johnathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
- Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
- Three Notetakers
DATE & TIME: Friday, February 25, 1972 - 12:50-1:15 a.m.
PLACE: Guest House, Villa 2, Peking
Dr. Kissinger: The thing that, as I said, holds my staff together is the hope that they will be there when I collapse.
VM Chiao: Let’s begin our work. We studied the formulation which you put forward, and I reported it to Premier Chou En-lai. I would like to proceed in accordance with the spirit of the discussion held today with the President and Chou En-lai on Taiwan. And I don’t believe it is necessary for me to say much more on this. I would first like to say something concerning your formulation—places we find difficult for us.
Dr. Kissinger; We thought the Prime Ministers presentation showed a great understanding of the problem.
VM Chiao: Thank you. In the draft which you handed over this afternoon there is a possible misunderstanding of what we meant when we mentioned [Page 2] what was in the World Report. President Nixon said the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is not for the U.S. to decide. In the context of the World Report of the President it implied that you considered it to be an internal affair of China, but in the context of the Communique we don’t think this appropriate.
Now, why is that? Because it had already been made quite clear in the first part of this paragraph that there is only one China. You have already made clear that this is a matter between the two opposing sides in China. But to say it here about the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland, this would imply two possibilities. One eventuality is that Taiwan would separate itself from China and the other possibility would be to return to the embrace of the motherland. Of course, I don’t imply by that that that is your implication when you say that. I am just saying that placed in this context it will give my people this impression.
Dr. Kissinger: We took it out of context—a slight misunderstanding of what the Vice Foreign Minister said. We don’t insist on this.
VM Chiao: We suggest that this sentence be deleted.
Dr. Kissinger: Alright.
VM Chiao: Your following sentence “[the U.S.] believes that a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question by the parties concerned would do much to reduce tension in the Far East.” We think the general meaning is alright but I would like to make some changes.
Dr. Kissinger: But I am afraid you will take out the whole sentence.
VM Chiao: Because you have repeated the sentence …
Dr. Kissinger: No, no. Please give us your ideas.
VM Chiao: And then in your final sentence you want to link the question of the final withdrawal with certain conditions, and we should put it in such a way so that it would be passable for you and for us.
Dr. Kissinger: I think the Prime Minister expressed it very well this afternoon.
VM Chiao: As for the first sentence, there is the question that Taiwan is a province of China. That was originally agreed upon but this morning you [Page 3] told us in a frank way why you find it difficult to keep that wording, although, in our view the reasons you advanced were insufficient. I asked you why don’t you ask Connally and why don’t you ask Chiang Kai-shek? But nevertheless, we are willing to consider your difficulty in this matter. So we would like to make a concession to you on this point and put this idea into our statement. In our statement we would say Taiwan is a province of China.
Dr. Kissinger: And us?
VM Chiao: And for you Taiwan is a part of China. That is to say we have made efforts in the general spirit of the Prime Minister and the President to see to it that both your side and our side will [be satisfied].
Dr. Kissinger: Of course, I am in the same position as you were this afternoon. That is to say, I do not want to reply to this hastily and I would like to discuss it with the President. Just a preliminary comment. First, I recognize you have made an effort to move to take into account our difficulties and in a preliminary way I think that the first three sentences have moved us very far towards a solution. It is the relationship between those and the last sentence that is frankly the difficulty for both of us. And we will have to consider how … we realize that you do not want to make it conditional, and we would like to imply to some extent that it is. I am being very honest. But we will consider it. This is just a preliminary reaction, and I would like to discuss it with the President, and it is really this sentence at this moment that stands between us. Let us consider it overnight with the President and get together tomorrow morning again. Would that be a good way to proceed?
VM Chiao: Alright.
Dr. Kissinger: Now I have only the concern how we will bring this to a conclusion, much as I enjoy the company of the Vice Foreign Minister, and because I suppose you will have to consider any counter proposal we make.
VM Chiao: That is correct. This is a crucial question.
Dr. Kissinger: The other issues we will settle relatively easy.
VM Chiao: I believe there won’t need to be too much time spent on this, once this question is solved. As for the others, even if there is some differences of views they can be overcome.
[Page 4]Dr. Kissinger: I have a few suggestions on the part we discussed this morning. Should I give them to you now or should we wait until morning?
VM Chiao: You may as well tell us now. I enjoy your company.
Dr. Kissinger: In the first paragraph of page 2 you are saying they reviewed the international situation in which important changes are taking place and great upheavals exist. Upheavals do not exist. So, I would like to take out the word “exist” and have “important changes and great upheavals are taking place.” Consider it is purely a stylistic point.
VM Chiao: I don’t believe there would be any difficulty there.
Dr. Kissinger: Where you say “expressed their position and views”—purely stylistic—I am trying to refrain from using “views” in both sentences. How about “attitudes”? Does it present any problems?
VM Chiao: “Positions and attitudes”?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
VM Chiao: As a matter of style.
Dr. Kissinger: In the last paragraph 11 “… people want revolution”—“revolutionary changes” is better for us.
VM Chiao: We will consider the matter.
Dr. Kissinger: In our section where we say the U.S. side stated that in Asia—that paragraph in the middle where it says “… improving communication with countries that have different world outlooks.” I think “ideology” is better in English than “world outlook.”
VM Chiao: We will consider it.
Dr. Kissinger It will not fail for that reason. I think if we settle everything except that one I will yield. And one: other stylistic change which is not worth it now. We will do it tomorrow. In that paragraph prior to the principles, where you say “it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude against another country.” We are going to suggest “to divide up into spheres of interest.”
[Page 5]VM Chiao: You mean for major countries of the world to divide up into spheres of interest. We will review that. I believe that on this matter there is no difference on our basic thinking,
Dr. Kissinger: Alright, Those are the only changes I have now. Shall we meet tomorrow morning?
VM Chiao: As to when we will meet, that is up to you.
Dr. Kissinger: I have to talk with the President. He is going to the Forbidden City and so the press will think I am very blase—seen it once, why see it again.
VM Chiao: Maybe they will think that you are up to some collusion somewhere,
Dr. Kissinger: They do. Mr. Cronkite of CBS called today and insisted on talking to me to make sure I was still in Peking. But, of course, I am up to some collusion.
Alright, let’s say 10:00, because the President will be leaving by then, and we will have discussed it by then.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, Country Files, Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic of China during the Presidential Visit, February 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Guest House, Villa 2, Beijing.↩
- Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua and President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger continued to debate the semantics of the communiqué as they applied to Taiwan.↩