Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

92. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing February 23, 1972, 9:35 a.m.-12:34 p.m.¹ ²

Beijing, February 23, 1972, 9:35 a.m.-12:34 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
• Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission
• Chiao Kuan-Hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Assistant to Yen Chien-ying
• Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
• One Notetaker

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, February 23, 1972 - 9:35 a.m. - 12:34 p.m.

PLACE: Guest House, Villa 2, Peking

VM Chiao: This is the assistant to Marshall Yeh. You know about the other Chinese friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I know about the others. Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, I have brought a suggestion on Taiwan. Should we put this aside to do the other thing first or which do you prefer?

VM Chiao: I would be happy if you would give it to me first, and then we can translate it.

Dr. Kissinger: I will give you this (copy at Tab A), and I want to explain to you what we attempted to do. It may not meet your full suggestions, but we wanted to do what we could in the light of your discussion yesterday. We have taken the version that General Haig brought to you and changed the word “abiding interest” to “position.” Where it says “it reaffirms its abiding interest,” we have said “it reaffirms its position.” And it added the phrase “through peaceful negotiations between the parties directly concerned,” to make clear that we don’t consider ourselves a party to that negotiation. And we have substituted the word “removal” for “reduction”—“the progressive removal,” rather than “the progressive reduction.” And we have modified this phrase “as tensions decrease.”

I have just tried to explain to the Vice Foreign Minister the spirit with which we approached it, and why we did what we did. And I am certain—don’t insist on it but I am certain—he will have a counter-suggestion once he has studied it.

VM Chiao: Thank you. After we have studied this matter then we will continue our discussions further.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to leave the wrong impression. I am, of course, delighted if he accepts it. I don’t want to encourage him to reject it.

(Laughter)

VM Chiao: I only hope that it would be possible for us to accept it. I am only fearing that it may not be possible. That’s just joking.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, of course. I have two sets of subjects to discuss, one concerning some military information which we wanted to pass on to you and secondly, a list of all the discussions that are going on with the Soviet Union in preparation for the summit and afterwards. Because my friend the Vice Chairman is here, I will perhaps start with the military issues if this is agreeable to you. I do this with apologies because I am not the expert on it, he is. I am a doctrinaire; he is a practitioner.

VC Yeh: Well, you are a military theorist.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not a practitioner. I have very complicated theories that can never be applied.

(Laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: May I give you, for a minute, the origin of why the President thought we should have this discussion. On December 10, I had a meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua, as the Vice Foreign Minister remembers, in which the Ambassador expressed the view that perhaps on the crisis in the Subcontinent we were not taking as strong a position as the People’s Republic. And I told him that we would pursue a parallel course, and that we were going to make some preliminary military dispositions. On the morning of December 12, we received a message from your Mission that you wanted to see General Haig—you knew I was going to the Azores and therefore you asked for General Haig. We thought, and I will be honest with you, we thought you were calling to inform us that you might intervene militarily. I am explaining to you our thinking, not what you should have done. We, the President and I, then had a discussion on what we would do if you intervened, and if your northern neighbor then brought pressure on you. You should know that we decided that if you came under military attack yourself that we would take whatever measures were necessary to prevent it.

VM Chiao: You mean if we were under pressure or attack?

Dr. Kissinger: Both, You had not requested this, and we did not do this for you, but for ourselves. I mention this because it was a practical reality at this moment and not a theoretical issue. And we had already told you this on the 10th, but General Haig was instructed to reaffirm it if your message had been what we incorrectly thought it was. We then, however, as we were planning the practical side of this, did not know whether you knew all the details of the dangers you faced or whether you could tell us what would be most helpful to do if the greatest danger should happen. So the President asked me on, obviously, an extremely confidential basis to give you some of the information we possess and to tell you also that we are prepared, without reciprocity, to give you additional information if you request it.

VC Yeh: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not… I am obviously not an intelligence expert, but we are willing, if you want us to, to establish a very confidential channel; or if you want to do it through me, if you ask additional questions to attempt to reply to them. Now, I repeat, we do this without any request for reciprocity, but with a request for complete discretion. I think the Vice Chairman speaks better English than he admits.

(Laughter)

VC Yeh: Well, the ability of our two sides to maintain secrecy has already been tested on several occasions.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

VC Yeh: We must first of all maintain confidence; only then is it possible to keep a secret.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have taken big steps toward establishing confidence.

VC Yeh: On that you can rest assured.

Dr. Kissinger: Now, Mr. Vice Chairman, we have broken down this information by manpower and by various weapons. We have information on the following: Ground Forces, Tactical Aviation, Strategic Air Defenses, Strategic Bomber Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces and some characteristics of weapons with nuclear warheads that are capable of reaching you.

Let me begin with divisions. And we have a map of their approximate location here. In the Far East Military District… do you know the boundaries of these districts?

VC Yeh: Somewhat.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the Far East Military District (showing map)—it’s this area.

VC Yeh: Up to Vladivostok.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There are up to 21 motorized rifle divisions; no less than 17, and they are building toward 21. The uncertainty is because they move the headquarters first and then they fill it out.

VC Yeh: May I ask some questions now?

Dr. Kissinger: Please. If I don’t know the answer, I will get you an answer.

VC Yeh: These divisions, they are divided into infantry divisions, motorized divisions, and tank divisions?

Dr. Kissinger Yes, I will give you the tank divisions in a minute. The motorized rifle division has tanks also. It’s not moving on foot. It’s moving by truck and carrier, and it has a substantial number of tanks. But I cannot tell you how many tanks each of the motorized rifle divisions have. What I can give you first are the divisions ready to be used almost immediately; that is what I am giving you now. What I will then give you is what can be used in a very brief time, say one week; and then I will give you what can be used in one to three weeks.

In addition, in the Far East Military District there are two tank divisions. And the total number of tanks is between 4,300 and 5,000.

In the Trans-Baikal Military District—that’s this one here (showing map)—there are eight motorized rifle divisions, and two tank divisions, and between 2,700 and 2,900 tanks.

In Mongolia - I don’t have to show that to you on the map.

(Laughter)

…there are two motorized rifle divisions and one tank division and a total of 700 tanks.

In the Central Asian military district, which is here (showing map), there are six motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, and a total of 1,900 tanks.

So the total in these districts is some 43 divisions, in all four districts, and about between 9,600 and 10,500 tanks. In addition, in the Siberian military district, which is right behind Mongolia, and therefore available within less than a week, are three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division and 900 tanks. In the Turkestan military district—the Turkestan military district we consider a one-week reinforcement to the Central Asian military district—there are five motorized rifle divisions, one tank division and 1, 200 tanks. In the Far East military district, but not right on your border—we are talking about reinforcements now, there are three motorized rifle divisions in addition to the 23 divisions I gave you before. And they have 600 tanks.

The second category now was reinforcement, and thirdly is what we consider the strategic reserve which can be used for these purposes. We are not counting Western Russia. These divisions would have to call up reserves. There are 12 motorized rifle divisions, nine tank divisions, and 5,000 tanks. And then, of course, you know that there are seven airborne divisions which are hard to count because they can be moved. They are not located near your borders, but they could be moved. So if you count all of these reinforcement divisions, the total number—and all the strategic reserve—our estimate is that there is a total of 55-60 motorized rifle divisions, and 17 tank divisions. This includes 17,300 to 18,200 tanks. And our estimate is that including ground forces, KGB border guards, the border guards of the secret police (there are 70,000 of these), military transport, strategic defense—everything that is currently available for deployment against the PRC is between 1,115,000 and 1,170,000 men. And in wartime, it would be 1,865,000 to 1,915,000, that is if reserves are called up. This is without shifting forces from western Russia. These are the numbers. Let me now turn to … do you have any questions?

VC Yeh: That is all the ground forces?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

VC Yeh: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: We have a map here of the approximate locations of the divisions, but I will discuss that afterward. Oh, the total number I gave you included also air forces. When I gave you over a million, that included everything. That included also the air forces and others … and naval that I am going to give you. It included some 100 thousand naval personnel. The divisions were obviously only ground forces. The total number included air forces, but apparently not the combat air force, not the tactical air force. Everything except the tactical air force. The one million 115 thousand included all the military personnel available for action except the tactical air force. The tactical air force has about 40,000 personnel… oh no, excuse me, it is included, Commander Howe is my military expert here.

Let me now turn to two categories, tactical air force adjacent to China plus tactical rockets adjacent to China. Of course, here it is very easy to reinforce. And there are very large air forces in Europe. So we are talking only of what is permanently stationed adjacent to China. First, I would talk about tactical interceptors. That’s MIG-17, MIG-19 and MIG-21. In the Far East military district there are 144; in the Trans-Baikal military district there are 144; in Mongolia there are 108; in the Central Asian military district there are 144; in the Turkestan military district there are 72. In the strategic reserve, suitable for this purpose, there are 174 and the total available is 786. I don’t have here what they have in Europe in tactical aircraft. Before I leave here I will find out from Washington what of the air force in Western Russia we think could be shifted. It isn’t included here.

The second category is fighter bombers. That includes MUG-17 and SU-7. The numbers are as follows: Far East military district 72, Trans-baikal military district 108, Mongolia 36; Central Asian military district 36; Turkestan military district 36; strategic reserve 36, and a total of 324.

For light bombers, which are the IL-28 and YAK-28, the numbers are as follows: Far East military district 40, Trans-Baikal military district 40, none in Mongolia or the Central Asian military district. In fact, that’s 80 all together.

Now for reconnaissance aircraft, but some of these could be used for dual purposes, most of them

Interpreter (Chi): Most?

Dr. Kissinger: Some, we could get the figures on how many bombers could be converted for reconnaissance purposes. These are MUG-21, IL-28, and YAK-28. There are 88 in the Far East military district; 72 in the Transbaikal military district; 30 in the Central Asian military district; 16 in the Turkestan military district; 30 in the strategic reserve, for a total of 236.

The total number of aircraft therefore facing you—this is without reinforcement from western Russia and Europe—is 1,426. And the total number of personnel is 45,000 plus 10,000 in the strategic reserve, or 55,000.

As for helicopters, there are 211 in the Far East military district. I will tell you the truth. I can’t believe our intelligence is so good that we can say 211 rather than about 210. I am impressed.

(Laughter)

I don’t think we have a man there who counts them every month, but maybe. 132 in the Trans-Baikal military district; 40 in Mongolia; 25 in the Central Asian military district; 48 in the Turkestan military district; 66 in the strategic reserve, or a total of 522. This does not include naval helicopters or naval aircraft, none of this.

Now, as long as we are speaking of tactical weapons, there are three others that are missiles, that are not aircraft. There is one tactical weapon to which we give the name of “FROG” that has a range of 155 miles. It’s on a track; it’s mobile. The newest version of it has wheels and most of it is in the newest version. The old version has a range of 155 miles, and the new version has a range of about 311 miles. This can have both a conventional and a nuclear warhead. And if it has a nuclear warhead it can range from 3 kilotons to 20 kilotons in the old version and 40 to 90 kilotons in the new version. This is what the old version looks like (shows picture). This is what the new version looks like (shows picture).

VC Yeh (In English): Rocket.

Dr. Kissinger: The way these are assigned is each division has four launchers. That means that in the Far East military district there are 76 to 84. In the Trans-Baikal military district there are 28 or 32. In Mongolia there are 12. In the Central Asian military district there are 28. Or a total of 144 to 156 are in these four districts. Then in the Siberian military district there are 28. In the Turkestan military district there are 18. Then in the Far East military district, farther back than can reach you but available for reinforcement, are 9. In interior districts, east of the Urals, are 73. Or a total of 272-284.

Now let me turn to another tactical missile. It doesn’t matter what we call it, because I don’t even know what the name we give it means in English. It’s a short-range ballistic missile which has a range of 160 nautical miles. This is more modern than the “FROG” and it has an accuracy of about a quarter of a mile. This is newer than the old version of the “FROG,” but the new version of the “FROG” is newer than this. This can be used with both conventional and nuclear warheads, but we think that all of these weapons I am giving you have nuclear warheads. This has tracks.

VC Yeh: Two-stage or one-stage?

Dr. Kissinger: One-stage.

VC Yeh: And on the nuclear version, how many kilotons?

Dr. Kissinger: From ten to 100. They have four different warheads, 10, 20, 40, or 100 kilotons, but we don’t know which they have on which. In the Far East military district, of this type missile they have 12 to 18. In the Trans-Baikal military district, they have six. In the Siberian military district they have six. In the Turkestan military district they also have six. There is a total of 30 to 36. We know the locations. All of these are nautical mile ranges. It’s also true of the range we gave for the “FROG.”

Then there is the third missile. When I get back I will ask to be introduced to the man who gives them names. I want to know his mind.

(Laughter)

But I can tell the Vice Chairman it’s a good way to learn English because I am learning words that I didn’t know.

(Laughter)

This is a single-stage rocket which has liquid fuel and which has a range of 500 nautical miles. It has warhead which has an accuracy of between a quarter of a mile to a half mile, and a warhead of up to one megaton. They seem to like to put them very close to your border. They are not designed to travel over much of Soviet territory. The following face you: In the Far East military district nine, mostly in the southern part, here (pointing to map), and very close to the southern border. It’s that blue dot here. In the Trans-Baikal military district, nine, about here (pointing); it’s the blue dot. In the Central Asian military district, nine near Sary Ozek. Each of them has nine to twelve launchers; we gave you the lower figure. In the Siberian military district, there are also nine; so all together it’s either 36 or 48. We think 36, but it could be 48.

There is one other which is like a naval missile of which they have four, which has a range of 300 nautical miles.

VC Yeh: All together four?

Dr. Kissinger: Four, that’s all we have found. It’s unreasonable that they have only four, but that’s all we have seen. It’s illogical but that’s all we know about. It goes at low latitude and 300 nautical miles and has a warhead of from ten to lOO kilotons, and it’s on a track. It’s located here, the one we know about. It’s the green dot.

Now with regard to air defense forces, these were not in the total. The numbers I give you now are in addition to the numbers I gave you before. No, excuse me, the number of troops are in, the number of planes are in addition. The air defense is different; they have different military districts for air defense than they have for ground. These are the air defense districts. So when we talk about Far East military district, you will know what we mean (shows map). But they have different names for these districts than for the other districts I have given you.

Airplanes for air defense are as follows: in the Far East air defense district, 490; in the Trans Siberian air defense district 200; and in the Tashkent air defense district, 230. About half of them are all-weather MACH-2 aircraft. These are all the air forces that are within 300 miles. The forces I am giving you are ‘within 300 miles of the Chinese border.

Interpreter (Chi): Nautical miles?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Interpreter (Chi): Speed is MACH 2?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. In addition to this there are 560 interceptor aircraft that are in central Russia that could be used here. Now, turning to surface-to-air missiles within 300 miles of your border, in the Far East air defense district …

Interpreter (Chi): The distance is all in nautical miles?

Dr. Kissinger: I suppose, but what is the difference?

Interpreter (Chi): A little bigger than a mile.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not absolutely sure, but it doesn’t make any difference for air defense. In the Far East air defense district there are 130 SAMs. Eighty-one of these are what we call SA-2; 34 are SA-3’s; and 15 are SA-5’s. The 2’s and 3’s are what they have in Vietnam. You may have some of them yourselves, but at any rate that’s what they are. In the Trans-Siberian air defense district there are 76 SA-2’s and 19 SA-5’s. These are sites; each site has more than one of these missiles. We are talking about sites, I think each site has four missiles. Well, they certainly have more than one missile at each site—I know that;— we are going to check. For example, on the SA-2’s, there are two launchers on one truck. On the SA-3’s there are two launchers on one truck. But it is impossible that they would have only one missile at one site. And there are 63 in the Tashkent district, 63 SA-2 sites. One SA-3 site, and 11 SA-5 sites. And there are five SA-2 sites in Mongolia.

With respect to radar, there are 155 radar sites in the Far East district, 140 in the Trans-Siberian district; and 80 in the Tashkent district. So altogether, there are 375 radar sites facing you.

I will just give you a few other items and then we will let it go. About naval forces, the Pacific fleet has 155 medium bombers; 16 ballistic missile submarines; which have a total of 113 missiles; and 23 cruise missile units which have altogether 150 launchers.

Interpreter (Chi): Surface aircraft?

Dr. Kissinger: No, launchers.

Interpreter (Chi): But surface?

Dr. Kissinger: No, these are all on submarines.

Interpreter (Chi): What do you mean by 23 cruise …

Comdr. Howe: Guided by radar rather than a ballistic missile.

Dr. Kissinger: Most of these are based in Vladivostock except for the ballistic missile submarines which operate out of Petropavlovsk. That’s what a cruise missile submarine looks like. Commander Howe is a submariner. So every time the Soviet Union gets one more he comes to my office. To make him feel at home he has an office without windows.

Comdr. Howe: That’s true.

Dr. Kissinger: He stays in it for two months at a time so he remains in training.

Comdr. Howe: That’s also true.

Dr. Kissinger These are the major forces. When we go to strategic forces there is no sense listing what’s adjacent to you because when we cometo strategic forces—bombers, missile submarines, and land based missiles they have long ranges. For example, there are 260 SS-9 missiles adjacent to China, but they have a range of 5, 000 nautical miles. I know they could reach the United States. It has a range of 5, 000 miles arid altogether they have 970 of them, so if they want to they can use them all against either China or the United States. They have a total of 1, 500 long-range missiles that can be used either against China or the U.S. and we don’t want to discriminate. They may all be directed against you—perhaps they are all directed against us. 519 of them are in military districts adjacent to the PRC, but it would be incorrect to assume that these are the ones that are targeted on the People’s Republic.

All this is the basic information. In addition, there are 205 heavy and medium bombers of the long-range aviation forces, and they are directed at you. In the Central Asian military district there are 45; in the Trans-Baikal military district there are 50, and in the Far East military district there are 110. The total if 205. Of these, 45 have a radius of 4,500 nautical miles, and they are turboprop, TU-45. And they can carry 30,000 pounds of bombs (shows picture). You must know it. There are 45 in the Central Asian military district. It’s a turboprop.

Interpreter (Chi): 30 or 35 thousand pounds of bombs.

Dr. Kissinger: 30,000. Then they have medium bombers, 120 of these 205 have a range of 1,600 nautical miles. Fifty are in the Trans-Baikal military district and 70 in the Far East military district, and these are jets. The speed of the “BEAR” is about 450 kts, the maximum is 500 and the normal is 435 knots. That’s of the former (BEAR) and on this one (Badger) it’s 445 normal and 540 kts. maximum. Then in the Far East military district they have 40 of another plane which has a range of 3,000 nautical miles, and a speed of 445 knots normal and 540 maximum.

All this is the information we thought we should give you today. And none of our colleagues here know that we have given you this information and nobody in our government except for the President and these people here know that we have given you this information. The intelligence people do not know we have given it to you. We have only asked them to prepare it for us. It is a sign of… so that if we face other crises we have the same basic information on which to make decisions.

VC Yeh: I am grateful to Dr. Kissinger and our other American friends here for informing us of the most confidential information concerning the Soviet military strength.

First, I would like to have our American friends rest assured that we will certainly keep all this information absolutely secret, and secondly, I would like to say that this material which you provided us is very useful. And thirdly, I would like to say that in providing us with this most confidential information it is an important indication of the sincere desire of the United States Government to improve our relations and for this we would like to express our thanks to Dr. Kissinger and to President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: We did it for both of us.

VC Yeh: We understand.

Dr. Kissinger: If you have any additional questions, either while we are here or afterward, you can either contact me or we can set up a separate means of contact. And if we get indications of drastic changes in the deployments, it would be helpful if you could let us know whom we should inform. Paris may be a little too complex for that purpose. But actually we can send somebody to Paris to tell your Ambassador there, but it makes no difference. You tell us whom we should tell and where and what is your most secure place and we will send someone there. But perhaps you could give us either a word so you can get us a message or tell us how to do it in a more restricted way than normal in a place you designate. Perhaps before we leave.

VC Yeh: It is very necessary to keep constant contact. I will report all of this to Premier Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao and they will consider this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. Now I have brought along a discussion of every negotiation that is being conducted with the Soviet Union.

VM Chiao: Shall we take a break for five minutes. Or let’s be generous, ten minutes.

Dr. Kissinger: Like Chairman Mao to Kosygin. You know what I mean.

A copy of the paper to which Dr. Kissinger referred to in making this presentation is at Tab B.

BREAK—11:25-11:34 a.m.

Dr. Kissinger: We wanted to inform you of all negotiations we are conducting with the Soviet Union. We understand that part of the Soviet strategy is to create the impression that they and we are establishing a two-power directory over the world. And therefore they have started negotiations on a whole range of topics, some of very secondary importance, especially since my visit to Peking last July. Our policy is to make those agreements that are also in our own interest, to inform you of every negotiation we are conducting, to do nothing that looks to us as if it could be collusion against you (and therefore we did not, for example, agree to that conference of the five nuclear powers), to be prepared to make any agreement with you that we are making with the Soviet Union and to, if you want to comment, to take your views very seriously. So should I run through what is going on?

VM Chiao: Please.

Dr. Kissinger: It could be that I am breaking the Harvard record for length again.

VC Yeh: Doesn’t matter.

Dr. Kissinger: First, you are familiar with the negotiations on Berlin. We keep you informed of this. Incidentally, again, no one in our government knows the degree to which we have kept you informed. There are now negotiations between the East and West Germans on the practical implementation of the agreement and there are some convoluted German legalistic problems. But we think that these treaties will be concluded by the summer. Incidentally, it is our impression that the Soviet Union is saving a number of technical agreements so that they will all be signed at or near the summit in Moscow, but I am sure you are wise enough to understand that this does not signify anything in particular.

There are a number of technical agreements that the signature is being held up on and we are sure they will come to a head around that time. In any event, as you know, the President has offered the Prime Minister yesterday that he would send me to Peking if you agree in June and I would then give you an account in the frankness with which we have always treated you.

VC Yeh: Very good.

Dr. Kissinger: European Security Conference: The Soviet Union is being active both with us and with our European friends to convene a European Security Conference. They are more precise about the fact that they want a conference than what they want to discuss there. Their strategy is to get a general atmosphere of relaxation in Europe, partly to free their resources in that area. We are under great pressure from our European friends to go to such a conference. Our strategy is to say that we will not oppose it in principle, but that we want to see what is on the agenda first. So at the moment we are delaying. We may agree to exploratory, low-level talks later this year, but we do not expect a conference before 1973.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: Again, the Soviet Union has talked about it in principle, but they have shied away from discussion of specifics. Our position is stated in the World Report, and that represents our actual position. I know. the Report didn’t get a good review in the Peking publications …

(Laughter)

Our approach is to talk on very concrete issues in such a way that they cannot get disarmament just by talking about it but only by taking specific steps. I must be very honest with you in this regard. If the negotiations were to be successful—they will in any event take a long time, but if they are successful—the objective consequence will be for the Soviet Union to move some forces from Europe to the Far East, and we will have to make up for this in some way. In any event, I do not believe that negotiations will start in the first half of this year, if then. I don’t think they will start before the end of this year, and they will certainly take two years to complete.

The next issue is the Chinese participation in the disarmament conference. When it reconvenes in February, we frankly do not know whether you want to be invited to be co-chairman, whether you want to participate; and therefore we have adopted a neutral position. I am talking about the 18-nation conference. If you want to participate … we will not put pressure on you to join, but also we don’t want to oppose your joining and therefore we have avoided the issue. If you could let us know your preference we will be heavily influenced by it.

VM Chiao: Our delegation in the UN has expressed an attitude and our position has not changed from that attitude. That is, we do not plan to take part in that conference. And we have noted that you are taking a neutral interest on this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: You are in your history familiar with the American missionary instinct, and the members of our Arms Control Agency always hope that they can persuade you to be what they consider more reasonable. We shall maintain our position and you will not come under any pressure from us. The same is true of the Soviet proposal on a world disarmament conference—we will not join it.

VM Chiao: So the United Nations passed a resolution to postpone?

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right, but we will undoubtedly be approached again by the Soviet Union before the next General Assembly.

Comprehensive Test Ban: Those negotiations are hung up on a technical issue whether you can discover underground explosions without inspection. If there are negotiations on that this year, we will move very slowly. You are familiar with the treaty banning nuclear weapons from the seabed?

VM Chiao: (Nods)

Dr. Kissinger: Rather than read it, why don’t I give you its provisions and you can study it yourself. The same for the treaty banning biological weapons. I do it to save time. (The papers used by Dr. Kissinger in this briefing are at Tab C.) Don’t you think that’s better.

VM Chiao: Much better.

Dr. Kissinger: Chemical weapons … here is another discussion of the law of the seas.

VM Chiao: I have also looked at, in a preliminary way, your principles in approaching this matter in your State of the World message. It is very important for us to understand your positions on these matters.

Dr. Kissinger: Last year, the Prime Minister spoke to a group of Japanese about last year’s Report. That was before it was known we had met, and I thought he made the best analysis of the Report I had seen anywhere. It’s our experience with the Japanese that they cannot keep any secrets.

(Laughter)

VM Chiao: Do you feel that you were taken in by them?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but I find that anything we tell them they tell the press.

VM Chaio: For instance, your talk …

Dr. Kissinger Oh, I was not taken in by the socialist. First, I didn’t want to see him, so the Japanese Ambassador called me and told me it would be a terrible loss of face for the Ambassador if I didn’t see him. I did. I knew he would talk to the press because they always do. So I said nothing. Every time he asked me a question, I said read my press conference; it’s all in our process conference. And I was astonished when the Prime Minister said to General Haig that I had given him my impressions on the Taiwan question, I wasn’t taken in; they just invent things now.

(Laughter)

VM Chiao: Fabrications.

Dr. Kissinger: When I tell a Japanese diplomat something and he gives me his word of honor that it will be kept secret, that means 72 hours.

Director Chang: But you know that example of that Japanese socialist party leader showed the Japanese are very good at keeping secrets, because they said nothing about what you really told them.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn’t tell them anything. Here is the status of the discussion on a draft treaty on the moon.

VM Chiao: The moon is too far away from us. The moon is closer to you than to us.

Dr. Kissinger: Here is the status on an agreement on exchanges with the Soviet Union. And here is the status of the agreement on health. We have an agreement to negotiate on health matters, and I wouldn’t be surprised if the Soviets conducted that negotiation that the agreement is made at the time of the Summit. This is an agreement on civil aviation. I am just doing this to be correct—none of this is of any great importance. And on environmental cooperation. And on maritime matters. Some of these I have informed you of. Here is talks on preventing incidents at sea. I have told you of this through the other channel. These are technical diplomatic matters. I have some topics I would like to explain to you because they are of great importance.

The first is SALT. We believe that an agreement will be reached this spring. Right now, the Soviet Union has taken the position on defensive missiles—offering us a compromise, by which they can get four defensive sites and we can get one.

(Laughter)

But since even we know the difference between four and one we are not likely to accept that.

(Laughter)

And so we will probably … the agreement … we have not negotiated it yet, and in fact we have not yet adopted our own position, but it will have a more or less equal number of defensive missiles on both sides. The Soviet Union would defend Moscow and we would defend an offensive missile base, with each side having an option for another site, so we can defend Washington and they can defend an offensive site. This is what I think the agreement will be. And there will be also a limitation on offensive missiles. We have more or less agreed to stop building land-based missiles on both sides. We have not yet agreed on submarines. We will keep you informed through our channel but this is the present state of the negotiation. We know you are not interested in participating, but we will avoid positions which can be used as a pressure against you. And of course we will not participate in any pressure against you.

A second area in which the Soviet Union has been extremely active is in attempting to negotiate an economic agreement with us. They have offered to negotiate a settlement on the lend-lease issues and the purchase of grains.

VM Chiao: I would like to take this opportunity to ask Dr. Kissinger what is the figure of the lendlease which you paid the Soviet Union in the Second World War?

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t have it here—I will get it for you before we leave. I will have it in 48 hours. I can give it to you very soon. The figure that is now being discussed, I think they have offered, is 300 million and I think we believe it is closer to a billion that they owe us.

Interpreter (Chi): Dollars?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Our figure I believe is 800 million on the debt, but I am sure we gave them more aid than this during the war. We will get you the figure.

VM Chiao: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: What they are now proposing is that we send our Secretary of Commerce to Moscow again to begin discussion of agreements including some credits and “most-favored-nation” status. We may do this, we may send the Secretary of Commerce there. Our general policy is to have the People’s Republic on the same status in our legal considerations as the Soviet Union.

VM Chiao: May I interrupt a moment?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

VM Chiao: The question of trade between China and the United States was not mentioned in our original draft communique and only when General Haig came he mentioned your side desired we say a few words about this matter of the development of Sino-American trade. But now we are somewhat confused because in discussions between Secretary Rogers and Chi Peng-fei, our impression is you are not very interested in this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: No, what General Haig told you is correct. We would like to mention it in the communique and are prepared to discuss it. The difficulty is that not all of our people are familiar with every communication which has gone to you because we don’t want to embarrass you through leaks. But we gave you a paragraph yesterday.

VM Chiao: Yes, we are studying it.

Dr. Kissinger: I know, but we are interested in it, and 1 will talk to the Secretary of State about clearing up this confusion.

VM Chiao: Just because you mentioned this question of trade, so I said it in passing.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. As I told the Prime Minister, we are much more complicated than you are in our method of government. But after the election we will bring this into greater consistency.

On the Middle East, you are familiar with the discussions that we have attempted to be set up between the Egyptians and the Israelis, indirect discussions. The Soviet Union has told us that they would raise the issue at the Summit. But we don’t know in what form, and with what proposals. But this will be one of the topics when I come here in June, if that is agreeable to you. We will give you a complete account of what was discussed.

Two more items, one which you can read yourself, is the technical problem of space exploration. That will probably be signed at the Summit, or just before or just after. It’s been discussed for two years but there is a sudden acceleration on a lot of these things. There were reports in our press that we were discussing arms control in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union—that is correct.

These are the major items and we will keep you meticulously informed. Don’t pay attention to press reports. If I have not told you, it isn’t true. We believe that we must have a relationship of confidence, and we don’t believe in trickery. We will inform you always well ahead of time so that if you wish to comment—which you have not up to now done—we are prepared to hear your views and take them very seriously.

Now I have only one other question which is, how we should handle the completion of the communique. Practically, not the details, the procedure.

VM Chiao: Well, first of all I will thank you for giving us this information. And this is also an indication of your wish to improve our relationship. I will say no more on that. I will report all this to Premier Chou En-lai and to Chairman Mao.

Now the question is how to work out the communique. It involves how to arrange our time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

VM Chiao: First of all, we will want to study your new wording of the Taiwan question and then after we have studied it we can discuss it.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, of course.

VM Chiao: This afternoon there will be the discussions between the President and Prime Minister, and we are all taking part in that. As for tomorrow morning, are you going to that?

Dr. Kissinger: I am prepared not to go. I think in fact it would be better if we worked. Of course you could tell me tonight you are accepting all our proposals.

VM Chiao: Then you can go to the Great Wall.

Dr. Kissinger: Slip me a note at the gymnastics.

VM Chiao: It might be possible that Dr. Kissinger will have a stomach ache tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: I was ill in Key Biscayne in January; I was really ill with the flu, and the press insisted that one member talk with me on the telephone to make sure I wasn’t in Cuba or someplace. But how about tomorrow morning?

VM Chiao: Our thinking is it would probably be more realistic to continue the work tomorrow because tomorrow is the 24th. As for the specific time when we will do the work tomorrow, I will tell you this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be important if we could agree on something that I can show my colleagues so they are not too surprised at the last minute about how this came into being. So if we could agree, not on the whole thing, but on some key questions, that this is our position, it would help us. When do you think we should release the communique. This was one question I wanted to ask you.

VM Chiao: We have no particular inclination as to when it should be issued to the press.

Dr. Kissinger: Sunday night?

VM Chiao: When we are in Shanghai?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, or what is your thought?

VM Chiao: Once we have finalized it, it is up to you to say what date is better for you. We give you priority.

Dr. Kissinger: But at any rate, before we leave here.

VM Chiao: That’s all right.

Dr. Kissinger: Two possibilities, Sunday night or Monday morning. But Monday morning our press will not have time to file it. Our plan is that when we release the communique—so far we haven’t said there will be one—but our plan is I will meet with the press and explain it to them because otherwise they will write very confusing things.

VM Chiao: In Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: After we release it.

VM Chiao: But you will meet with the press in China?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We would give them the communique and then I Would explain to them how it came into being and what it means. And I would agree with you what I would say and I would say nothing that you and I and the Prime Minister haven’t, agreed on.

VM Chiao: In Shanghai?

Dr. Kissinger: If we do not do this there will be the wildest speculation. We can do it as a joint one if you want to so you can correct me if I say anything wrong.

VM Chiao: Please, spare me this ordeal. You are more experienced in this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: As a Harvard professor, I can use many words to say nothing.

(Laughter)

When they don’t understand it, they think I am very profound. I think it is in our common interest that I explain it so there is one major theme that emerges. That way I can work out exactly what I will say, and how I will explain it. We can go through how I will explain it paragraph by paragraph. That way it has the least possibility of embarrassment and the maximum possibility of a positive impact.

VM Chiao: Good, we understand. As for when we will work on the communique tomorrow, I will tell you this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we are prepared not to go to the Great Wall. I have been there.

VC Yeh: Yes, we should have quite sufficient appraisal of the impact of the communique in the world. So it is a matter over which both sides should give serious consideration.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that’s why we shouldn’t leave it to the end.

VM Chiao: It is not a matter of just saying something as we part, but something that is said for the whole world.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

VC Yeh: Thank you once again.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, Country Files, Far East, China, President’s Trip, Feb 1972, HAK Conversations. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Ellipses in the source text. Also present on the Chinese side was Yeh Chien-ying, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. The meeting was held at the Guest House, Villa 2. Tabs A-C are attached but not published.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua discussed the communiqué, confidential information on Soviet conventional and strategic weaponry, and the current status of U.S.-Soviet negotiations.