Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

90. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 22, 1972, 10:05-11:55 a.m.¹ ²

Beijing, February 22, 1972, 10:05-11:55 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
• Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs John H. Holdridge,
• NSC Staff Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
• Two Notetakers

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, February 22, 1972 - 10:05-11:55a.m.

PLACE: Guest House, Villa 2, Peking

Kissinger: Here is a letter from Governor Rockefeller to the Prime Minister.

How should we proceed, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister?

Ch’iao: If it is not lacking in courtesy, our idea is to first hear your ideas and suggestions.

Kissinger: May I suggest that we do the following? We are discussing the Communique now. May I suggest that we go through it page by page to see whether there is any part of it that either side wants to change, and then we can go back to those parts.

Ch’iao: Well there are actually two ways to go about it. One way would be to first bring out those principal questions, that is to say some parts of the Communique already have been changed—for instance the question of the South Asian subcontinent, and then there is the question of the crucial question which Dr. Kissinger talked with the Prime Minister about yesterday and you can offer us your thinking on that. And then the other way is as you suggested, the methodical way from the beginning to the end. We want to hear your views on that.

Kissinger: We have a number of which may be minor suggestions as we go through it, and then we have, I think, the major question of South Asia, simply because it is now outdated, but I think we will agree that it will not take us long. What you call the crucial question is very difficult. My deputy General Haig had told the Prime Minister that we would come with some additional suggestions on exchanges and trade which we could also use, which I don’t think are questions of principle but more a form of expression. We have a few editorial suggestions for changing the word “would” to “will” in a few places—for instance where we say commitments “would be honored” we would like to say “will be honored.” It is purely grammatical, and I don’t think it makes any difference. And we have one suggestion how to underline—as I understand this Communique—we are saying that People’s Republic and the U.S. will not resort to the use or threat of force with each other. This is in the Communique now, and we have one suggestion for your consideration of how we could emphasize this a little more, but that is again not an issue of principle.

Ch’iao: We agree to your suggested procedure, that is we can go through the entire Communique page by page, and this is only a preliminary review, because the talks between the leaders have not started, and these are matters which can be agreed to.

Kissinger: We should talk about Taiwan today, too.

Ch’iao: Our side may also have some ideas and some changes, and some of them may be minor suggestions. We will mention them later.

Kissinger: Let me give you our suggestions. Would you like a copy so that you have the same page number that we have? This should be the same text as yours, but I can never guarantee the typing.

Ch’iao: It does not matter, if there is an error on our part.

Kissinger: We don’t have to bother with the first page. Then on the second page of this we would like to suggest—this is a purely rhetorical device—to substitute for the first paragraph a sentence from the last paragraph of the Communique—this paragraph in English is not very strong—to say “the two sides were gratified to have this opportunity after so many years without contact to present their points of view.”

Ch’iao: Then on “variety of issues” … You prefer to leave it out.

Kissinger: If you want to keep that paragraph, this is not a big issue. It is just to begin the Communique with a slightly stronger sentence. “During our talks”—this sentence can be either kept or dropped. We prefer to leave it out but only for the English. If it means a lot to you we can keep it in. Maybe if we dropped “during their talks …”

Ch’iao: After that “the leaders of China and the US”—we will consider it.

Kissinger: It is only to begin it with a stronger sentence.

Ch’iao: I approve of that. From our side we think it is better to maintain these words—“important changes taking place.”

Kissinger: We can tighten up the sentence a little bit. We can just say “expounded their respective views” but “views” and “positions” in English just repeats itself.

Ch’iao: Would you kindly prepare a text as a preliminary exchange?

Kissinger: Then no comments on the rest except you will want to change the last three lines on page 3 about India/Pakistan.

Ch’iao: We plan to bring it up to date.

Kissinger: No change in the US position.

Ch’iao: On the question of South Asia—on the Chinese side, in addition to the necessary change in South Asia, we have some minor changes on some other parts of our statement—not substantive.

Kissinger: We may do this, too, but I won’t discuss it now. On the US side, on pages 3 and 4 of the text you have that I gave you, the only change we made is to put everything in the past tense and conditional into the present tense—on page 4 put everything in the present tense. For instance “envisages” rather than “envisaged.”

Ch’iao: Where it says “would be honored”—“will be honored.”

Kissinger: Yes. It means the same thing. The reason that we had “would” was because it referred back to “stated, “and it is the correct English, but the word “stated” is four lines back and people forget. It changes no meaning. If my assistant had been from Harvard rather than Yale it would have been right the first time. You don’t know what I have to put up with, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister.

Ch’iao: If you bully him like that, I will have objections about you.

Kissinger: The only way I keep my staff is that they hope they will be around when I collapse. They have invested so much time in being bullied now that they have to be present when I have a breakdown (laughter).

No other change on page 4 of our text except on South Asia. One page 5 we have a suggestion on how we could emphasize this point of renouncing force, and we would put it in the middle here. The underlined part is new. It really repeats what we are saying on top of the page. It really repeats it.

Ch’iao: We will consider that.

Kissinger: The Taiwan section we will discuss, so I will skip this. On the next paragraph, alter the Taiwan section, we promised we would bring you some language which we would like to submit. This is just for discussion.

Ch’iao: On this matter we will further discuss it and study it. It is a question of wording, and at the same time involves matters of substance. Normalization should be handled on the basis of normalization of state relations.

Kissinger: That’s the issue that the Prime Minister and the President discussed yesterday which should come first. Perhaps we should not use the word “normalization” at all here. Let me suggest, in order not to have that word an issue, let us leave it out.

Ch’iao: We will study that.

Kissinger: We are here now just discussing it—you usually come back with a better draft than we do.

Ch’iao: You have praised us on so many occasions, you have overpraised us. It is a pity that there are no Yale graduates. I put the issue in a very simple way, but my colleagues put it in a very complicated way.

Lord: He must have gone to Harvard (laughter).

Kissinger: One more suggestion, and then I am finished. In the last paragraph we would like to add one sentence. We would like to say “the two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels,” and then we would say, “In addition the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking from time to time” instead of “at irregular intervals.” The reason we would like to add this, Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, is because as it is now written it gives the impression that the only way we will be in contact with you is to send a senior representative to Peking, and that gives the wrong impression to our people. And it does not reflect the reality of the situation.

These are all the changes we have except for the issue of Taiwan.

Ch’iao: Just out of asking, what is your suggestion about South Asia.

Kissinger: We do not have a very good text yet because we want to discuss it with you. What we will say is that we support the right of the people of South Asia to determine their future without the threat or use of military force, and that we believe that their future should not be subjected to interference from countries outside of the region—something like that. We have not phrased it yet, but that is the thought we are expressing.

Ch’iao: We are very grateful to you for telling us your preliminary thinking. And we also would like to tell you our preliminary thinking on this matter. We consider this to be a realistic question. The Indian armed forces are still occupying East Pakistan. The resolution passed by the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly is not being implemented, so there is a question of the withdrawal of the Indian armed forces, so we are considering reflecting this thinking in our statement. This is only for some preliminary ideas, and we have not yet really worked out a phrase. We will still have further exchanges on this matter.

Kissinger: I think the President and the Prime Minister will want to discuss this matter.

Ch’iao: What you have in writing you have already given us.

Kissinger: That’s right. I have now given you all our suggestions except for the crucial issue.

Ch’iao: We will, of course, study all these views. Our preliminary impression of these changes suggested is to make it stronger, and in some places it is merely a matter of wording, and in some places it involves the matter of substance. We will study these and give you our views.

Kissinger: Mr. Vice Foreign Minister, how should we discuss the issue of Taiwan which is probably the crucial issue in the Communique?

Ch’iao: Dr. Kissinger asked General Haig to bring wording on this crucial matter during General Haig’s visit, and at that time we already made clear our position which is that we do not approve of that suggestion. If you have any new proposals to make on that matter it would facilitate our further consideration of this matter.

Kissinger: You have no counter-proposal?

Ch’iao: Our position remains as follows—that is, the proposal for this Taiwan question which we put forward and asked Dr. Kissinger to bring back is the wording we consider to be necessary. The thinking reflected in that we consider cannot be deducted—the ideas. We consider that our proposal. In that proposal we already had taken into account your various difficulties. So, frankly, speaking, we are persisting on that proposal.

Kissinger: Let me explain again what our difficulties are. I think we have a fair understanding of the direction in which we want to go. I think we realize that both of our countries are engaged in an extremely delicate process. We are breaking our established patterns and really changing the fact of international relations. Each of us no doubt has domestic considerations which affect the freedom of maneuver we have on specific matters. But I can only speak for ourselves; this is the case with us. And we are approaching this with the attitude of moving from contact to cooperation.

We are confronting also, as General Haig pointed out to you, a very complex domestic situation. The right and the traditional China Lobby is not itself very strong anymore, but it still is more powerful than it looks. But if it can ally itself with the pro-Soviet left and with the other forces that are pro-Japan, pro-India, it can create tremendous pressure against the President’s present course. You must have noticed that during January a quite systematic anti-Chinese campaign developed in the American press, based on the India policy, and broke this in part through a step which you don’t approve—the speech on our negotiations on Vietnam.

So I simply want to explain to you what we confront, and we quite frankly want to avoid a situation where the President comes back from Peking and is accused of having been taken in, and therefore will not be able to do the things which he has undertaken to do and which he will do.

So what we are looking for on Taiwan—and we recognize it is very difficult, and I don’t think your formulation was reasonable in the abstract—but we are looking for something that indicates a general direction without creating a tremendous domestic furor. We will carry out all the commitments we have made, and indeed we have already carried out some things such as not basing nuclear weapons on Taiwan and storage, which is something which we did unilaterally. So we are not talking about substance—we are talking about language.

Let me give you an example of what our problem is. I am sorry I am talking at such great length. Harvard professors always speak 50 minutes.

Ch’iao: So long as it does not exceed 50 minutes. And Yale professors …

Lord: We are much more concise.

Kissinger: Do you need a junior assistant in your foreign office (laughter)? I have always dealt with you with sincerity and honesty, and let me tell you what we did when we came back from our trip the last time. We did not show the Communique or the existence of the Communique to anybody, but we did send the two paragraphs on Taiwan to the Secretary of State. Those are the only two paragraphs he has seen. He wrote a memo to the President with his suggestion of what these two paragraphs should contain, and when you see them you will realize that what we sent you with General Haig is relatively mild compared to what the State Department has recommended to the President.

And this is, of course, a rather sensitive matter to show you an internal document, but I have never seen any Anderson papers in the Peking Daily (laughter). So if I could give this to you unofficially and confidentially for the Prime Minister you might want to take a look at it. Of course, if you accept them, our problems will be finished. Much of this is—the underlined part is what he added.

Ch’iao: I am grateful to Dr. Kissinger for your confidence in us. I can guarantee you there are no Anderson papers. This is just an expression of our sincerity.

Kissinger: I am not tabling this as a proposal even though you see this is what I am supposed to do. I want to show you we are making a sincere effort. But if we separate ourselves too far we will have another set of Anderson papers, and we will be very vulnerable to criticism that will limit our ability to do what we have undertaken to do.

Ch’iao: Please go on.

Kissinger: This is our problem, and I have actually not brought a text other than the one that General Haig gave you. We are willing to modify that text. I am a bad negotiator by telling you we are willing to modify. But I thought we should have a preliminary discussion before we attempt to play with it. If I could have your objections… what is it you object to most in that text?… so that we could make an effort.

Ch’iao: I am thankful to you for telling us in such a frank way the difficulties you are facing. And we, too, would like to very frankly tell you our views on this matter. In speaking generally from both your side and our side, we look upon this as a major step, particularly from your side and from the side of your President. It is a major action, and as the President and Chou said yesterday, from our point of view we appreciate this action.

Kissinger: Which action?

Ch’iao: The visit from your President. We look at it as an event which is unprecedented from our two countries.

As for the specific matters, you, of course, are more clear about the entire process than I am. I am not as well acquainted as Mr. Chang, who took part in all these discussions. As for me, it is my first contact with this, and I would want to be very frank with you in our discussions and I hope you will not look upon frankness as being crude.

Kissinger: That adjective has never crossed my mind with the Chinese.

Chiao: Well, but you said yesterday you hoped I will not use the methods I used against Malik with you.

Kissinger: Yes, but not because they were crude, but because they were very subtle.

Ch’iao: But actually I am a very bad negotiator and worse than you.

Kissinger: I thought the Vice Foreign Minister treated Mr. Malik like a bullfighter treats a bull - you had him charging all the time.

Ch’iao: He had too great self-confidence and arrogance.

So in a very frank way I would say my ideas in this matter. In the draft which Dr. Kissinger put forward at the end of the interim visit, you mentioned still in that draft “the U.S. accepts the ultimate objective of withdrawal of forces on Taiwan.” And why is it that we do not agree to that suggested version? We did not agree to it because Dr. Kissinger said we must be clear on our direction, but we must also be clear about our final objective. If we don’t have that objective in mind where will be the direction?

So, when I say I want to be frank I mean to say that the proposal put forth by General Haig was a backward step in comparison to the proposal you put forward in the interim. You say you have your difficulties, but you can’t say we don’t have our difficulties. And in our wording we put it—that is in the reply to you on the question of our side also having difficulties—we put it in a very mild way, because you should know, whether it would be a question of substance or whether it would be a question of how to express it in words, the Chinese people have very strong feelings.

While I was in New York, in many of the speeches made by your side—a number of your speeches—it was always emphasized that your treaty obligations with Chiang Kai-shek remain valid, but you see in our version we do not mention the question of this so-called treaty. And so our Chinese people would also ask us, why is it it was not mentioned? So we can say that on our version it is already the lowest key version which we could put forward.

Now, where are the differences? The difference is that in your version you only talk about a reduction of forces without mentioning the final objective. This is a point which we cannot agree. And then as to why you are going to do this, it is not clearly stated in the version submitted by General Haig.

Kissinger: Can you explain that?

Ch’iao: Let me finish. Since you are to acknowledge that the Taiwan question is a question of the Chinese people themselves, then the logical and inescapeable conclusion would be the final and complete withdrawal of American forces.

So, there are two points. One is that this final objective must be made clear, that is, complete withdrawal, and that is not made clear in this proposal, and in that way it is not possible for us to make an accounting to our people.

Kissinger: The second point?

Ch’iao: And the second point is that in the version submitted by General Haig it was not made clear as to why there will be this progressive reduction. The logical and the inevitable reason for that should be—as you said—because you acknowledge all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is one China—that should be the reason for the complete and final withdrawal. But in General Haig’s version there is no connection between the two, and it appears as if Taiwan is merely a tool of the U.S.

We do understand you do have your difficulties. It is not that we do not understand. But you should also consider the fact that for our side we have made great efforts.

Kissinger: I am not criticizing the good faith, the seriousness, and fairness of your side. We have an objective problem here which concerns less the actions than the words. We are not attempting to take away from what I said to the Prime Minister, and what the President will reaffirm to the Prime Minister, but we are trying to find a formulation that maintains our authority to continue on this road.

Ch’iao: On the other aspect, and also very frankly, we say that you did have your difficulties, but that at the same time you were able to overcome your difficulties with people like JACK ANDERSON and company. They cannot play such a high and mighty role. People came to your support.

Kissinger: It is not Anderson. It is that on this issue many of the President’s oldest supporters have very passionate feelings, and that they ally themselves with pro-Soviet elements. They may try to use our Communique as an example to discredit everything. Anderson we can handle.

Ch’iao: I think I have already made clear our reasons why we are not able to agree either to the version Dr. Kissinger put forward in the interim visit or the version put forward by General Haig. To put it in a nutshell, we are persisting in the substantive thing which I have already elaborated. As for specific wording, however, for my side we will be willing to consider that.

Kissinger: My Yale colleague gave you our last copy so you know more about it than I do. Let me ask it in an informal way—is it possible for you to state that you want to assert your sovereignty of Taiwan by peaceful means and not military means?

Ch’iao: Frankly speaking, we cannot agree to that because that is a fundamental violation of our principle—that it is an internal affair. It is not possible for us to agree to have such a formulation.

Kissinger: I have not put it forward for that reason.

Ch’iao: No misunderstanding.

Kissinger: I thought this would be your position.

Ch’iao: Of course, you know we have been talking about this for many years—16 years.

Kissinger: The dilemma we face is that, while your formulation is not unjust, it is for this year impossible for us to say this. And therefore we have a question how to proceed. That’s really our problem. We are not debating the actions—we are now debating the words, as I said before.

Ch’iao: Today is a preliminary discussion. And then you also raise some other questions. I will study these. And then there is this crucial question about Taiwan. You look upon it as a question of expression. As we see it, it also concerns substance.

For instance, the President said neither the Chinese nor the US had territorial designs against the other, and so our people will then ask us since that is the case, how is it you cannot agree to a final, complete withdrawal of your forces from Taiwan? Because you know all our people will be reading the speech made by your President yesterday. And in our version we merely put forward the objective—there is no time limit and there are no other considerations which I have mentioned. No mention of the treaty. We know, of course, your difficulties in having to repeat that.

Our people constantly ask, and so this matter, I believe, the leaders of the two governments will continue to discuss.

Kissinger: The difficulty is that the American Congress lacks your subtly, and the American press lacks your goodwill. They do not understand the absence of a reference on your part to the treaty, nor that there is no time limit set on the withdrawal.

But let me understand again. Your two major objections are the absence of the statement of the ultimate objective, and the seemingly conditional formulation of the withdrawal which makes it appear as if Taiwan is held for ransom by us.

Ch’iao: The ultimate objective of complete withdrawal. To make even more clear our objectives: on the first question of wording but which also involves substance, that is in our version it says “it hopes that a settlement on the Taiwan question…”, whereas in General Haig’s version it says “reaffirms its abiding interest.” And there is “an abiding interest,” where it says “it hopes,” and there is “an abiding interest ….” “Consistent with this position”—the “position” means the position of the Chinese on either side of the Straits—“that there is but one China.” This is not mentioned in your version. But on your side, on the contrary, it is not linked up with that position, but linked up with reduction of “tensions in the area” which makes people think of Southeast Asia, China, etc. It makes it appear that Taiwan, although it is Chinese territory, that it is being used as a base by the U.S., and that doesn’t conform to the position of the U.S. as stated before in the Communique. And certainly it does not conform to our position.

And then the third point is that we mentioned “the U.S. will progressively reduce and finally withdraw U.S. forces from Taiwan,” whereas in General Haig’s version it says “as tensions diminish…”

Kissinger: Okay. I understand. We have a difficult problem.

Ch’iao: That is so.

Kissinger: And we understand your concern. I think we fundamentally agree that this is a problem which we both hope will be solved, and you have shown restraint in connection with it. But we have necessities which are partly self-inflicted, but which nevertheless, particularly this year, are very great.

Let me see whether I can do something to the version General Haig gave you to take account of as many of your concerns as is bearable to us. And maybe we can give you something after the cultural event tonight. Do you have the Prime Minister’s bad habits?

Ch’iao: The only thing is I smoke as well.

Kissinger All right, shall we meet here after the performance tonight? Or rather wait for the translation.

Ch’iao: I think we will work it this way, to speed up the process. If you can find the time to give us a written version of your thinking, because we too need some time to study it, and our purpose is common. Both of us want to find a way out. The Premier meets with the President, so there will not be much time—so if you can give us something in writing.

Kissinger: Should I meet someone here tonight just for ten minutes? We will just give you the paper.

Ch’iao: Yes.

Kissinger: May I raise one more little quick question? Tomorrow night we shall meet, and we shall give you what negotiations we are conducting prior to our meeting in Moscow, which will take a little longer. There are details and schedules as I told the Prime Minister yesterday. The President has asked me to give you some information of a more sensitive nature on the dangers we think we both face. So, it might be that you might want to have somebody here who understands some of the military issues involves so that we can explain it to him. It is entirely up to you. I think it would be more beneficial to your side to have somebody here with technological experience for me to give this information to. It is entirely up to you.

Ch’iao: We will study that.

Kissinger: We do it so that in any future crisis we both know militarily what the problem is, such as that which confronted on the subcontinent.

Ch’iao: Good. Then when shall we meet tomorrow morning?

Kissinger: 10:00. So we will meet briefly tonight after the cultural performance, and then again tomorrow at 10:00 a.m.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, Country Files, Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic of China during the Presidential Visit, February 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, presumably drafted by Lord. The meeting was held at the Guest House, Villa 2.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua discussed the wording of the communiqué, specifically in relation to the South Asia crisis and the continuing dilemma over Taiwan. The main sticking point for Ch’iao remained Washington’s unwillingness to withdraw all its troops from Taiwan. Kissinger responded that the U.S. was “confronting …a very complex domestic situation” in reference to the “China Lobby.”