Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

6. Memorandum of Conversation, Palm Springs, California, May 7, 1971, 2:50-5:45 p.m.¹ ²

Palm Springs, California, May 7, 1971, 2:50-5:45 p.m.

Participants:

• Joseph S. Farland, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• David R. Halperin (notetaker)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Friday, May 7, 1971—2:50 - 5:45 p.m.

Place: 1836 Aquanetta Circle, Palm Springs, California (Home of Mr. Theodore Cummings)

After an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador Farland stated that the State Department had accepted his cover story without question. Mr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for the cables sent by Ambassador Farland, and for his loyalty over the past weeks.

Mr. Kissinger then stated that McNamara was preparing to submit a devastating report concluding that it would take $250 million to give Pakistan breathing room; he then asked Ambassador Farland whether it is, in fact, possible to provide breathing room, and whether $250 million is a realistic estimate of the support required. Ambassador Farland replied that although he thought it would be possible, there are some real problems to contend with:

• — Ambassador Keating seems to have gone berserk; he has violated security and appears determined to break Pakistan. For example, he recently called in a New York Times reporter and, although he did not release the text, he did tell him the essence of Blood’s report. Ambassador Farland is convinced that Keating is determined to make a political issue out of the Pakistani situation, and is attempting to discredit the Administation in the process.
• — Another problem is the quality of political reporting in Dacca. The reporters there are missionaries without significant practical experience. They have never before seen war and are grossly exaggerating the amount of killing and bloodshed there. Moving to the primary item of business, Mr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Farland that for some time, we have been passing messages to the Chinese through the Pakistanis. Because of the communications problem, it had not been possible to inform Ambassador Farland of this previously, and messages have been conveyed directly to Yahya by the President, or through Ambassador Hilaly. Mr. Kissinger then outlined the exchange of messages that has occurred to date:
• — The channel was established in August, 1969. At that time, while visiting Pakistan, the President indicated to President Yahya (and Mr. Kissinger told the former Air Force Chief of Staff) that the United States desired to normalize relations with China.
• — President Yahya then called in the Chinese Ambassador who thanked him for his interest and indicated that China would be interested in hearing something positive.
• — Mr. Kissinger then told Hilaly that we would remove two destroyers from the Taiwan Straits as a gesture of good will. (In point of fact, this had already been decided for budgetary reasons.)
• — The Chinese responded by releasing two American yachtsmen.
• — Two days or a week later, the Chinese told Yahya that they were willing to resume talks in Warsaw. They also expressed concern about the Japanese.
• — In a subsequent message delivered by Yahya, it was said that a war between China and the U.S. is seen now as a very remote possibility.
• — For a while, the Rumanian channel was used; then, when Yahya came to the U.S. in October, the President suggested to him that the Chinese could begin talking to us in secure channels.—On December 9, 1970, the Chinese replied as follows (Dr. Kissinger stressed that this must be treated with the greatest sensitivity):

  “This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. A special envoy of President Nixon’s will be most welcome in Peking. We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past, but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head.”

• — We replied in early January: “In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En-Lai to President Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S. -China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. The United States therefore proposed that representatives of the two Governments meet at an early convenient moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the modalities of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would enjoy while in the People’s Republic of China.” Orally, we suggested that the preliminary meeting be in Pakistan.
• — Last week, we received from Ambassador Hilaly a message probably written by the Chinese: “The Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a Special Envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for a direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet ripe, the matter may be deferred to a later date. As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely possible for proper arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan.”

Mr. Kissinger stressed that these developments could be of great diplomatic significance, both with respect to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Because (outside of the President), Mr. Kissinger is the only person who can talk to the Chinese understanding all of the inter-related aspects of the negotiations, it is desired that Mr. Kissinger be the first contact—the subsequent one to be with the President himself.

— Mr. Kissinger stated that we intend to reply that the U.S. is prepared to talk on all outstanding issues and cannot confine the meeting to one topic. Each side will be free to raise whatever issues are of concern to them. The President is prepared to go to Peking, but there should be a preliminary secret meeting between Mr. Kissinger and Cho En-Lai at which time Mr. Kissinger will be empowered to select a time and the general circumstances of a Presidential visit—possibly next year.

Mr. Kissinger then indicated to Ambassador Farland that the President will not go to Peking unless Vietnam is concluded. Mr. Kissinger will propose to meet with Chou En-Lai or his representative either in Pakistan or a location in Southern China which is easily accessible from Pakistan.

TECHNICAL DETAILS OF MEETING

Mr. Kissinger and Ambassador Farland proceeded to discuss a number of technical details related to the meeting between Mr. Kissinger and the Chinese.

Mr. Kissinger stated that Ambassador Farland would receive a copy of everything given to Yahya. [text not declassified]Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Farland if he thought Hilaly would permit our messages to be ready by the foreign office. Ambassador Farland thought there was no danger of this since, in his view, Hilaly does not trust either his staff or the foreign office.

Mr. Kissinger next raised the question of whether our next message should be delivered to Yahya through Hilaly or through Ambassador Farland.

Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Farland whether it would be possible to get to Pakistan without attracting attention. The Ambassador felt that a visit by Mr. Kissinger could be easily explained in terms of the East-West crisis.

Mr. Kissinger next questioned whether it would be better to meet in Pakistan where the Pakistanis would tape the meeting—or in China where the Chinese would do the taping. Ambassador Farland felt the latter would be preferable, and Mr. Kissinger agreed.

Mr. Kissinger outlined a proposed itinerary in which he would go to Vietnam on an inspection trip, stop in Bangkok, New Delhi, Islamibad on Friday, have Ambassador Farland take him off for the weekend—and then go to Southern China for roughly 24 hours. Mr. Kissinger stated he would then go on to Tehran on Monday. He will probably travel in one of the large Presidential aircraft—possibly Air Force 2.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were an American Press Corps in Rawalpindi; Ambassador Farland said there was one fellow named Zeiber.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that he could say he was going to the Khyber Pass or to the hill station, and Ambassador Farland could cover for him. Ambassador Farland stated that Yahya has a summer house which could be used; it would be best if President Yahya invited Mr. Kissinger there for the weekend. Ambassador Farland stated that the Chinese have an airfield just the other side of the mountains which could be used for the meeting.

COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. Kissinger stated there were several possible channels which he could use in communicating with Ambassador Farland:

• — [text not declassified]
• — [text not declassified]
• — Navy Channel ending in Karachi (a commercial plane would have to be used to get the message up to Rawalpindi, however).
• — Ambassador Farland could be shown how to use one-time pads (however, encryption and decryption each take about four hours).

[text not declassified] The Ambassador felt the Navy channel would probably be best; in his own office only his (non-State Department) secretary would handle the messages. Ambassador Farland felt it would be best to have the special Navy communicator in Karachi where the Attache is stationed. Mr. Kissinger stated that [text not declassified] he would have the Navy Channel set up by next week (Monday, if possible), after Admiral Moorer clears the Attache (named Dros).

TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS

Mr. Kissinger stated that he presently thought he would leave Rawalpindi Saturday morning and return Sunday evening—with a stay in China of about 24 hours to permit three separate sessions.

Ambassador Farland pointed out that he would be expected to have a large reception for Mr. Kissinger who agreed that everything required by protocol must be done to avoid arousing suspicion.

Mr. Kissinger raised the question of whether the country director at State should be permitted to send a representative along on the trip—which would pose real problems in Pakistan. Ambassador Farland suggested that the Vietnam country director be permitted to send his representative on that portion of the trip only.

PAKISTAN’S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Mr. Kissinger stated that he would talk to McNamara on Monday, May 10, and tell him that Yahya must be kept afloat for six more months; one problem will be that McNamara is emotionally against Yahya—as is the entire liberal community. Ambassador Farland pointed out that matters won’t be helped by the fact that Keating is now on his way back to conduct a series of conferences, including some with his old Senate confreres. Mr. Kissinger stated that he would tell McNamara that this is the only channel we have, and he must give Yahya at least three months. Ambassador Farland stated that six months should be the goal.

Ambassador Farland stated that he had urged Yahya to tell his staff to make a new presentation to the consortium. Ahmad is coming to the United States next week, and Ambassador Farland has stressed this to him. The Ambassador stated that one inherent problem is that the lower echelon in the Pakistani bureaucracy feels they have a commitment from China to support operations in East Pakistan. Although Japan is negative in their position, Ambassador Farland felt that Germany will not let Pakistan go down the drain and the British will probably help as well. Mr. Kissinger asked whether the $250 million will be applied entirely to debt re-scheduling—and whether Yahya could propose a plan applicable to West Pakistan. Ambassador Farland thought some of the $250 million would be a new loan, and that a consortium proposal would be geared to East Pakistan with the West receiving/administering the funds.

Mr. Kissinger next asked what he could do bureaucratically to help. Ambassador Farland said that the most important contribution would be to get McNamara to head up the consortium. Mr. Kissinger replied that he did not think McNamara would agree to this because it would antagonize his liberal friends. Ambassador Farland then pointed out that the IMF was another possibility that should not be overlooked. Assali had previously requested a standby loan from the IMF which was turned down; however, the loan request could be reactivated. Mr. Kissinger indicated that he would take this issue up with Peterson or Shultz, and that he would report on his meeting with McNamara through the Navy channel. [text not declassified]

POLITICAL SITUATION

Mr. Kissinger asked how it was that the election results were so unexpected. Ambassador Farland said that everyone has missed in their predictions. In East Pakistan, Rahman had been able to capitalize on the cyclone. When the western nations began to pour in assistance, the Benghalis realized for the first time that they were part of the world. In the West, everyone had thought the landowners could continue to retain substantial support.

* * * *

Ambassador Farland voiced some mild complaints about living in Pakistan and expressed the hope that if the China meeting came off successfully, a new post could be offered. Mr. Kissinger replied noncommittally that if this gets done, “we will owe you a great debt of gratitude.”

Mr. Kissinger asked if there is any way West Pakistan can hold on to East Pakistan. Ambassador Farland said no, not in the long run. Mr. Kissinger then said that all we need is six months. East Benghal is bound to become an economic disaster; Chinese influence will grow there, and, it will not be possible to win any permanent friends there. Ambassador Farland agreed and pointed out the difficulty of making a financial commitment to the Benghalis.

Ambassador Farland asked if Mr. Kissinger could have Hanna pass the word down through regular channels that we are going to work things out and support the government. Mr. Kissinger said he would insure this gets done. Ambassador Farland then said that our interest in trying to save Pakistan be conveyed to the heads of government in Britain, Germany—and possibly also Japan. Mr. Kissinger replied that he might be going to Britain on other business and would speak to Heath about this. Ambassador Farland pointed out that at this point, the other members of the consortium do not know our position.

SUMMARY

Mr. Kissinger indicated, by way of summary, that he would:

(1) Have Hanna told that we want a positive attitude and six months time;

(2) Talk to McNamara along the lines above;

(3) Look into the IMF Loan;

(4) Personally talk to Heath;

(5) Have Rush talk to Brandt in two weeks time—or, in any event, before the end of the month; and

(6) Possibly get the State Department to get to Japan if there is a convenient way to do this.

Mr. Kissinger then asked Ambassador Farland to check back with him if at any point he received instructions from the Department which were intolerable.

DELIVERY OF U.S. MESSAGE

With regard to the means of delivering the message to Yahya, Ambassador Farland felt that he should give it to Yahya (rather than Hilaly) since he could use this to build up credence with Yahya. Ambassador Farland also suggested that this could be used as a lever to get some things done which he has been pressing for in East Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that the two were separate, and must be kept that way. Mr. Kissinger stated that in any event the message would be shown to Hilaly and Ambassador Farland would get a copy to discuss with Yahya. All technical coordination will be done through Ambassador Farland—who should discuss with Yahya Mr. Kissinger’s around-the-world trip, his intention to stop in Pakistan for the weekend and then go on (presumably) to Tehran after leaving Pakistan. A one-day official program in Pakistan would probably have to be planned. Ambassador Farland should discuss with Yahya the fact that he met with Mr. Kissinger and also discuss the technical arrangements of the visit.

Ambassador Farland asked that the Navy attache contact him as soon as the channel is open, and Mr. Kissinger assured him this would be done—probably by Monday.

Scenario for China Visit

A number of details were then discussed without any definite decisions being made:

• — Whether to fly to China using a Pakistani, Chinese or U.S. aircraft.
• — Whether to employ a second U.S. plane (possibly a Jetstar) for the flight into China in order to leave the larger aircraft parked conspicuously at Rawalpindi.
• — Whether or not Ambassador Farland should accompany Mr. Kissinger into China.
• — Whether to fly into China from Rawalpindi or Sargoda.

Ambassador Farland pointed out that Mr. Kissinger would be least likely to be observed in Sargoda, a military base 45 minutes south of Rawalpindi. Mr. Kissinger might initially land there on the pretext of visiting the surrounding countryside. After his large plane had left for Rawalpindi to refuel, he could transfer to a smaller plane which would take his party to China and return him to Rawalpindi the following day. The problem with this plan would be that Mr. Kissinger could not normally visit a defense installation like Sargoda without arousing suspicion.

The final determination with regard to technical details was left in the hands of Ambassador Farland who indicated he would submit several well-developed alternatives to Mr. Kissinger for review.

After a few parting remarks, the meeting was concluded at 5:45 p.m.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1031, Files for the President-China Material, Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969-July 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by David R. Halperin. The conversation was held in Palm Springs, California, at the home of Mr. Theodore Cummings. For more information about the Blood report, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1972, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Farland discussed the arrangements necessary for a secret preliminary trip to China that would pave the way for an official, public visit by the President.