45. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 22, 19711 2

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October 22, 1971





The President is now very concerned that you not arrive in Washington on Monday night. He wishes to be sure that you plan your return trip to arrive some time after Noon on Tuesday. I told him that this might be quite difficult for you to arrange since you did not control your own destiny at that end. He replied that in any event he wanted you to be aware of his wishes on this matter, and posed two options:

Either remain in Peking if you consider this appropriate so as to arrive in Washington not before Noon on Tuesday, or
Follow original schedule and remain overnight in Anchorage, departing at such a time that you will not arrive at Andrews before Noon and preferably later on Tuesday.

I was told not to give you any reason for this other than the fact that the President will not be in Washington on Monday and wants to be sure that he is available when you arrive from Peking. The real reason is because Rogers insists that your arrival from Peking just before the Chirep vote, now scheduled for Tuesday morning, would seriously jeopardize its outcome and in any event would be the subject of considerable [Page 2] criticism should the vote go against us.

We met this afternoon in the President’s office with Rogers and Bush. This meeting indicated that chances for favorable vote on IQ afternoon, in Rogers’ presence, and asked him to see Lanusse immediately to urge that he vote with us on the IQ.

Following the meeting this afternoon, the President and Bush were photographed in the Rose Garden discussing the vote and Ziegler issued a statement indicating Presidential support for Rogers’ and Bush’s efforts on Chirep. It was a testy afternoon here and I am not sure I haven’t lost future utility due to the resistance on both the issue of your return and too much Presidential activity on Chirep.

I am sending you by separate message State’s latest ploy on contingency actions should we fail on important question vote. I will need your guidance since it looks very worrisome in context of your Host’s attitudes.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1035, Files for the President-China Material, China-HAK October 1971 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Also designated as immediate. No time of transmission or receipt appears on the message. For Haig’s understanding of Rogers’ position on Kissinger’s return, see Document 49. For additional information concerning the Chinese representation issue at the United Nations, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, Document 167 and Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume V, United Nations.
  2. Haig indicated that President Nixon wanted Kissinger to delay his return to Washington.