141. Backchannel Message HAKTO 9 From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Beijing, June 20, 1972, 1713Z1 2
FROM:
- HENRY A KISSINGER
TO:
- GENERAL HAIG
WTE DE WTE 10
P 201713Z JUN 772
HAKTO 9
- 1.
- WE HAD FOUR PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH CHOU THIS AFTERNOON ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND VIET NAM. I DID ALMOST ALL THE TALKING AS CHOU EXPRESSEDLY INVITED MY PRESENTATIONS AND CONFINED HIMSELF TO CONSTRUCTIVE, NON-POLEMICAL QUESTIONS.
- 2.
- ON SOVIET UNION, I BRIEFED CHOU ALONG FAMILIAR LINES ON OUR PURPOSES, ATTITUDES, AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST JULY. HE ASKED SERIES OF QUESTIONS WHICH REFLECTED SOME CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR MCGOVERN TO CUT DEFENSE BUDGET BY ONE-THIRD AND LATER MADE A SCATHING REFERENCE TO PEOPLE WHO PROCEED OUT OF NAIVE ILLUSIONS.
- 3.
- ON VIETNAM, I REVIEWED OUR POLICY, SLOWING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE SOLIDARITY OF OUR DOMESTIC SUPPORT, PRESIDENT’S DETERMINATION AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF OUR BETRAYING AN ALLY. CHOU WAS MODERATE AND SHOWED MORE DIRECT INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS THAN BEFORE. HE ONCE AGAIN FLOATED IDEA OF CEASE-FIRE-IN-PLACE. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR MCGOVERN OR ANYONE ELSE TO OVERTHROW Thieu, IMPLYING THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THIS FACT. CHOU MADE NO STATEMENT, PERHAPS WISHING TO PONDER MY REMARKS BEFORE OFFERING HIS OWN.
WARM REGARDS.
[Covering memorandum]
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: AL Haig
SUBJECT: Second Situation Report from Dr. Kissinger in Peking
Henry has just reported that he completed four private meetings with Chou on the afternoon of June 20. Kissinger did most of the talking as Chou expressly invited his presentations and confined himself to constructive, non-polemical questions.
- — On Soviet Union, Kissinger briefed Chou along familiar lines on U.S. purposes, attitudes and policy developments since last July. Chou asked questions which reflected some concern about Soviet intentions.
- — Chou made the point that it would be impossible for McGovern to cut the U.S. Defense budget by one-third and later made a scathing reference to people who proceed out of naive illusions.
- — On Vietnam, Henry reviewed our policy designed to slow the North Vietnamese offensive, the fact of solidarity of our domestic support, your determination and the impossibility of betraying an ally. Chou was moderate and showed more interest in negotiations than ever before. He once again floated the idea of a cease-fire in place. Most importantly, Chou said that it would probably be impossible for McGovern or anyone else to overthrow Thieu, implying that North Vietnamese would have to accept this fact (this coincides with the intelligence report we had yesterday).
During the meetings, Chou made no statements; Kissinger surmises he wished to ponder the U.S. position before offering his own.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files, Far East, China-Dr. Kissinger’s June 1972 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was also sent to Rodman. Handwritten notations on the memorandum read: “To HAK file” and “Haig, Rodman.” Haig transmitted the message to Nixon under an attached June 20 covering memorandum summarizing Kissinger’s meeting. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. Nixon bracketed the section on McGovern.↩
- Kissinger noted that he and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had gathered for four separate meetings on the Soviet Union and Vietnam.↩