139. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, June 19, 1972, 10:25-11:20 p.m.1 2
PARTICIPANTS:
- Prime Minister Chou En-lai
- Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
- Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
- Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winston Lord, NSC Staff
DATE & TIME: Monday, June 19, 1972; 10:25 - 11:20 p.m.
PLACE: Guest House #5, Peking
Dr. Kissinger : This was where it all began.
Prime Minister Chou: With the same participants (Lord and Pineau, the stenographer).
Dr. Kissinger : No, Miss Pineau was not on the first trip. I had no idea what we would find here when I came.
Prime Minister Chou: You are probably familiar by now.
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, now. And now I always look forward to it very much.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, it’s almost one year, I believe.
Dr. Kissinger : I was accused in a New York Times article of conducting a China-first policy two days ago.
Prime Minister Chou: Oh, is that true? We haven’t seen that editorial.
Dr. Kissinger : I will give it to you. I have a copy.
[Page 2]Prime Minister Chou: They say you practice China First?
Dr. Kissinger : China first, at the expense of Japan.
Prime Minister Chou: That might not be so because you also said some very nice things in Japan. For instance, you told them you could now tell them you were coming to China this time and therefore Sato and Fukuda were very happy because they could say they had knowledge of that beforehand.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: There would be no more Nixon “shocks.”
Dr. Kissinger : There was no way I could avoid telling them, being in Japan 48 hours before the announcement was made. But we told all three—we told both Fukuda and Tanaka, so nobody could claim any preference.
Prime Minister Chou: So which items would you like to be discussed in the restricted meetings?
Dr. Kissinger : Well, we can discuss in the restricted meeting, if you want to, Vietnam or Indochina, Soviet affairs, or a general assessment of the Soviet situation. Let me just see. If you want to discuss anything about Taiwan, I would like to discuss it in a restricted session, and one item about South Asia.
Prime Minister Chou: Japan?
Dr. Kissinger : Japan. We can do it in one of two ways. Either in a restricted session or a slightly enlarged session. I don’t need to have every member of my group present at every meeting, and I can control this. I won’t ask you to arrange meetings unless it is absolutely necessary. Would this be your format for a restricted session, just this group?
Prime Minister Chou: That will depend upon the specific conditions. The comparatively small scope would be those present. For certain issues that might be related to larger scope, then we would include more, not very many.
Dr. Kissinger : Right. I feel the same way. And we can discuss that from case to case.
[Page 3]Prime Minister Chou: So how do you think we should begin? You informed us beforehand you would like to talk to us about your visit to the Soviet Union and your talks there. But that could be long, do you think?
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, that could be.
Prime Minister Chou: What do you think would be rather short? Japan?
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, Japan would be rather short. Probably. Probably Japan would be short. And probably I can make one point about the Soviet aspect, because that would relate to what I would like to have Mr. Jenkins discuss with his colleagues. We will have a long discussion about the Soviet Union, but I want to make one point.
It was clear to us one of the objective consequences of the Moscow summit was to free Soviet policy for a greater role in Asia by producing relaxation in Europe. We recognize that this is the Soviet strategy, but we cannot deal with it in Europe.
Prime Minister Chou: You cannot deal with the Soviet Union you mean?
Dr. Kissinger : No, with what the Soviet Union might do in Asia by maintaining tension in Europe, because our allies would not agree to that. But as we decided last December, and in fact proved, we will not support, in fact we will strongly and, if necessary, violently, oppose Soviet adventures in Asia, and in particular pressures that might be directed against the People’s Republic. We do this in our self-interest, not for any other reasons.
Now, this, however, makes it desirable that the links that are beginning to develop gradually become somewhat more visible in the area that is being discussed in Paris. And therefore we have asked ourselves how this could be done.
Let me say right at the beginning in the field of trade, for example, we are not interested in this for commercial reasons. The maximum trade we can foresee is almost meaningless in terms of our gross national product. So our interest in this respect is quite different from say, the [Page 4] Japanese interest. We don’t look at China as a big market. But we are prepared to use it as a symbol of the equality vis-a-vis the other countries with which we are prepared to trade of the People’s Republic, and for whatever use it can be in establishing such links. The same is true in science, agriculture, technology, medicine, etc.
But in this respect I have one particular problem. The problem as I have looked at the Paris channel is that at least in our government very many projects have come up one at a time, and from our point of view become unmanageable in relationship to any political objective. I don’t know how it is with you, but that’s how it is with us. So we thought that if we could create some commissions in various fields—some joint commissions say in agriculture, economics and science—then we could give directives to our members of these commissions in a general political sense rather than have fifty projects a month that come to us and are very difficult to relate one to another. And then the commission could sort out the individual problems.
If this idea commends itself to you, then Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Solomon and Mr. Holdridge can discuss the details with whomever you designate. But we are also prepared to continue on this present basis. It seemed to us a more efficient way of proceeding.
Prime Minister Chou: Of course, that is a bilateral matter.
Dr. Kissinger : Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: That belongs to the bilateral field.
Dr. Kissinger : Exactly, but I wanted to explain to you what our general strategy is, and why I am raising it with you rather than leaving it entirely to the bilateral field. We are in no particular hurry. It is simply growing out of our understanding of what the strategy of some other countries may be.
Prime Minister Chou: The second point I would like to ask is, has there been any progress made in the Paris talks with the Vietnamese?
Dr. Kissinger : No, at this moment the Paris talks are suspended and there is no fixed date for the resumption. We have proposed, and this is [Page 5] confidential, we have proposed to the North Vietnamese that there be a private meeting between Le Duc Tho and me on June 28 and have stated that if there is such a meeting its purpose would be to prepare for the resumption of plenary sessions. We have not yet received a reply.
But the real problem, Mr. Prime Minister, is not whether the talks resume but what we are going to talk about when they do resume. The tragedy is—as I have told you before and I know we don’t agree, but I have to be honest—the North Vietnamese are very heroic but they are not wise. They are acting as if Dulles were still alive and as if they had to protect themselves against Dulles. There is no solution to this problem if they insist that everything must be settled at once. If they could do what you have done—to separate those issues which must be taken care of immediately from those which should be settled by history, the war would be over in a month. Because we have no permanent objectives in Indochina.
Prime Minister Chou: I also mentioned Dulles to Fairbank. I admitted that I had made a mistake when I met with the five American families that evening. I didn’t have time to meet them individually, so I had to put them together.
Dr. Kissinger : Which families?
Prime Minister Chou: Fairbank, Cohen, Stone, Salisbury and Dudman.
Dr. Kissinger : I will hear from them, Mr. Prime Minister, without any question when I come back to America.
Prime Minister Chou: You also mentioned you would like to see Mr. Fairbank.
Dr. Kissinger : Oh, for 15 minutes some time.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: He is now in Peking. He is going to leave for other places, but he is now in Peking.
Dr. Kissinger : If there’s a free half-hour.
[Page 6]Prime Minister Chou: On the first day Mr. Fairbank came he told Mr. Ch’iao he had met you before he came to China. The core of his point was to get Chinese students to go to his research center in Harvard.
Dr. Kissinger : He is a very single-minded man. But, of course, he is also an old friend.
Prime Minister Chou: This time I would like to discuss this issue more with you, the issue of Vietnam. Because you are always trying to compare them with us. This is a different thing. You are a very practical statesman so you know the situation is different.
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, we will discuss it any time the Prime Minister wishes.
Prime Minister Chou: But Podgorny on his return to the Soviet Union from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam said he had suggested if the hostilities could stop…if a cease-fire could be entered, together with the bombing and the blockade stopped…we don’t know whether that was something you discussed with the Soviet Union. Because he said that openly.
Dr. Kissinger : I have not seen the text of his statement. I can tell you what was discussed with the Soviet Union. I cannot comment on what he said. If you have a text, I will be glad to comment on it.
Prime Minister Chou: We also saw a few press releases. Le Duc Tho passed through China the day before yesterday; I also met him yesterday. I hadn’t met Podgorny either. He might have met him…Podgorny might have left after Mr. Le Duc Tho went back. But we don’t know. At that time Le Duc Tho hadn’t gotten news of Podgorny’ s statement. And, of course, I had neither the responsibility nor right to discuss how they were going to proceed. But we assessed the situation together.
So in the future when we have this specific topic of Vietnam I can say more about that. Because if what Podgorny said had already been accepted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam then it seemed close to what you said. He mentioned a ceasefire in place on the one hand, and on the other hand there will also be a simultaneous cessation of bombing. But we will get the English text.
[Page 7]Dr. Kissinger : What we discussed with the Soviet leaders was an explanation of our May 8 proposal. And we secondly discussed how, if the North Vietnamese insist that there also be a political solution, how the May 8 proposal could be combined with the January 27 proposal, the eight points. We didn’t discuss with the Soviet leaders a separate ceasefire that did not involve prisoners. But a ceasefire that included some arrangement for the prisoners we would be extremely interested in discussing, and we would be very flexible in… we would not at all exclude a ceasefire-in-place. (Prime Minister Chou nods.)
But we have not received any official information either from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or from the Soviet Union as to what was discussed in Hanoi.
Interpreter: In Vietnam?
Dr. Kissinger : In Hanoi.
Prime Minister Chou: We haven’t received any either.
Dr. Kissinger : But when we do discuss Vietnam we should discuss it from the aspect that we are not looking for excuses to extend the war and are not looking to inflict a military defeat on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Prime Minister Chou: And beside the question of Japan we would also like to discuss the issue of Korea.
Dr. Kissinger : All right.
Prime Minister Chou: I would only like to ask you one thing. Do you not oppose China discussing with Japan the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations?
Dr. Kissinger : I favor it.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I saw from the Japanese reports something to that effect. I would like to confirm them.
[Page 8]Dr. Kissinger : And I encouraged every Japanese leader in that direction.
Prime Minister Chou: And also you, of course, know we haven’t had discussions with the Japanese government, but with members of the ruling party, four Prime Ministers and ex-Foreign Ministers. You met four ex-Foreign Ministers and I met three of them. During each meeting we discussed the fact that normalization of relations with Japan would not exclude any other power. And I also quoted the Sino-U.S. communique that neither of us should seek hegemony in the Pacific region and were opposed to any country or group of countries seeking hegemony in that region.
Dr. Kissinger : We both have to show restraint in dealing with Japan. If we were to compete in the short term I think we would win politically, but that’s not important. In the long term it would lead to a new nationalistic trend in Japan. So we are encouraging you in your normalizing relations with Japan. And you may have noted Secretary Richardson’s comments in Japan. He was there at the same time I was and I overshadowed his speech. But he made a very good speech which said essentially the same thing. I will send you a copy of his speech.
Prime Minister Chou: We only saw some salient points. We haven’t seen the text.
Dr. Kissinger : I will send it to you.
Prime Minister Chou: What was the main theme?
Dr. Kissinger : That the U.S. has no objection, and in fact welcomes, better relations between Japan and the PRC.
Prime Minister Chou: Is Mr. Reischauer still opposed to you?
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, but that will end after the election.
Vice Foreign Minister Ch’iao: And he’s still quarreling with Mr. Fairbank.
Mr. Kissinger: Yes, much of this intellectual community has suddenly discovered a great affection for Japan which they believe we have neglected.
[Page 9]Prime Minister Chou: So you now have made up for that.
Dr. Kissinger : No, I think if you… Well, I cannot follow the Japanese press and what the Japanese press says bears very little relationship to what actually went on. In my conversations I stuck to the basic themes of our understanding which is (1) that we have no objection to normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC, (2) that we are opposed to the nuclear rearmament of Japan.
Prime Minister Chou: I read that, Dr. Kissinger!
Dr. Kissinger : Three, that we are opposed to an overseas role for Japanese military forces.
Prime Minister Chou: I saw that also.
Dr. Kissinger : Four, that the Japanese military should confine themselves to the conventional defense of their home islands.
Prime Minister Chou: I believe you first mentioned that the U.S.-Japan Treaty was necessary.
Dr. Kissinger : Yes, I said that, but we have always said this to you.
Prime Minister Chou: But we have noticed that there are some sections of the ruling party that do not agree to that and their opinions are different from other sections of the ruling party, and they wish to make some amendments to that treaty.
Dr. Kissinger : Particularly with regard to Taiwan.
Prime Minister Chou: As to the case about Taiwan, that long ago shouldn’t have existed.
Dr. Kissinger : No, there are two issues. One with regard to the language in the communique of 1969, and the other, if we wanted to defend Taiwan whether we could do so from Japanese bases. What I said in Japan about the Security Treaty was that we will not ask for its revision, but Japan is a big country now and it has every right to ask for a revision if they want to, but they have to take the initiative.
[Page 10]Prime Minister Chou: I heard that among the mainstream sector of the Japanese ruling party there are some who would like some amendment of the treaty at a certain time, not necessarily at the present.
Dr. Kissinger : That could be, and when that happens we will consider it. It is my belief that a Japan without the Security Treaty will sooner or later rearm on a nationalist basis, maybe not right away but eventually. It may rearm even with a Security Treaty so I don’t want to… because we are dealing here with a very volatile country (Chou nods). It seems to me that the Japanese are torn by four different motives:
- — an attraction toward the United States produced in part by their defeat, and since they had never been defeated before they have to exalt the country that defeated them; and financial considerations;
- — Second, a sentimental historical attachment to China—a combination of love and hatred;
- — Thirdly, the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere toward Southeast Asia; and
- — Fourth, an attention toward Siberia now being encouraged by the Soviet Union.
And it is quite conceivable that when you meet them—not you because you’re too far-seeing—but China may hear only the pro-China side, and it may be that we hear only the pro-America side, but I think all four exist simultaneously.
Prime Minister Chou: It seems that there’s a great difference between your balance of trade still.
Dr. Kissinger : That’s right, about 3. 5 billion dollars, and that presents a problem. And the commercial practices of the Japanese present another problem.
Prime Minister Chou: It’s a very complicated world.
Dr. Kissinger : But I think it’s important not to…I think that Japan has to be kept in some sort of emotional balance, and anyone who is trying to push it too far in one direction may easily bring about the opposite of what he wants.
[Page 11]Prime Minister Chou: I still say that Japan is at a crossroads, and it hasn’t yet decided itself.
Dr. Kissinger : I agree with the Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Chou: It’s now in a process of change.
So do you think we should end here today? We covered the general range today. Tomorrow afternoon do you think we could try to discuss two topics—Vietnam, the question of Indochina, and second, the question of U.S.-Soviet relations? I would like first to hear your opinion of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Dr. Kissinger : All right. Could I add one member to my group?
Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps we might add Mr. Chang Wen-chin, maybe others depending on your side.
Dr. Kissinger : I will let you know in the morning. I will certainly have Mr. Negroponte for Vietnam.
Prime Minister Chou: I think it is best to begin with you on the question of U.S.-Soviet talks.
Dr. Kissinger : Okay, it will just be the two of us. And then I will turn over the bilateral matters to Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Solomon and Mr. Holdridge, and you might let me know whom they should talk to.
Prime Minister Chou: In the morning perhaps you will all go out to visit… sight-see. We will try to arrange it. So tonight you can get some early rest.
Dr. Kissinger : Actually it’s 6:00 in the morning or later for us because of the time change.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files, Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Visit, June 1972 Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Presumably drafted by Lord. Ellipses and brackets are in the source text. The meeting was held at Guest House #5.↩
- President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Chinese Premier Chou En-lai that the United States would oppose Soviet aggression in the Far East. Kissinger also indicated that the Paris talks had been suspended and that he favored a Sino-Japanese rapprochement.↩