Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

129. Memorandum of Conversation, New York, May 16, 1972, 6:10-7:10 p.m.¹ ²

New York, May 16, 1972, 6:10-7:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Winston Lord
• Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
• Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

DATE & TIME: Tuesday, May 16, 1972, 6:10-7:10 p.m.

PLACE: New York City

Dr. Kissinger: I am sorry we are late. There was good deal of traffic. I read about the Ambassador in cables all the time. I have brought along a red folder with me in your honor.

I wanted to see the Ambassador to tell him about our plans for the next few weeks, for the information of the Chinese Government. It now appears that the President’s visit to Moscow is going forward, and in the spirit of previous exchanges I wanted to keep you informed about the present stage of these discussions.

First, a technical matter, I will be gone from May 20 to June 2. In my absence General Haig will have full authority to receive messages and you should get in touch with him. Mr. Lord will be with me.

Mr. Lord: (To Mrs. Shih) You can call Mr. Howe at the same extension numbers I gave you for me.

Dr. Kissinger: He (Mr. Howe) has been in China twice with us.

I have told you before that we understand the Soviet intention at this Summit meeting is to have the maximum number of agreements with us, and therefore they have delayed a number of negotiations so that they can be announced in Moscow. I have prepared a paper which lists the agreements that are likely to be concluded and the major content of these agreements. Perhaps rather than reading it to you, it would be simpler if I gave it to you. (He hands over a memorandum, attached at Tab A) This is for … this is, of course, very confidential. (The Ambassador and Mrs. Shih skimmed it quickly.)

These are the major provisions of the agreements. They can change slightly, but this is how it now looks.

In addition, the Soviet Union has proposed to us two other agreements which we are in the process of discussing and on which we therefore cannot give you the outline, but I can summarize them for you.

They would like us to state some common principles affecting the United States and the Soviet Union, somewhat similar to the principles which we signed affecting the People’s Republic and the United States. These are still in the process of being discussed, but I want to summarize them for the Prime Minister. (He then reads from the document attached at Tab B.)

The first affirms the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The second deals with the need to exercise restraint on bilateral relations and to conduct negotiations on the basis of reciprocity.

The third will deal with the responsibility of both countries to prevent conflicts and tensions in the world generally and will state that no country should be subject to external influence or outside pressures.

The fourth will deal with the desirability of placing US-Soviet relations on a firmer juridical basis.

The fifth will express the need, the desire of continuing the exchange of views at all levels.

The sixth will affirm the interests of both sides to continue efforts to limiting armaments.

This is assuming we can find correct formulations, and I would rather deal with your Vice Foreign Minister. Also Mr. Chang is a master in English. He knows it better than we do. (The Chinese side then indicated that they thought there was some confusion between Mr. Chiao and Mr. Chang.) I mean the Mr. Chang who just now was promoted. In fact, I don’t know whether it is appropriate but let me convey my best wishes to my friends from previous visits about their promotions which I read in the newspapers.

The seventh, eight, ninth, and tenth points will deal with these agreements that are announced here.

The eleventh, which we are insisting on very much, renounces any special rights for either side and says that neither recognizes special claims for the other. And it also stipulates that US-Soviet relations are not directed against any other country.

The twelfth point states that nothing agreed to here affects previous understandings, agreements or obligations.

Incidentally, I want to point out that the People’s Republic is the only government we have informed of these matters. We have not informed any of our allies.

In addition, the Soviet Union has proposed to us that we sign an agreement that we have renounced the use of nuclear weapons against each other. We have responded that we cannot consider an agreement that implies the right to use nuclear weapons against other countries. And this will probably prove to be an insoluble problem. At any rate, if we do anything with respect to nuclear weapons, it will be a general formulation applying to all countries and not just the Soviet Union, a general attitude toward nuclear weapons rather than specific obligations.

The other subjects that are likely to be discussed concern European matters, specifically mutual force reductions, and the Soviet proposal of a European Security Conference.

Undoubtedly the issue of Indochina will be raised. On Indochina we will take the position which you know. It will be exactly as we told you.

Now we want to reaffirm the enormous importance we place in our relationship with the People’s Republic. We will not knowingly sign agreements directed against your interests. And we are prepared to sign any agreement with you that we have signed or will sign with the Soviet Union, adapted of course to our special conditions. Also, if the People’s Republic expressed any concern with respect to any aspect, that would be taken with extreme seriousness by us. There should be no reluctance on your part to do that.

One other matter, with respect to Indochina, which we simply want to inform you of. We have had proposals from various sources to resume plenary sessions. We see no sense in plenary sessions unless there is some prospect for a useful discussion. We have therefore proposed a private meeting next Sunday in Paris to see whether any basis exists for making rapid progress. And we are prepared to be forthcoming and flexible.

We understand your reluctance to become involved in this issue, but we wanted to express one general view. We have no interest in humiliating North Vietnam. If North Vietnam—I have often felt—dealt with us with 30 percent of the wisdom of your Prime Minister, we would settle matters very quickly. The basis of our discussions last July and afterwards were that we managed to make a distinction between what could be done immediately and what has to be left to history. If the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could ever bring itself to make that distinction we could settle this matter very quickly, and I believe satisfactorily to all sides.

I wanted to make one other comment which rose out of a statement I read in the newspaper today which may not be accurately reported, in which your Prime Minister seemed to think that our recent actions in Vietnam were not consistent with the Shanghai communique, and that there was some concern about whether we really keep our promises.

We feel that in our relationship with the People’s Republic we have been very meticulous to keep every promise we have made, whether it is formal or informal, and my presence here is an indication of that. We have told you on at least six occasions since our visit to Peking that if military measures were used against us, we would have to respond strongly. Out of respect for the Prime Minister, we took no actions in March while the offensive was being prepared. And we were given no choice by an offensive that was continuing even while we were attempting to start negotiations.

But we have stated our point of view often, and I simply want to reiterate that every promise that we have made to the People’s Republic will be kept strictly, both in letter and in the spirit of our understanding.

I have only two more matters if the Ambassador can be patient with me. First is to tell you that Senators Mansfield and Scott returned from China with all the enthusiasm that other visitors have shown. And they speak of their visit now with the slight nostalgia that we all feel that have been exposed to Chinese hospitality. They have submitted a very positive report to the President.

The other point I wanted to mention, since I will be gone for two weeks, I will contact you, of course, immediately upon our return from the Soviet Union to speak to you; it will be around June 3.

But as you know, we had a tentative plan for me to visit the People’s Republic on June 21. And I wanted to suggest that we might announce that around June 13. There is a text which we are proposing, but the new assistant minister (Mr. Chang) will no doubt have a much more eloquent version. (He hands over the text at Tab C.) There is no need for you to reply now. (The Ambassador and Mrs. Shih read the text.) We propose to make this announcement on June 13 at 11 o’clock in the morning.

Miss Shih: Washington time?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We can do it at 4 in the afternoon if that is better for you. That would be about five days before I leave.

Mrs Shih: What is the time difference between Washington and Peking?

Dr. Kissinger: Twelve hours. You can pick any time between 11 and 4, or you can do it earlier in the day.

Ambassador Huang: That is all?

Dr. Kissinger: One other matter. You remember that I was planning twice already to go to Japan on a private visit. (Ambassador Huang chuckles.) I am now planning to go around June 5 for three days. But it is an unofficial visit and it has the same purpose that I have already described to you.

Ambassador Huang: Doctor, you have mentioned just now the situation in Vietnam. I think you have noticed the statement issued by the Government of the People’s Republic of China recently.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Huang: In the view of the Chinese Government, President Nixon’s announcement on May 8 involving the recent actions was not aimed at ending the war but escalating the war. In its statement the Chinese Government has expressed its views very clearly. No matter what form the war may assume, whether ground forces or air forces or naval forces, whether fought by the US Government troops or the puppet troops, no matter what happens, the Chinese Government will support the Vietnamese people in their resistance against the aggression of the United States and for national salvation, to final victory. This stand of the Chinese Government is firm and unshakeable.

Another matter is about the telephone call made by Mr. Lord to me (Mrs. Shih) about the incident in which two Chinese ships were attacked near the Hon Ngu Island on May 6, 7 and 8th. That caused some injuries among the Chinese crew and Vietnamese workers aboard the ships and also caused damage among the ships. Your side has promised to make an investigation regarding the incident and, depending upon that, make an apology and compensation. I wonder what the result is of your investigation.

Dr. Kissinger: The primary result up to now, which I just received before I came here, is as follows: First, no attacks on Chinese ships are ever authorized under any circumstances, and our airplanes are prohibited from approaching your territorial limits. Our investigation has shown that there were attacks on North Vietnamese small ships that were taking cargo from your ship and bringing it ashore. We can therefore - while we have no certain knowledge - it was very plausible that your ships were accidentally hit. Moreover, our experience is that you never protest frivolously. And we therefore consider it very likely and practically certain that what you say is correct.

Therefore, on behalf of the President, I would like to express our regret for this action. As for the question of compensation, we are in principle willing to do this, but we must discuss it with our legal people as to how to go about it.

With respect to your first point, we have always respected your principled stand. We only wonder whether some service could not be rendered to your heroic ally by giving them a somewhat longer vision. What possible interest could we have to have a permanent position in Southeast Asia? And any thoughtful observer must come to the conclusion - I can assure you that what we are trying to arrange is an honorable withdrawal.

We are not the country trying to seek a permanent position in Southeast Asia. Nor are we the country which has any intention of threatening the People’s Republic of China. But we do not believe it is in anybody’s interests to have this solution forced by military means. We will approach negotiations with an attitude of goodwill. But we recognize the big gulf of suspicion that separates us - not you and us, but us and the Vietnamese. I can only repeat that we seek no permanent bases, no permanent position in this area, Southeast Asia.

Ambassador Huang: Doctor, you probably know the history of the war in Indochina, and we know the history very well. The present military situation in the war developed by the U.S. in its aggression has been created by the acts of the US itself. There is an old Chinese saying: “Those who tie the ring, should undo it.”

In our view this is not a very complicated question. It is very simple, as stated in the statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

But I won’t argue with you on this question. And I will surely report, convey the message you have just said to Premier Chou En-lai, the information you have made available to Premier Chou En-lai.

As to the date and timing of your visit to China, the announcement of your visit to China after your visit to the Soviet Union, when I have instructions, I will let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps you can let me know the proposed time for the arrival of the airplane crew, etc., the usual technical information.

Ambassador Huang: Yes. Sure.

About the incident concerning the two Chinese ships that were attacked near Hon Ngu Island off of the shore of Vietnam. We have made a very solid investigation and there is no doubt about it.

Dr. Kissinger: We accept your facts. If you will give some estimates on the damage, I will take appropriate action. And we have given the strictest orders that we hope will prevent a repetition.

Ambassador Huang: I will let you know after making some inquiries.

Dr. Kissinger: Or you can do it through Ambassador Watson in Paris.

Ambassador Huang: I have no more to say.

Dr. Kissinger: It is always a pleasure to see you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: I am not quite clear about the points 11 and 12 that you mentioned just now.

Dr. Kissinger: In the principles?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Point 11 renounces any special rights or advantages which may be claimed. We have inserted this, for your information, because we do not recognize the Brezhnev Doctrine, and it affirms that all states, the relations of all states must be based on the principle of sovereign equality and that nothing in US-Soviet relations can be construed by either party as directed against a third country.

The 12th point. This is the point we are insisting on, and formulating it is a little bit complex. The 12th point is a positive formulation of the 11th. It says nothing agreed on can affect any obligation with respect to other countries or understandings with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the two parties. In other words, it does not supersede any other agreement.

Ambassador Huang: What would be the example for point 11 in specific instances?

Dr. Kissinger: In specific instances, in point 11, we interpret it to mean that the Brezhnev Doctrine is no longer valid, that is a claim by the Soviet Union that it has a special right to intervene in certain parts of the world. That is our intention.

I will see you as soon as I get back. Of course, in Peking we will have full discussions with the Prime Minister and anyone he may, designate, but I won’t wait for that. I will see you first.

(The formal meeting then adjourned. There was some small talk while the Chinese were waiting for their car. Dr. Kissinger commented that the Chinese ping-pong team had made a good impression. Mr. Lord asked when the pool at the Chinese Mission would be open, and Mrs. Shih said this would be in June. Ambassador Huang confirmed that it was unheated and outdoors. He said that their new quarters were much more convenient and more quiet.

Dr. Kissinger said that he did not know whether personal feelings were allowed in his job, but he had developed them toward the Chinese.

He noted that the Ambassador had said that it was not convenient now for him to come to Washington. Ambassador Huang said that Dr. Kissinger could send Mr. Lord or someone else, if necessary. Dr. Kissinger said that at some point maybe the Ambassador could come up to Camp David which was secluded and serviced by a military airport.

(The car then arrived and the Chinese departed.)

[Tab A]

US-Soviet Bilateral Agreements That Might be Concluded During President Nixon’s Visit to the USSR

Strategic Arms Limitation: An agreement in this field has been under negotiation since 1969. It is now expected that it will be completed in two parts: the first will be a treaty limiting ABMs, the second an interim agreement freezing certain strategic offensive systems.

As regards ABMs, each side would be limited to two deployment areas, one around its capital city, the other in an ICBM field. The Soviet Union already has in place an ABM defense of the Moscow area and the United States is constructing an ABM defense in its ICBM field at Grand Forks, Montana. There would also be radar limits to ensure that neither side could establish the radar base for subsequent deployment of a territorial ABM defense. There will also be other provisions limiting activities in the strategic defensive field, all of which are designed to hold the two sides to only two permitted deployments. Verification will be by the national means of each side.

The offensive agreement will place ceilings on ICBMs and submarine-based strategic launchers. Each side would be held to its present number of ICBMs, operational or under construction, and to submarines and launchers presently operational and under construction. Old ICBMs could be converted into submarines and submarine-based launchers. This arrangement would have a five-year duration, during which a more permanent offensive limitation would be negotiated.

In the interim five-year agreement there would be no qualitative limitations, and replacement and modernization would be permitted, provided the agreed ceilings are not exceeded. Verification would be by the national means of each side.

It is expected that negotiations for a more definitive offensive limitation agreement would take place, beginning in the near future.

Space Cooperation: The US and USSR will probably agree to enhance cooperation in outer space by utilizing the capabilities of both countries for joint projects of mutual benefit. The National Aeronautical and Space Agency and the Soviet Academy of Sciences would oversee implementation of the agreement. Under the agreement the rendezvous and docking systems of American and Soviet spacecraft would be made compatible so as to provide for joint missions and rescue operations. The US and USSR would agree to a joint, manned space flight in 1975 using Apollo type and Soyuz-type spacecraft. The two spacecraft would rendezvous and dock in space, and the cosmonauts and astronauts would visit the respective spacecraft.

Environmental Agreement: The US and USSR will probably agree to establish closer and longerterm cooperation between interested organizations in the environmental field. A new US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection is being established to approve bilateral measures and programs of cooperation and make recommendations to the two Governments. Each country would designate a principal coordinator—on the US side this would be the Chairman of the Council on Environment. This cooperation would be aimed at solving the most important aspects of the problems of the environment, including work in the following fields: air pollution; water pollution; environmental pollution associated with agricultural production; enhancement of the urban environment (this includes noise pollution); preservation of nature and organization of preserves; marine pollution; biological and genetic consequences of environmental pollution; influence of environmental changes on climate; earthquake prediction; arctic and subarctic ecological systems; and legal and administrative measures for protecting environmental quality.

Health Agreement: The US and USSR are undertaking to develop and deepen mutual cooperation in the field of medical science and public health. They will probably agree to do so through the Joint Committee for Health Cooperation which was established by the February 11, 1972 exchange of letters between Ministers of Health. As agreed in that exchange of letters, initial research efforts would be focused on cancer, heart diseases and the environmental health sciences.

Science and Technology Agreement: A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will probably be established to identify, explore and set up appropriate joint programs. The President’s Science Adviser would chair the US side and negotiate the detailed arrangements for the establishment of the new commission. Cooperation in these fields could include the following: the exchange of scientists, specialists, and scientific and technical information and documentation; joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the fields of basic and applied sciences; joint research, development and testing and the exchange of research results and experience between scientific and research institutes and organizations; organization of joint courses, conferences and symposia; rendering of appropriate help on both sides in establishing contacts and arrangements between US firms and Soviet enterprises where a mutual interest develops.

Maritime Agreement: The US and USSR may agree to understandings on maritime and related matters which should facilitate an expansion of commerce between the two countries. The understandings would include provisions relating to port access, entry and treatment of ships of one country in the ports of the other, and equal participation in cargo carriage.

Incidents at Sea Agreement: The US and USSR may agree to understandings designed to prevent incidents at sea between units of the US and Soviet Navies operating on the high seas. Provisions of the understandings would deal with such issues as observation of the letter and spirit of the international rules of the road; avoidance of specified types of harassment and simulated attacks; measures to be taken so as not to hinder maneuvers such as carrier operations; general distances to be observed in aircraft-to-aircraft approaches and aircraft-to-ship approaches. The Defense Ministers would sign an agreement for the two countries.

Joint Commercial Commission: The US and USSR will probably agree to establish a Joint Commercial Commission to translate bilateral commercial objectives agreed to during the President’s visit into specific agreements and actions. The Commission would negotiate a bilateral trade agreement, work to resolve outstanding commercial and financial issues, and monitor the US-Soviet trade relationship over time. The Secretary of Commerce would chair the US side.

[Tab B]

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

It is expected that a document containing certain principles which would guide US-Soviet relations will be agreed and published.

In addition to a preamble, there will be twelve points.

The first will say that in the nuclear age, there is no alternative to conducting relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence and that ideological and political differences are not obstacles to normal relations.

The second will deal with the need to prevent dangerous exacerbations in US-Soviet relations, to exercise restraint and to conduct negotiations on the basis of reciprocity. It will also state that each side should recognize the security interests of the other, based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the threat or use of force.

The third will deal with the responsibility of both countries to do what they can to prevent conflicts and tensions in the world generally. It will state that no country should be subject to external interference.

The fourth will deal with the desirability of placing US-Soviet relations on a firmer juridical basis.

The fifth will express readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views, including at the highest level.

The sixth will affirm the intention of both sides to continue efforts toward limiting armaments, in accordance with the UN Charter.

The seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth deal with improvement of various kinds of concrete bilateral relations and cooperation.

The eleventh renounces any special rights or advantages for the two sides and states that claims by any other country on this score would not be recognized. It affirms the sovereign equality of all states. It also stipulates that the development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

The twelfth point states that the principles agreed upon do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the two sides.

The principles thus cover the bilateral relationship of the United States and the USSR and express certain objectives and yardsticks concerning their respective conduct in international affairs.

[Tab C]

In the joint communique issued in Shanghai in February 1972 at the conclusion of President Nixonts visit, the United States and the People’s Republic of China agreed to stay in contact through various channels. The two sides stated that this would include tithe sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.”

Accordingly Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will visit the People’s Republic of China from June 21 to June 25, 1972 for discussions with Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File-China Trip, China Exchanges, March 1, 1972-June 24, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Mission at the UN. Attached at Tab A is the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements; attached at Tab B is the Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations; and attached at Tab C is the draft Sino-American announcement.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger alerted Chinese Ambassador to the UN Huang Hua as to the nature of the discussions at the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit and reassured him that the U.S. would not agree to anything that would hurt Chinese interests.