Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

126. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, April 22, 1972, 4:30-8 p.m.¹ ²

Beijing, April 22, 1972, 4:30-8 p.m.

April 22, 1972

Premier - I hear you preferred “Red Detachment of Women” to “White-Haired Girl.”

Mansfield - Yes.

Scott - I have seen only “White-Haired Girl”. Mrs. Scott and I liked it and hope that the Premier will send the Shanghai bailet to the U.S. (referring to Premier’s suggestion at his dinner that he might send them if Mansfield and Scott liked them.)

Premier - We have heard today from Paris that the two House leaders will visit China June 26th after President Nixon returns from Moscow.

Mansfield - Recognizing your policy of non-intervention in internal affairs of other nations, but is any agreement possible with Hanoi for release of POWs and MIAs on same day of final U.S. withdrawal with no other conditions or quibbles?

Premier - I have already said we cannot say anything on behalf of third party (cites 4th clause 2nd part of Shanghai Communique) - cannot give definite reply - can explain bit on two points of Madame Binh 7-point proposal. (1) U.S. set final date for complete withdrawal all U.S. forces from Indo-China and as gradually withdrawn, gradual release of all POWs - at final day of withdrawal, all POWs released. (2) U.S. withdraw support of Thieu government and establishment of a government of national concord. If any U.S. forces remain, war will continue these conditions are firm and we support them. We are friends of the Indo-Chinese people—we continue to assist them - we do not interfere - we offer advice. On April 16th I said to Charge d’Affaires of Provisional government of South Viet-Nam (Viet Cong) that bombing should cease and Paris talks should resume - they and North Viet-Nam also suggested talks resume on April 27th even if bombing not stopped - was rejected by U.S. We are most disappointed by turn of events. We can only continue to support North Viet-Nam.

Mansfield - Do you think it would help to enlarge talks to include Laos and Cambodia?

Premier - Time is not now - Viet-Nam is not resolved - how can we expand talks? Britain has written Russia to expand Geneva Conference - Russia has not replied - I think you know why we are signatories, too.

Scott - Premier has said what could be more fair than that the bombings cease. I would suggest the invasion also stop, that would be fair - then a cease-fire could result.

Premier - What do you mean by invasion?

Scott - Presence in South Viet-Nam of almost all armed forces of North Viet-Nam.

Premier - Ask if in your opinion invasion from air is not invasion? Would it by your definition not be an invasion to shell from sea? Only shelling by land to sea by your definition our opinion the invasion began with 1964 incident - deem all the various bombings to be invasion and aggression - invasion of U.S. troops in Cambodia also aggression. As for 9th route battle last year, that was a more massive intrusion. If the question is to be solved - stop all war in Indo-China. If we are not to discuss responsibility and just ending the war, then we could go less into history and more into what can be done (reverts to SEATO and also to 2 Geneva Accords) - not a single Chinese soldier in North Viet-Nam - not a single base in North Viet-Nam.

Scott - If we differ on terminology, let us call both of them invasions then, but let us talk about cease-fire and stop killing—what is wrong with that?

Premier - The question of cease-fire is a complicated one and brings us back to negotiations. When we discuss negotiations we discuss assistance to the Thieu government - and if that continues the war will not end. The U.S. turndown of peace talks on April 27th was very disappointing - the war will continue.

Mansfield - I was disappointed by U.S. reaction - I think talks should resume.

Premier - So we shall wait and see because this is already the 22nd. You may have noticed that only after our meeting of April 16th, we published an editorial on April 18th and have said nothing else since.

Mansfield - We are aware of your restraint in that regard. What does Premier think of chances of neutralization of all Indo-China?

Premier - Madame Binh has included this point in 7-point proposal and we support it. Even after U.S. massive bombardment we did not respond with soldiers as we did in Korea - not even in Cambodia, even though a part of their government is in Cambodia and a part in Peking Sihanouk has issued more than 30 appeals to his compatriots - although some of his views are not the same as ours, we do not change one word of his statements.

Mansfield - Are there any ways by which our two countries could bring about a peace settlement in Korea?

Premier - The relations here between our two countries are different from other issues. That is, during 1954 conference a meeting was convened to find a settlement - our efforts failed there - that was Dulles policy. During 1958 we withdrew our volunteers from Korea - at present the two sides meet once a week at the 38th parallel - in the north. The North Korean representative is principal but in the south the U.S. is principal and South Korean deputy - to bring about relaxation of tension Premier Kim Il Sung has proposed peace steps, beginning with Red Cross help in bringing about reunion of families.

Scott - Advances hope for journalistic exchanges (ASNE letter) cultural, athletic, political, scientific, and medical. Members of Congress generally after political conventions - all on a reciprocal basis to be much more meaningful.

Premier - This also covered in Shanghai Communique. Cites effective contacts between Embassies in Paris - U.S. would send important members of government, when necessary, for important discussions - after visit of Senate and House leaders the Congressmen of both houses will be able to come - should both parties come together or separately - we feel they should come together since this is an election year.

Scott - I fully agree and we are amazed at your understanding of the psychology of American politicians in an election year.

Mansfield - I agree - I would like to come alone sometime and spend more time.

Premier - Next year, yes, and Sen. Scott, too.

Scott - Yes, Mr. Premier, after we have shown our own discretion in the way we handle this visit, of course with 535 members, not all will be wise.

Premier - Of course not - one does not expect any overwhelming agreement even within a political party, or within the Communist Party, or for that matter, even within so-called Socialist Parties—we liked Nixon’s Kansas speech - he put forward some new ideas, as did Prime Minister Heath in his latest speech - we do not fully agree with either speaker in describing China as a great power - we can potentially, with proper use of our resources, become a strong country but we do not want to become a super-power or exert hegemony over another region, nor should any other power.

Mansfield - I agree - would hope a degree of mutuality to work toward betterment of mankind. Is a nuisance to be a superpower.

Scott - And elements of guilt, I’m afraid.

Premier - Good if all had that awareness.

Scott - Cites conversation with Alf Landon. “Hugh, now you’re on the right track.”

Premier - As for exchanges in the scientific field, they are now beginning. Also sports now beginning and cultural field such as your Philadelphia Orchestra or Pittsburg Symphony. As to journalists, somewhat more difficult - we are considering establishment of journalists abroad - perhaps they should: come by name and not agency - and they need not be sympathetic to us, if not that is good, too. As to ASNE, which you discussed, Chou Pei-yuan will look at the correspondence which I have not seen and it would be good to have them. (Scott hands Explorer Club and Mrs. Flynn’s letter to Dr. Chou Pei-yuan at Premier’s suggestion. Mrs. Flynn’s letter later given to Minister CHIAO KUAN-HUA.) We will give consideration to all applications received but we still must do a lot of preparation to receive visitors, and expand our facilities for tourists so we cannot satisfy all requests by large numbers as now developing.

Mansfield - Of mutual interest to both our countries is Japan. The 1969 Nixon-Sato communique does refer to Taiwan as “of interest” to Japan, but that was ‘69. Our country not interested in any expanded Japan or a return to the old Japan. Would you discuss your relations with Japan and your views regarding the future of the three countries in the Pacific area?

Premier - Of course we must look at changes within a country. It was after “69” communique and drawing up of 4th defensive plan for Japan we saw military expansion to keep pace with economic expansion. Since liberation, contacts between our two peoples has never ceased - we also see that it would not be easy to lead Japanese people on road to militarism, since first victims would be Japanese people. So we are pointing out the dangers at the very beginning. Many facts and public opinion can show this trend - many films advocating revival of militarism and in suicide of Okiro.

Mansfield - He belonged to a tiny group.

Premier - Yes, but he could shake the country for a time. We see a reversion to concept of Emperor as supreme power when we point this out to our Japanese friends they agree-not only members of opposition but also of ruling party. Does this obstruct us from improving relations no difficulty on our side—Japan the problem—Japan government and Taiwan government are too close.

Mansfield - But Shanghai Communique recognized only one China.

Premier - That’s precisely it - Japan government felt passed over - perhaps your visit, too, “passed over Japan” (a pun relating to our flying across Okinawa). Sato’s Cabinet about to be reshuffled and we hope for more open-minded views. If U.S. and China can improve relations, why not China and Japan? On basis of 5 principles of peaceful co-existence.

Scott - Relates visit of Scott-Muskie delegation to Japan in January 1970 - Japanese fears that China and U.S. will have less trouble improving relations than will Japan and China. A sentiment found in all four parties.

Premier - Seems to me that perhaps because of their previous aggressions against China over half a century they lack self-confidence. During past 22 years major visitors to China have been Japanese - greatest amount of trade is with Japanese - all three parties of opposition have visited China and have urged restoration of diplomatic relations. So many former Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers have come that I joke with them, “You come only after you are out of office. Why didn’t you have the courage to come earlier?” There is Foreign Minister of “another country” that is most opposed to improved relations between Japan and China.

Mansfield - A neighbor?

Premier - A neighbor who has placed a million men along our borders - frontiers and territory are historical matters but historical matters that must be solved - that is why when Kosygin came here in 1969 we signed a statement that these problems should not be allowed to increase tensions. In spite of unequal and imposed treaties on China, we assert no territorial claims because at times of treaties neither Russian nor Chinese people were in control of their governments. We said we could go to old maps to solve disputes in spirit of mutual negotiations and mutual understandings. Our other border questions have all been settled on that basis Burma, Mongolia and others - so we propose conclusion of a provisional agreement conducive to settlement of the border question - three points—(1) maintain status quo of border; (2) avoid armed conflict, and (3) disengage military forces in disputed areas. Then negotiations could proceed on Vice Ministerial level at Peking. They have met and are continuing but still agreements on provisional agreement have not yet been made - and at same time Soviet is putting 8 divisions (300,000 men) along borders of Mongolia - what threat do we pose to Mongolia? At UN Mr. Chiao posed the question - Malek wouldn’t answer, so the Mongolian delegate felt compelled to state that troops were there under a treaty - but we can wait. We waited through 16 years of negotiations with you until President Nixon came here.

Scott - Sen. Magnuson asked us to raise question regarding trade. Many persons interested in trade and would like Premier’s reaction.

Premier - We have already invited 30 U.S. businessmen and we will await results of these visits.

Mansfield - Mentioned Magnuson and Inouye - can they visit China?

Scott - Also Cotton and Pearson.

Premier - If friends from Senate Commerce Committee would like to come, will you draw up a joint list when you get back so that we can consider their request - both for economic and comprehensive discussion. You could contact our Institute of Foreign Affairs or the Embassy in Paris. I am interested in what both of you have told us of them - would like to turn now to Cambodia. Since head of State in Cambodia is in Korea (Sihanouk) I regret that it is not advisable for you (Mansfield) to meet with the Prime Minister of Cambodia in the absence of the head of State. They believe (Sihanouk) that coup by Lan Nol was staged with foreign support believe present war against Lan Nol is a just war and that foreign forces that aid Lan Nol are committing aggression—U.S.-Viet-Nam-Thai. In the past, when S. Vietnamese were wounded in Cambodia, they were allowed time to recover. But now the war has merged the three countries into one battlefield - this can be seen from fact that puppet forces go in and out, U.S. troops have been there, air and naval forces have been used. So they think it a matter of course for the North Vietnamese troops to come to their assistance at this time. Once the war ends, all troops from any foreign countries should withdraw leaving integrity and original borders maintained. I am convinced, and believe, that this view of Prince Sihanouk is correct.

Mansfield - I have the highest respect for him - he knows it - the U.S. Government knows it - I understand Cambodian protocol - the message from you as to his position will be conveyed to the U.S. Government. I don’t think Lan Nol represents the Cambodian people - I think Sihanouk does.

Premier - The position of Sihanouk is not to recognize the Lan Nol government.

Mansfield - Sihanouk will have to decide the future of his own country.

Premier - Very unfortunate that the U.S., U.S.S.R. and Britain also recognize Lan Nol, although we do not. This emotionally insults Sihanouk.

Mansfield - Would like to conclude on subject of U.N. but one question of central point of difference: Taiwan. What are your feelings as to a timetable of withdrawal and how do you expect to reclaim Taiwan? It is a difficult question but must be faced.

Premier - No question - we also discussed that with President Nixon. And on this point I can only stand by our agreement that we should not discuss any issue we talked about - I can only say two sentences: (1) In any case, Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of its motherland, and (2) in any case, the U.S. will finally withdraw all its troops from Taiwan.

Mansfield - 8,000 of 10,000 troops tied into Viet-Nam—in many cases, fleet in Taiwan Straits does not include U.S. vessels - at other times, two U.S. destroyers. Both Chairman Mao and Chiang Kai-shek have always said there is only one China—Chiang Kai-shek also said Tibet was a part of China, also the rectification of the McMahon line with India.

Premier - Something else I would like to point out - with regard to relaxation of tensions, the key issue is still the war in Indo-China—all other issues—Japan-Taiwan-Korea would be easy to resolve if war was ended.

Mansfield - All questions regarding prisoners in China raised and referred to Mr. Chiao request consideration of their cases and assurances as to their health.

Scott - This is also my earnest request.

Premier - I agree to conveyance to our Institute of Foreign Affairs. These matters must be dealt with separately Downey’s term has been cut to a remainder of 5 years - his Mother is quite old and would like to see him - Nixon mentioned it. We’re considering it—other two pilots a different matter. Journalist (Salzberger) easier - we’ll try. When you go back to report to your President, is your duty and you must report to the Senate - I hope you will not make it official - I would hope that you would stress informal nature of discussions and that you would make clear that these were not diplomatic discussions.

Scott - Yes, informal, but would like to report anecdotes and general nature of our talks and topics.

Premier - Yes, to add color, would hope you would not print report.

Mansfield - We may have to print - and we’d like to - it could only lead to better understanding and relationships between our two countries.

Premier - But we hope not to involve other countries.

Mansfield & Scott - Express great thanks for inviting us and for being so frank.

Premier - Although there is a question of Taiwan, and India occupies 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory, we are not an aggressive country and I’m glad both Senators noted that. We want to build up our own country - our country is big enough, our land is vast enough, our people are many so we have enough to do in our own country. I recommend you read Neville Maxwell’s book, “India’s China War”—very fair book. I want to thank you for the warm welcome given in your country to our table tennis team and please convey the friendship of the Chinese people to the American people.

Scott & Mansfield - We will be delighted to do so, and thank you.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Files for the President-China Material, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China [April-May 1972]. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; presumably drafted by Jones. The meeting was held at the Great Hall of the People.
2. Senators Mansfield and Scott and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai discussed the feasibility of neutralizing all of Indochina, how tensions on the Korean peninsula could be reduced, the state of negotiations between the Soviet Union and China on reducing border tensions, and the status of Cambodia.