124. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, April 20, 1972, 10:45 a.m.-1:22 p.m.1 2
SECOND MEETING Peking, China - April 20, 1972
CHINESE DELEGATION
Mr. Chiao Kuan-Hua, Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister of the Chinese Foreign Ministry
Prof. Chou Pei-yuan, Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Peking University
Mr. Chang Wen-chin, Director of Department of American and Western European and Australasian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry
Mr. Chou Ch’iu-yeh, Secretary-General of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hu Hung-fan, Council Member of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs
Miss Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Mrs. Tzu Chung-yun, Interpreter
Mr. Chao Chi-hua, Interpreter
Mr. Lian Cheng-pao, Stenographer
AMERICAN DELEGATION
Sen. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), Majority Leader, U.S. Senate
Sen. Hugh Scott (R., Penn.), Republican Leader, U.S. Senate
Mr. Frank Valeo, Secretary of U.S. Senate
Mr. Bill Hildenbrand, Admin. Asst. Republican Leader, U.S. Senate
Mr. Norvil Jones, Staff Member - Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Meeting lasted 2 hrs. 37 mins. (10:45 a.m. - 1:22 p.m.)
[Page 2]Chiao Kuan-Hua - Discussion yesterday very useful - I propose we proceed as follows - like to ask two Senators to give views on international situation - particularly Viet-Nam, Korea and Taiwan. This is frank discussion of views and will reassure we will not take advantage of discussions and not use anything said for propaganda purposes.
Mansfield - Agree - place to express our views is at home.
Scott - Repeats request as to PRC view as to what is the right attitude to bring peace in Viet-Nam, bearing in mind U.S. has withdrawn one-half million men, concern for POWs and our intention to withdraw all forces if peace can be had at the table.
Chiao Kuan-Hua - Position clear as announced in Shanghai Communique.
Mansfield - Opposed to war there - my belief that war will not end on the battlefield but through talks at Paris. The sooner the better. I desire neutralization of all of Indo-China with observance of both Geneva Accords and some sort of external guarantee of future peace - we have no business in that part of the world and we ought to get out.
Chiao Kuan-Hua - Since neutralization is common view of U.S. and PRC, does Mansfield have any further view on Laos and Cambodia?
Mansfield - Enlarge talks at Paris - Sihanouk should represent his country and King Sri Savang Vatthana to represent Laos.
Scott - No personal objection to enlargement of talks at Paris - Laos and Cambodia should have representation from competing groups so that all will be bound.
Chiao Kuan-Hua - As to international guarantees, we had experience with 1954 agreement what could be more solemn - U.S. made a statement it would not disturb the agreement, U.S. later took action. It is because of that we are still studying that question.
Mansfield - U.S. was not a signatory.
[Page 3]Chiao Kuan-Hua - Of course that could involve historical facts I must respectfully disagree with you.
Mansfield - Most respectfully but what is China’s attitude on neutralization?
Chiao Kuan-Hua - Concept very general with different meaning we have not opposed concept of neutrality. You may have noticed our two positions (1) all forces should be withdrawn - (2) all questions should be settled within countries by their own peoples and should be free to choose their own system. As to presence in three countries, exclude big country interference and countries following big countries and before this matter is settled is premature to discuss neutralization. And if you ask our position no matter the “54” Accord or “62” Accords, our position has been consistent adherence to these agreements. And it will continue - what the Chinese say counts and they abide by agreements which they sign.
Scott - Renews question of peace in Korea - leading steps by U.S. and PRC toward substitution of peace agreement for armistice, thus facilitating withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Chiao Kuan-liua - Reviews history including Chinese volunteers vs. U.S. forces. If situation in Korea were to develop into situation present in Europe then China need not have withdrawn forces. But we withdrew voluntarily in 1958 but your troops have remained until Nixon took office and withdrew some troops. Here opinions of our two sides disagree - you regard U.S. presence as preserving peace. We believe the presence obstructs chances of peace and increases tension - therefore we believe that from whatever point you look at it the U.S. should withdraw from Korea, as essential to a peace treaty and the coming together of North and South Korea and the reunification of that country. We have noted Richard Nixon statements as to gradual reduction of troops - all have noted in Sino-U.S. Communique - U.S. expressed hope that contacts between two sides should be increased and U.S. has encouraged this. To put it in a nutshell - the withdrawal of that military presence is the one issue we agree upon - nations of the East have long history of unification - if objective is to allow states to exist for long period in state of division we believe that is not possible-2 Chinas - 2 Koreas - 2 Viet-Nams. Erroneous and impossible to [Page 4] continue such a policy. How can a few decades of division affect the long history of unification? If these countries can be left to themselves without foreign intervention, they will effect peaceful unification of their countries - if we thought no hope we would not have advocated peaceful solutions within the countries without foreign intervention.
Mansfield - No disagreement with your analysis - these countries will have to decide own destinies without outside interference, near or far.
Scott - Speaks of very quick reversal of U.S. policy and U.S. sentiment - reversing decade of policy in Viet-Nam - 2 decades in Korea and as to China - with only very small percentage of dissension - U.S. opinion. This change is too great not to be well understood.
Chiao Kuan-Hua - Question of Korea, Viet-Nam and China are different from East and West Germany. Sen. Mansfield may be right that East & West Germany may take longer to settle very happy to note that majority in both U.S. parties have expressed support of Nixon’s policies and to note also the developments which have followed.
Mansfield - PRC attitude toward Japan has surprised me - why do you place so much emphasis on Japan as a hindrance to better relations in the Pacific and why you give Japan such emphasis in view of the fact that Japan has become close to greatest trading nation and is now less militarily oriented than in past years?
Chiao Kuan-Hua - First, you are a strong country far from Japan. We are its close neighbor. Japan has in the past committed aggression against both of us, but deeper and greater against us. Impossible for this not to influence us. But we have never taken attitude of revenge against country or people of Japan. About 1955 Japan held an exhibition in Peking. In front of the hall they ran up the flag of Japan. Our officials thought that was normal but popular reaction was very strong they were still sensitive to Japanese aggression since 1890 in spite of this our government worked to persuade our people to differentiate between Japanese people and their government.
[Page 5]Japanese people most apologetic about Japanese aggression - we stress no need for this. In the future we look forward to equality in all our relations - why then do we have concern - you have great influence over Japan and Japan is embarking on a great course of war preparation (Scott notes underlined my notes say military). Lessons to be drawn from World Wars I & II if revenge is followed both countries will suffer and could be counter-productive and offensive to people. We believe present Japanese government policy is not defense but expansion and aggression - not happy to point out that in the joint communique between Sato and Nixon Japan stated that they regarded Taiwan closely related to the defense of Japan (Nov.1969). Obvious that Japan’s view is to control Taiwan, Korea and other Asia nations. Our view is a lesson of history that economic outward expansion inevitably leads to military outward expansion during World War II the spearhead was directed first against China and when strong enough against the U.S. We remember that lesson and we believe we should be vigilant.
Scott - Surprised by depth of concern - have met Japanese leaders in all four parties and have found reluctance to increase military budget much beyond 1% of their GNP.
Mansfield - Surely Japan is aware how much stronger China is today - and non-aggressive.
Chiao Kuan-Hua - Reason in that argument - but it must not be forgotten that when Japan attacked U.S. you were strong - like to add that although no relations with present government exist, volume of trade and meetings with Japanese people is quite great. Bulk of China visitors are Japanese - have been happy to have this exchange. Propose we break off here.
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(Mike Mansfield suggested a third meeting, but in the end we got a second meeting with Chou En-lai instead, since this suggestion occurred before our first meeting with the Premier.)
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Files for the President-China Material, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China [April-May 1972]. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; presumably drafted by Jones. Presumably the meeting was held at the Great Hall of the People.↩
- Senators Mansfield and Scott and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao Kuan-hua discussed Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan.↩