Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972

102. Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 25-26 1972, 10:30 p.m.-1:40 a.m.¹ ²

Beijing, February 25-26 1972, 10:30 p.m.-1:40 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter

Two Notetakers

DATE & TIME: Friday, February 25-Saturday, February 26, 1972; 10:30 p.m. - 1:40 a.m.

PLACE: Guest House, Villa 2, Peking

VM Ch’iao: First with the Taiwan question and on that last sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: I have reached the point where I am rejecting my own drafts.

VM Ch’iao: You want to start all over again? I have one vice. When I start speaking, I must smoke.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t want to tell you to stop speaking.

VM Ch’iao: Let us go straight to the point. Following the discussion between the Premier and Dr. Kissinger, and in the spirit of that discussion, and after making a study after that discussion, and before the Premier met with the President, we have decided to accept your proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: Which is what?

VM Ch’iao: In the meantime—with respect to withdrawal of all forces—“it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan …” With the exception of adding the words “military installations.”

Dr. Kissinger: No problem. It is awfully hard to argue when you accept my proposal [laughter]. What I would really like to do is interrupt for ten minutes and go over to see the President. I can’t argue with you about your accepting my proposal.

VM Ch’iao: Mr. Lord will argue for you.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me just read to you what I understand it is. “The U.S. side declared: the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” And then “in the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”

When you hear a loud voice you will find you have a new applicant in your foreign office.

(The meeting adjourned for a few minutes at 10:40 p.m. while Dr. Kissinger checked the draft with the President. The meeting then resumed at 11:00 p.m.)

Dr. Kissinger: Much as I enjoy arguing with you, the President accepts this, with one suggestion which is not essential. Where it says “it reaffirms its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves”—he wonders if you could say “the Chinese on both sides of the Strait” to make it consistent with the second line.

VM Ch’iao: That is what is to be meant anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is really more for clarity.

VM Ch’iao: Our putting this is not—the actual purpose is for simplicity. It was quite alright to add it. Taiwan Strait. We don’t have to repeat it. Add Taiwan Strait—originally it was our intention to make it simpler but since we want to make it more clear, we might as well make it more clear. “It reaffirms its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” It is also in the first sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: My colleagues wonder whether we include the off-shore islands in these. If you do anything militarily, we will not be able to wave a piece of paper at you.

VM Ch’iao: As far as this paragraph is concerned, that’s the only change.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Then we consider it agreed.

VM Ch’iao: Basically—essentially. If there are any other changes it would be changes like that. We will start from the beginning.

Dr. Kissinger: Go on from here, and then we go back to the beginning.

VM Ch’iao: The next is concerning the question of people-to-people contacts. Basically speaking, we agree with your draft, but we made some slight changes. That’s the latter part. The last sentence of the first paragraph we suggest: “Each side undertook to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.” Just to make it more concise. The meaning is the same.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Minister, just one point which we don’t have to waste time on now. But there seems to be a change in tenses. Some things are in the present and some are in the past. We are doing this to clean up the style.

VM Ch’iao: No question about that.

Dr. Kissinger: “Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.”

VM Ch’iao: Tonight, we will just basically agree on the paper and make some stylistic changes.

Dr. Kissinger: I accept this, subject to any advice I will get from my right.

VM Ch’iao: We would like to make it read, “both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit could be derived and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agreed to facilitate the gradual development of trade,” I don’t find it necessary to explain this.

Dr. Kissinger: The question of normalization we raised the last time.

VM Ch’iao: And because our relations are only in the process of being normalized.

Dr. Kissinger: My one concern is the word “gradual”—“Progressive?”

VM Ch’iao: Quite all right. But in Chinese it is the same—“progressive development”—“facilitate the progressive development of trade.” Dr. Kissinger, would you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Development of trade between their two countries, or between the U.S. and the PRC.

VM Ch’iao: “Between the two countries.” The implication is not quite clear.

Now let’s go back to the beginning. “The two sides agreed that they would stay in contact through various channels. In addition, the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two governments and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.”

Dr. Kissinger: This may not be the time, but what if we are asked about channels? How do you plan to answer? I understand from the Prime Minister what you wish—as I understand it, it is to do it through New York primarily now. But I understand also you don’t want to have that publicly known. That’s the channel we use secretly.

Now, we can say one of two things. We can say it is still under discussion, what forms of channels will be established. And what we ought to consider—you might discuss this with the Prime Minister—to have someone different from New York where the State Department can pass whatever technical messages it might have on trade, and we can say that is the channel. We said we used Warsaw once so that then technically is one place, which we do not mind.

So when I am asked—so my answer will be this is still in the process of discussion, and we have not yet got it formally settled. And some time later your leaders may know where you want it to take place and we will use that for the passing of technical documents.

VM Ch’iao: Okay.

Dr. Kissinger: We are assuming that you have no interest at this time, such an interest say with another embassy. In Canada, for example.

VM Ch’iao: You mean through a third country?

Dr. Kissinger: I think your suggestion for an open reply to those who ask us is correct—that is, this matter is still under discussion.

VM Ch’iao: And we will consider some place where we can have communications and take technical matters.

Dr. Kissinger: And then just so I am clear, we will use Ambassador Huang Hua for secret communications; what we used to pass through Paris. Now no one knows.

VM Ch’iao: I will give a reply to you on that after asking for my instructions from my Prime Minister. I want to confirm that because as time passes New York may not be a very safe place.

Dr. Kissinger: We know how to do it. If we can’t arrange for a secret meeting in New York then we can’t do anything.

VM Ch’iao: We will not discuss it now.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay.

VM Ch’iao: And then the following paragraph, the first sentence is moved to the front. And then no more following that up to the very end. But there is a suggested change in this sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: The one which we are considering?

VM Ch’iao: Yes, yes. The two leaders “were gratified to have this opportunity” and we suggest to say the two leaders “considered it beneficial to have …”

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Minister, “the leaders of China and the United States considered it beneficial” is fine, “to have this opportunity, after so many years”. I think to say “The leaders of China and the United States considered,— found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact and express their views”—it is just English.

VM Ch’iao: Yes. “Found it beneficial.”

Dr. Kissinger: It is stronger—to have this opportunity after so many years without contact, to have the opportunity to frankly present—present frankly to one another their views. It is not very strong in English—I don’t object to it. It is just not very strong.

VM Ch’iao: I agree it is better than “gratified.”

Dr. Kissinger: I am just trying to find a stronger adjective. Found “invaluable”—although beneficial is a little reserved, it is substantive.

VM Ch’iao: Then back to the Taiwan question. The President made his suggestion. I reported this to the Premier, and he said there was no need for this addition. He does object because it was already said all Chinese on both sides—it does not have to be repeated. And then secondly, you wish to see a peaceful settlement by the Chinese on both sides. And thirdly, we have already accepted in its entirety the principles put forward by Dr. Kissinger on this. And we have made so many efforts. Why should there be any changes on it? But we will not object when you explain the Communique. You can say that when it says “by the Chinese themselves,” it means Chinese on both sides of the Straits.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have to accept it ad referendum. I will check it with the President who is probably retired. I think he will accept it. I am practically certain.

VM Ch’iao: We can settle it if the President wants to have a word with the Prime Minister on the airplane. I do not believe the Communique will fail on those three words. I think it can be settled. And then subject to any changes by our two leaders it will be as we handed it to you.

Dr. Kissinger: I just made a slight reservation that the President may wish to raise it on the plane.

VM Ch’iao: Actually the interpretation will be just the same.

Dr. Kissinger: You have made a considerable move. When I pass it to the press and when we inform other governments, then …

VM Ch’iao: No question about that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will say with the approval of the Government of the People’s Republic of China this is our mutual understanding. May I take these quotes off?

VM Ch’iao: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

Interpreter: The Vice Minister said it is self-evident because anyone can see from the preceding sentence it is Chinese on both sides of the Straits.

VM Ch’iao: Now, shall we start from the beginning and go up to the end? There may still be some points which have not been finalized.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. We will have to check with the President if he wants to use his middle initial. We will speak about the most important problems first. If he does not use his middle initial, none of us will.

VM Ch’iao: We will respect the decision of your President on that. If one has it, then everybody has it. We don’t have this problem of middle initials. That is your decision.

Dr. Kissinger: We will drop the “En” out of Chou En-lai.

VM Ch’iao: After we have read the Communique, it still will be subject to final approval.

Dr. Kissinger: Where are we starting? First, “The two leaders held”—Why don’t we—shouldn’t we say, “the two leaders had a serious and frank discussion on Sino-US relations and world affairs”—which is what the Communique says. Is that agreeable?

VM Ch’iao: “The two leaders had a serious and frank discussion on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.” It is alright. There will be no “exchange of views.” And then the dates February 21, and on the first paragraph from February 21 to February 28, 1972. But it will be published on the 27th.

Dr. Kissinger: That doesn’t affect it.

VM Ch’iao: “Earnest and frank?” I would say the two leaders had a serious and frank discussion—exchange of views on Sino-US relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t think it adds anything in English.

VM Ch’iao: If they exchanged views on Sino-US relations, what did they discuss? You want to say “had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and,” etc. But then immediately following that the last paragraph—“the two sides had discussions.”

Dr. Kissinger: That’s airight. “Serious and frank conversation—serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations.”

VM Ch’iao: “The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs.”

Dr. Kissinger: May I make a suggestion on the next one? During the visit rather than say “further”, I would say “extensive” discussions.

VM Ch’iao: “There were extensive …

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we say: “During the visit, extensive and earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations.” Is that agreeable?

VM Ch’iao: We have here another suggestion. “During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China as well as on other matters of interest on both sides.”

Dr. Kissinger: Do we need the list of everybody else who participated in these discussions? I don’t care—is it your custom?

VM Ch’iao: We will consider that. What is your preference?

Dr. Kissinger: Let me check with the President.

VM Ch’iao: Only a technical matter. Just a formality. Leave it for the time being.

Dr. Kissinger: “And they toured Hangchow and Shanghai.” We are making a slight change in the English: “where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.”

VM Ch’iao: They also toured Hangchow and Shanghai, where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed …”

Dr. Kissinger: It is better English. It is purely stylistic.

VM Ch’iao: The next page—will you read it out?

Dr. Kissinger: Shall I read—“The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the United States found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present frankly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.” How about “candidly”?

VM Ch’iao: “The leaders of China and the United States found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly their views.”

Dr. Kissinger: “And expounded their respective positions and attitudes.”

VM Ch’iao: Go on.

Dr. Kissinger: Please.

VM Ch’iao: Then the next paragraph—“the people want revolution” -

Dr. Kissinger: I had not been sure we had agreed on that. In other words you prefer to keep it.

VM Ch’iao: “The people want revolution.”

Dr. Kissinger: It is going to make some people extremely unhappy, but I won’t call attention to the fact.

VM Ch’iao: Your assistants will agree to this.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s why I am keeping them in a state of panic.

VM Ch’iao: Then it is on the question of the elaboration of the two key principles—on Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay.

VM Ch’iao: “The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the sevenpoint proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal.”

Dr. Kissinger: That time the sentence was so long.

VM Ch’iao: We admit grammatically it is rather poor. Then the rest is about our position on India/Pakistan. It comes after Japan.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mind if we break this into sentences? Your whole section. This will help you. It won’t help us.

VM Ch’iao: That will be alright. In the English we can change—keep the semicolon. We will make another compromise. We will accept the semicolon to four stops. But in Chinese we will stick to the four.

Dr. Kissinger: And we will put a period whenever there is a new subject. When you go from Vietnam to Korea, we will make it a period and vice versa. It is really better reading, and then when you go from Japan to India we will make a period. Let me go through our section. We have substituted “ideologies” for “world outlook”. We said“… be willing to compete peacefully …” “Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully … .”

VM Ch’iao: There is no need for us to change the Chinese there.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me read you what I have on Vietnam. “The United States stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; its eight-point proposal of January 25, 1972, represents a just basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina.” Alright.

VM Ch’iao: That, of course, was put in because much of …

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but for two reasons. Because, one, when we were here in October we did not have public proposal and therefore we could not reply and, in addition, now you have mentioned both the seven-point proposal and the two problems, so we put it in to balance.

VM Ch’iao: I understand. Tentatively, let us put it in that fashion, but we still have to consider it further because in ours we made no comment on that proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: We can support our own proposal. This is what makes it different. I understand you accept it tentatively, subject to a possible discussion.

VM Ch’iao: And now let me read this American statement in total.

Dr. Kissinger: I reserve some discussion.

VM Ch’iao: Let’s go on.

Dr. Kissinger: We are willing to say “it has put forward its eight-point proposal of January 25 for the attainment of that objective”—something like that.

VM Ch’iao: That would be better.

Dr. Kissinger: If we say its “constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution on a just basis - it has put forward its proposal in order to attain its objectives”—and then we don’t characterize those objectives.

VM Ch’iao: You have too many adjectives—true self-determination.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t mind taking out “true.”

VM Ch’iao: Never put both “just basis” and “true.”

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t mind eliminating “true”, but I do feel we have to characterize what we are trying to do. “Its constant primary objective has been a negotiated settlement.”

VM Ch’iao: And there should be no difficulty there.

Dr. Kissinger: You have a slightly subjective view.

VM Ch’iao :Then I am willing for you to point out that subjectivity.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to explain to our people. You are supporting a seven-point proposal which is extremely critical of us. It uses many unflattering adjectives. Therefore we have to assume you support these unflattering adjectives also. This is a statement of our position.

VM Ch’iao: We could have said a “fair and reasonable” seven-point proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: If we said “reasonable” rather than “just”, could that help you? I don’t mind taking out “true.” Let me make this suggestion. We could say “its objective has been a just negotiated solution” and then we would say “represents a basis”—we drop the word “just”—we don’t characterize our eight-point, proposal as such.

VM Ch’iao: We are being restrained. ‘Express firm support of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts”—no adjective and no adjective to characterize the seven-point proposal. And if adjectives are to be added to the statement of both sides it will become quite cumbersome. We will consider it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s both consider it. We will put a bracket around it. “The U.S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stated that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; its eight-point proposal of January 25, 1972, represents a [just] basis…

VM Ch’iao: Our idea is adjectives should all be deleted.

Dr. Kissinger: “and was put forward for the attainment of that objective.” Has been put forward—just—negotiated solution. “The eight-point proposal has been put forward for the attainment of that objective.”

VM Ch’iao: “It has put forward its eight-point proposal for the attainment of that objective.”

Dr. Kissinger: If we can say “just negotiated solution” then I will be glad to say “has been put forward for the attainment of that objective.” It doesn’t characterize what we have done. We leave the word ‘Just” with “negotiated.” Instead of saying—we will say “has been put forward for the attainment of that objective.” Two versions. “Its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; its eight-point proposal of January 25, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective.”

Then as an alternative: “Its constant primary objective has been a just negotiated solution; its eight point proposal of January 25, 1972 has been put forward for the attainment of that objective.”

Your point is we should drop the word altogether or put it just before negotiated. That’s what I prefer.

VM Ch’iao: First point is not to have the word “just.” There will be a lot of work in Hangchow, and on the plane, or you, too, will be unemployed. I have additional information for you. We’ll talk on Vietnam …

Dr. Kissinger: Don’t prolong the discussion just for the pleasure of talking to me.

VM Ch’iao: … First, “its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; its 8-point proposal of January 25, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective.”

Second, “its constant primary objective has been a just negotiated solution; its 8-point proposal of January 25, 1972, has been put forward for the attainment of that objective.

The question here is simple. I would suggest we put brackets around it and have both versions—only a question of maintaining the word “just.”

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, there are two versions. One is to have a just negotiated solution in which Mr. Chang suggests that we say “the eight-point proposal has been put forward for the purpose of achieving that objective”—“represents a basis for the attainment of that objective.” If we retain the word “just,” it determines the second sentence.

VM Ch’iao: We will have two versions typed out.

Dr. Kissinger: “In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The existing commitments between the United States and the Republic of Korea will be honored; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan, and it will continue to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace and free of military threat; it supports progress to fulfill the aspirations of all the nations of the subcontinent without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.”

VM Ch’iao: You don’t plan to add any more to that?

Dr. Kissinger: We can probably say “it supports adherence to the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of troops to …”

VM Ch’iao: It is up to you.

Dr. Kissinger Can we keep it open tomorrow?

VM Ch’iao: It is up to you. We will just type this part. On the following paragraph there seems to be nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: We may add a sentence to India/Pakistan, and we will discuss that tomorrow.

VM Ch’iao: That will be for you to decide. We have nothing on the following paragraph. Do you have any suggestions?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I would like to raise again the issue that I raised with you before, whether we should not say “our people are prepared” or whether we say “will prepare.”

VM Ch’iao: In that way of putting it the difficulty will not lie on our side but with your side, because just before that there is the question that involves Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: But we have a separate section on Taiwan which explains our position.

VM Ch’iao: But in your explanation on Taiwan you only put forward an ultimate objective and that ultimate objective has not been realized.

Dr. Kissinger: “Prepare” means we want to create a condition to realize it. Can we say “the United States and China have renounced the use or threat of force in their international disputes?”

VM Ch’iao: We discussed it before. I don’t think we need to go into this matter.

Dr. Kissinger: But I don’t know what we are saying.

VM Ch’iao: We had already said we wish to reduce the danger of international military conflicts.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. But what are we saying? Are we going to apply these principles or are we not?

VM Ch’iao: We are laying the ground for implementation of these principles. For instance, we now still have no state relations.

Dr. Kissinger: There is nothing in the five principles of coexistence that says we must have state relations.

VM Ch’iao: Five principles—your maintaining your treaty with Chiang Kai-shek cannot be said to be consistent. So I think that this wording which has been discussed so many times should be maintained. We do very much like to use that wording, and we are making an effort so in the future we will be able to use it. The difficulty is not on our side. It is you who have sent the force of arms to Taiwan. For instance, your people—you cannot answer to that because you have not removed the use of force. So it is only a question of solving it progressively. It is clear, so I don’t think there need be any more discussion on this.

Dr. Kissinger: But I am not.

VM Ch’iao: For instance, if this Taiwan question had been settled by now, to withdraw all your armed forces, there would be no question but to have you withdraw them. This matter we have been discussing for more than a decade and the fact is you are there and the fact is you do have your armed forces on our territory and that military presence on our territory is a violation of …

Dr. Kissinger: Two questions. How will this be interpreted? In 1955 the People’s Republic was prepared to sign a treaty for the renunciation of force. The only reason it failed was because we insisted this apply to Taiwan.

VM Ch’iao: It was not so simple as you described it. We will discuss this in more detail on the plane tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: On December 1, 1955 you made the proposal that the PRC and the US should settle disputes between our two countries through peaceful solution without the use of force. And we said does this apply to Taiwan? You said Taiwan is an internal matter which China is willing to settle by peaceful means. We raised the issue that this is without prejudice to the collective right of self-defense. This you did not accept.

VM Ch’iao: But here you only touch the surface of the problem. You did not touch the roots of the problem, that is, the premise of your putting forward your suggested joint declaration and an inevitability of putting forward that joint declaration is that you would agree to withdraw from Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: That was never put forward.

VM Ch’iao: There is not much time tonight, but I can tell you the whole story tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: I am less interested in that story than I am in what exactly we are saying here.

VM Ch’iao: I am trying to say we are working towards that goal.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not clear that this applies to Taiwan. We recognize you do not consider Taiwan an international dispute.

VM Ch’iao: The trouble is there are American troops stationed in Taiwan. We had always maintained that there are two aspects to the Taiwan question. One is that it is an internal matter between the Chinese. The other aspect of the Taiwan question is you have your armed forces there and that constitutes an international dispute between the U.S. and China. We are willing to bring an end to the international dispute between the U.S. and China. We are willing to bring an end to the international dispute between our two countries—you withdraw your forces. You cannot say you are not using your armed forces when you have them stationed there. You said, if they would ask you has there been an agreement between China and the U.S., you cannot say that.

Dr. Kissinger: If one said, yes, one would have to add the People’s Republic does not consider Taiwan an international dispute and therefore this restriction does not apply to Taiwan.

VM Ch’iao: That is not correct. Taiwan is a part of China. We should not reach agreement on this. What both of our sides have been saying—with relations suspended for more than 20 years—let us admit errors and move in that direction. The direction is to merely put into implementation those principles mentioned above.

Dr. Kissinger: The President may want to discuss this.

VM Ch’iao: “There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People’s Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.”

Dr. Kissinger: Alright.

VM Ch’iao: And then the following paragraph. “It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.”

Dr. Kissinger: May I suggest we take out the word “major”; then it will apply to minor countries. (Laughter)

VM Ch’iao: It is not realistic to think that a small country can divide the world into spheres of interest.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you not in fear of Arab countries making a sphere of interest against Israel?

VM Ch’iao: Let’s not go into any discussion on that.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay.

VM Ch’iao: “With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated—no change.”—Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.”

Dr. Kissinger: I was going to make a suggestion here. I think “wish” is a very weak word. “Make efforts to reduce the danger of international military conflict.” “Wish” is a weak word.

Mr. Chang: Because that is not conforming to reality.

Dr. Kissinger: It will not happen unless we make an effort.

VM Ch’iao: With the word “wish” that does not hinder you from making your efforts.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is not a word that does justice to two great peoples.

VM Ch’iao: We made so many concessions to you. As the Premier said, if we don’t show clear restraint.

Dr. Kissinger: But this is no concession to the U.S.—what do we get out of it?

VM Ch’iao: We wish to maintain the word “wish.”

Dr. Kissinger: You don’t even wish to discuss it?

VM Ch’iao: We have such big differences. Of course, we may have further discussion of this wording. We suggest, however, to keep it as it is. I am quite capable of talking at great length.

Dr. Kissinger: But we are not trying to wear each other out. We are trying to get a good document.

VM Ch’iao: That is right. As you joked the other day, you hoped I would not deal with you as I dealt with Malik. We are striving to approach each other.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you discuss this point with the Prime Minister?

VM Ch’iao: If you express that wish, we can do it. The next is—the whole document will have to be referred to your President and our Prime Minister subject to their approval. Third, “neither will seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.” There is lack of clarity. We can say “neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into”—what is the agreement between the US and Japan and your treaty with Chiang Kai-shek?

Dr. Kissinger: That is why I think we should say “to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.” “Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.”

VM Ch’iao: Okay, it is more clear.

“The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ ‘one China, two governments,’ ‘two Chinas,’ and “independent Taiwan’ or advocate that ‘the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

Then the U.S. side. “The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.”

Dr. Kissinger: It makes no sense in English.

VM Ch’iao: You have trapped me.

Dr. Kissinger: No, not yet.

VM Ch’iao: Shall I continue? “The two sides agreed that, it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in the fields of science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial.”

Dr. Kissinger: If you people lose one game in the U.S., I will know you have instructed them.

VM Ch’iao: “Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.”

“Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit could be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interests of the peoples of the two countries. They agreed to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.”

“The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels. In addition, the U.S. Government will send a senior representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

“The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries.”

Dr. Kissinger: May I make a suggestion—that repeats—may I say progress of the … “open up new prospects.”

VM Ch’iao: “They believe that the normalization of relations of the two countries is not only in the interest of the two peoples but …

Dr. Kissinger: The first of the two.

VM Ch’iao: Progress towards the relations of China and the U.S. is in the interest of all countries. A little bit of difference. In the principles, it is progress towards normalization—here it is the normalization. If you put various channels before a stop, that is something not agreed to by both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: Now we have a practical problem. We will get this typed up tonight, and we will have a copy on the plane. Now the question is we would like to tell Secretary Rogers and him alone. What do you think? It is almost essential.

VM Ch’iao: I know this is your problem and one we respect. But as you know, Premier Chou En-lai shows great concern on matters of that, and we have to report to him on that first. Your wish is to show it to Mr. Rogers now?

Dr. Kissinger: No, not now. Tomorrow. He will have to defend it before Congress. But we will not show it to anyone else.

VM Ch’iao: As the Premier said to you this afternoon—we would say we reached some agreements, and we might work out a Communique.

Dr. Kissinger: We can say we might work out a Communique, but then we have to be prepared to tell the press there will be a Communique.

VM Ch’iao: The fact is that the President and the Prime Minister may still want to have some changes here and there.

Dr. Kissinger: How is the seating arrangement on the plane? Will we sit together?

VM Ch’iao: We will be together. We can discuss this. No matter how we arranged it, we can sit together.

Dr. Kissinger: Then I suggest I will give Secretary Rogers a copy after we reach Hangchow and that we not discuss it on the plane.

VM Ch’iao: I approve.

Dr. Kissinger: And then we will give it to him as soon as we arrive in Hangchow, and you and I can have private discussions anyway. You will find out from the Prime Minister with respect to the various points we raise, and I will find out various points you raised with the President, and then we will put it in final shape.

VM Ch’iao: I approve. The scheduling for Shanghai is very tight.

Dr. Kissinger: We will get it finished tomorrow afternoon.

VM Ch’iao: Or in the evening. We must finish in Hangchow. Then the procedure will be as follows. Tomorrow, we will read it through in Hangchow and check it, and after that we still will have to send it for approval by the Prime Minister and the President.

Dr. Kissinger: I will submit to the President what we have, just to make some progress.

VM Ch’iao Certainly. Even after we do it once, we still have to submit it. We have just obtained instructions that if you want to show it to Secretary Rogers that can be decided by your President himself. We have no objections.

Dr. Kissinger: We will show it to him in Hangchow.

VM Ch’iao: Another thing—“also taking part in the discussions were so and so”— whether you have it or not have it is really up to you and we will list or not list accordingly.

Dr. Kissinger: I will dispense with it.

Mr. Lord: I think we ought to take Kissinger out of it.

Dr. Kissinger: This is his last trip (laughter).

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 92, Country Files, Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger’s Meetings in the People’s Republic of China during the Presidential Visit, February 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; presumably drafted by either Lord or Howe. Brackets in the source text. The meeting was held at the Guest House, Villa 2.
2. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch’iao finalized the communiqué wording concerning Taiwan, discussed specifics on the development of trade relations, and considered editorial changes to the section on Vietnam.