Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

46. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹ ²

Washington, February 22, 1969

SUBJECT:

• Actions Resulting from the National Security Council Meeting of February 14, 1969

Attached is a list of the actions indicated during the National Security Council meeting on Friday, February 14, 1969 dealing with (1) Biafra and (2) Strategic Balance. The list has been coordinated on an eyes only basis with the principals and has been agreed to by them.

With your approval, I will prepare appropriate implementing instructions where required.

Approve [RN]
Disapprove
Other

Attachment
List of Actions

Washington, undated

Actions Resulting from the National Security Council Meeting of February 14, 1969

Biafra:

The President desires that the U.S. Government conduct a two track policy line toward the Biafran situation by:

a. Taking high public impact actions designed to reflect our concern for the humanitarian plight of Biafra, including designation of a Relief Coordinator of distinguished stature who is not closely associated with the U.S. Government.

b. Continuing to regard an ultimate Nigerian victory as best suited to the United States interests, yet carefully avoiding political involvement in the uncertain fortunes of either side in the war. At some later point—as circumstances may warrant—consideration may be given to offering greater support to the Nigerian Government in return for relief concessions designed to expand the flow of food to Biafra.

[Omitted here are actions concerning the Strategic Balance.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–20, NSC Meeting, Biafra, Strategic Policy Issues 2/14/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. Nixon approved decisions made at the February 14 NSC meeting, including designation of a Relief Coordinator not closely associated with the U.S. Government, and continuing to regard an ultimate Nigerian victory as best suited to U.S. interests.