Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

274. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird¹ ²

Washington, July 7, 1969

SUBJECT:

• Protocol Visit with Emperor Haile Selassie at Blair House on 9 July, 0900 Hours

You are scheduled to call on Emperor Haile Selassie for a protocol visit (about one hour) at Blair House on 9 July, 0900 hours. I plan to accompany you. The Emperor will have had discussions with the President and Secretary Rogers on Tuesday and is scheduled for another talk with the President following your meeting. The Ethiopian Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Minasse Haile, will serve as interpreter. (The Emperor understands English if spoken slowly.)

The Emperor at the age of 77 is a dignified individual who continues to aspire to a position of leadership in Africa and as a world statesman. In this vein, he will probably have exchanged views with the President in a global perspective, including Vietnam. The Emperor is principally concerned, however, as he was during his visit in February 1967, over what he views as dangerous threats to Ethiopiaʼs security and the need for increased support from the United States. The Emperor will express his concern over Soviet and UAR encroachment in the Red Sea Basin, external aid being given the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Somalia irredentist claims and insurgency in the Ogaden, and fears over the recent coup in Sudan (and the new regimeʼs likely radical orientation). He has been alarmed by the impressive Soviet military programs in neighboring Somalia (over $35 million) and Sudan (about $60 million to be delivered under a 1968 agreement).

The Emperor is uncertain about how the new Administration views its relationships with Ethiopia. His main objective will be to gain renewed assurances of U.S. interest in and support for Ethiopiaʼs security.

The Emperor is not particularly well informed on military matters and tends to think in political and psychological terms. He views comparative numbers of items delivered to his country and to his enemies as having overriding significance and that the larger Ethiopian Army should have a proportionally larger number of tanks and other weapons. (See Tabs C–2 and C–3 for a comparison of Ethiopian and Somalian and Sudanese Forces; in some cases the markedly smaller Somalia Army has larger quantities of equipment, e.g., tanks.) The Ethiopians have not presented us with a detailed “shopping list”, and we doubt that the Emperor will surface specific military items or quantities with you. He submitted a “shopping list” of well over $150 million during his 1967 visit and went away disappointed with a $2.5 million increase in MAP. He may express his needs in general terms such as for more armor and aircraft and a strong “deterrent” force (a term with great appeal to him). Also, Ethiopiaʼs need for additional helicopters has been a recurring theme. He has asked that his Minister of Defense, Kebbede Guebre, have follow-on meetings in Defense, presumably to discuss definitive requests (See Tab D - Items MOD Kebbede May Raise). HIM may refer to these follow-on meetings during your visit and present you with a document intended for later discussions with Kebbede. If he does, I suggest you accept it without specific comment, saying that you will have your staff study it immediately, and that I will make arrangements for a follow-on meeting with Kebbede. (If Kebbede intends to accompany the Emperor to Cape Kennedy, I can suggest a Saturday morning meeting—the party will pass through Washington on its way back to Ethiopia Friday afternoon).

We do not believe that the Emperor will use the leverage provided by our important Kagnew communications facility at this time because of our own leverage represented by our overall economic and military assistance to Ethiopia. His military forces are almost completely equipped with U.S. equipment and dependent upon us for follow-on support.

Our objective during this visit is to do what we can to demonstrate to the Emperor that we are truly interested in Ethiopiaʼs security without increasing our current and planned level of military assistance ($12–$13 million). I believe that you could best contribute to this objective by expressing to HIM the Talking Points at Tab A.

It is not necessary for you to read all of the briefing material—most of it has been prepared as background for my more detailed follow-on meeting with Kebbede. You should read, however, the summary of the Memo of Conversation between Mr. McNamara and the Emperor at Tab B, which is essentially the approach I am recommending for you to take. If you have time, it would also be useful if you would look over the Background Paper on Military Assistance at Tab C, and the Talking Point Paper at Tab D that I will use in my meeting with Kebbede.

G. Warren Nutter

Tab D

Talking Points

Washington, undated

VISIT OF EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE I OF ETHIOPIA
JULY 7–9, 1969
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND KAGNEW STATION
RESUME AND PROBLEMS

DISCUSSION

1. Military assistance for Ethiopia is essentially quid pro quo for the unhampered use of our vital communication [text not declassified] facility, Kagnew Station, at Asmara (see Tab A–1—Background Paper on Kagnew). Our objective is to retain this facility (no feasible alternative is available) at minimum cost to the U.S. by providing limited but effective support to the Ethiopian military forces. Although Ethiopia recognizes the leverage provided by Kagnew, a direct relationship has not been raised in connection with the visit.

2. Since 1960, Ethiopia has exerted constant pressure for increased military assistance. They have not been satisfied with the amount, the speed of delivery and the modernity of the equipment. This dissatisfaction has been aggravated by concern over external and internal threats and has been prevalent despite a general lack of capability to assimilate materiel at a faster pace, a lack of legitimate need, and a shortage of funds to operate and maintain the equipment.

3. The U.S. under the 1960 Herter Commitment agreed to support (organize, train and equip) up to a 40,000-man Ground Force, contingent upon the Ethiopian capability to absorb the materiel. In addition, there have been several smaller commitments related to the Air Force and Navy, which have already been completely funded. The U.S. has programmed about $141.6 million of military assistance for Ethiopia through Fiscal Year 1969, or approximately 53.5 per cent of the total African program. Another $12.0 million is planned for 1970, about 58.5 per cent of the African total. The initial equipment required under the Herter Commitment is planned to be funded by the end of FY 70, with deliveries completed by the end of FY 1972. The Ethiopians undoubtedly expect us to continue to support their forces indefinitely. And, as long as we have the need for Kagnew, we will at least be required to continue MAP at about the projected levels, i.e. $12–13 million annually.

ETHIOPIAN POSITION

1. The Emperor will probably emphasize external threats from the UAR, Sudan, Somalia and Soviet encroachment in the Red Sea Basin. He may refer to several long-standing internal dissidence problems. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in the past few months has demonstrated Kagnew Station is an important U.S. communications and [text not declassified] facility—an Army Security Agency Installation, a STRATCOM facility and a Navy Communications Station. Approximately 1800 U.S. personnel plus some 1400 dependents are stationed there and we lease some 3400 acres from the Ethiopian Government. The facilities operate under a US-IEG agreement which runs until 1978 and can then be terminated by either party on one-year notice.

Because of its geographic location and unique radio freaqency environment Kagnew is ideally suited to certain [text not declassified] operations. The Army Security Agency installation (which includes the [text not declassified] facility) and its 1250 personnel satisfy security requirements of the highest priority. Relocation of the facility would be expensive and could not be accomplished without degrading significantly [text not declassified] capabilities.

The STRATCOM facility supports the Army Security Agency installation and in addition is an important link in our global communications network. The Navy Communications Station provides tactical ship-to-shore terminals for fleet units operating in the Indian Ocean.

Costs

• —To duplicate facility—$115 million (if a politically and technically suitable alternative could be found)
• —Annually for operation and maintenance—$4.4 million
• —Annually for military salaries—$10.0 million (approximately)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: Ethiopia, 091.112. Secret. At Tab C is a report on military assistance and Kagnew Station. At Tab C–1 is a report on Kagnew Station. Tabs A, B, C–2 and C–3, are not published.
2. Nutter briefed Laird for his meeting with the Emperor on July 9. He indicated that the objective was to demonstrate U.S. concern for Ethiopia’s security without increasing the current or planned level of military assistance. He did not believe the Emperor would use the leverage provided by the Kagnew communications facility because of U.S. leverage represented by its overall economic and military assistance. The U.S. objective was to retain the facility at minimum cost to the United States by providing limited but effective support to Ethiopian military forces.