261. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon
1
2
Washington, November 1, 1972
[Page 1]
SUBJECT:
The purpose of this memorandum is to bring you up to date on what is
happening in Uganda and what actions we and others have taken. The
nature of our future relations with Uganda is presently being reviewed.
Ambassador Melady has been
brought back from Uganda in order to participate in that review and as
soon as it is completed I will submit recommendations for your
approval.
1. Tribalism at its Worst
Since his assumption of power in January, 1971, General Idi Amin has been destroying the elite
of all tribes not allied or belonging to his own grouping. The
judiciary, top civil servants, academics, the limited professional class
and senior army and police officers have been Aminʼs targets. Amin has not had to eliminate whole
tribes to insure his control; he has simply eliminated their leadership
with little regard for the consequences of wiping out the economic and
intellectual backbone of the country.
There are no reliable estimates of deaths. They most probably number
several thousand but not above 10,000 in a population of 10 million.
This compares with over 100,000 deaths in Burundi where the population
was 3. 5 million.
If Amin succeeds, his West Nile
tribal kinsmen, who represent between 5 and 10% of the countryʼs
population, would rule the country. The ill-fated invasion of Uganda by
Tanzanian-backed Ugandan dissidents has greatly strengthened Amin and accelerated the elimination of
any opposition to him.
2. The Asian Expulsion
Aminʼs expulsion of Asians is
moving apace. Most non-Ugandan Asians should be out of the country by
the November 8 deadline. These appear to number 25,000 to 30,000, which
is far less than earlier [Page 2]
estimates of 55,000 expellees. Furthermore, Asians are not being
brutalized as they were in the initial stages of the expulsion, probably
because of the worldʼs outcry, which included many African leaders.
3. Europeans and Americans in Uganda
As security deteriorated in Uganda, the number of Europeans and Americans
resident there declined from an estimated 11,000 in September to 7, 800.
Our own presence went from 1,000 to about 700; all of our 114 Peace
Corps volunteers were withdrawn. The British went from an estimated
7,000 to 5,000 citizens.
The safety of Europeans and Americans does not appear to be a problem
right now. Amin has resorted to
expelling those foreigners he dislikes and otherwise, has told his
troops to lay off whites, whose services the country still needs. In
fact, Amin has gone out of his
way lately to be friendly to the United States and West Germany, in the
hope that we will respond with aid. (For all practical purposes, US aid
to Uganda is presently suspended although we have not stopped on-going
technical assistance. This subject is now under review.)
4. The Soviet and Arab Presence
Whereas most everyone else—excluding the French, whose presence has
remained at about 200—has reduced its presence, our Embassy in Kampala
expects the Soviet presence to rise above the present 125. This could
result in Sino-Soviet competition between the Soviet-backed Amin versus the Chinese-supported
Nyerere of Tanzania. It is too early to speculate on this subject.
In addition, a Libyan contingent (possibly 400 men) remains in Uganda.
Both the Egyptians and Libyans have promised Amin assistance, which can only anger Nyerere, who, up
to now, has blindly supported the Arab cause against Israel.
5. Future Actions by Amin
Assuming Amin will remain in
power, and both State and CIA so
believe, it seems likely that Amin will continue to purge Ugandaʼs elite along tribal
lines. He is also expected to pursue Africanization programs which will
include the takeover of businesses vacated by [Page 3] Asians as well as probable future
nationalizations affecting the British. Foreign missionaries will
probably also come under increasing scrutiny by Amin.
6. US Interests
Our own interests in Uganda are limited to protecting our remaining
citizens and maintaining a presence in Uganda, rather than giving free
rein to the Soviets, assuming they are responsive to Amin. However, if aid is a prerequisite
for a presence, we may not be able to stay in Uganda. This will, of
course, be more thoroughly reviewed in the paper for you which will
discuss our future policy. This paper should be ready in
mid-November.
[Page 4]
Attachment
Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB-315/08804-72
Washington, October 19, 1972
Country
DOI
Subject
- Appraisal of Situation: Destruction of the Ugandan
Elite
ACQ
Source
What is now occurring in Uganda is the destruction of the Ugandan
elite: the judiciary, the top civil servants, the academics, a
limited professional class, and the senior army and police officers
who do not come from a West Nile tribe. They are being eliminated
because they, and the tribes of which they are the leaders and
favorite sons, pose a threat to the continued control of Uganda by
Aminʼs own tribe, [Page 5] the Kakwa, and his West
Nile allies. It is doubtful that Amin knows much about Chaka, the founder of the Zulu
nation, but the two men have much in common. (Headquarters comment:
Chaka was a chief from a minority clan in South Africa who in about
1818 began consolidating the Zulus into one nation by widespread
bloodshed and extermination of his enemies. He was murdered in
1828.)
2. The individuals from the West Nile are the new elite of Uganda,
and they intend to remain so. Amin was one of the few high ranking West Nilers in
the army at the time of the coup on 25 January 1970. The coup chain
of command went almost directly from Amin to the West Nile sergeants and enlisted men.
Amin outfoxed the
numerically superior Acholi, Lango and Itesot military personnel and
presented them with a fait accompli. If former President A. Milton
Obote had not been such a rank tribalist himself, there might have
been trouble. At the time, however, the change seemed for the
better, and the Acholi, Tesot, and other tribal groups went along
with it. The Lango had no choice but to follow suit.
3. With more perception that he seemed capable of, Amin set about insuring the loyalty
of the army. He removed those officers he considered disloyal by
whatever means he deemed necessary and replaced them with men he
considered loyal to him. In July 1970 the army had 99 Acholi [Page 6] officers, 50 Lango, and
107 West Nile; in January 1972 there were 19 Acholi officers, 16
Lango, and 222 West Nilers. Most of those remaining Acholi and Lango
officers are in support positions. The West Nilers, the majority of
them former warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, control
the troops. Amin has similarly riddled the senior police ranks
although he has not replaced those with West Nilers. Rather, he has
left the positions vacant.
4. The moves Amin made against military and police personnel should
have been enough. Today Amin
could, if he wanted, proclaim himself Emperor considering the lack
of opposition he would face. All is not completely smooth, however,
within the West Nile coalition. There have been indications of
strain between the Lugbara, the largest West Nile group, and
Aminʼs Kakwa. It is
doubtful that any single tribal group, such as the Lugbara, could
bring Amin down alone, but,
acting in concert with one or more sizeable tribal groups from any
area, the coalition might succeed. It is probably such a possibility
as this that Amin fears.
5. With the military under control, Amin still has the problem of the elite. Because of
their position in Uganda society, they either are themselves
influential or are in a position of strong influence with the elders
of their respective tribes. Amin does not need to eliminate whole tribes to
insure his control; he needs only to eliminate their [Page 7] leadership. If that
leadership happens to correspond with the economic and intellectual
backbone of the country, it makes little difference to Amin. It is increasingly evident
that his extremely elementary concept of economics and government
simply does not permit him to understand that destroyed talent
cannot be replaced overnight or even in a generation. The expelled
Asians represent most of the technological expertise to be found in
Uganda and some key Asian technicians are now being turned back at
the airport, but many got away early. It seems likely that the
present purge would not have reached anywhere near its present level
of intensity if it had not been for the abortive Obote-sponsored
invasion. It appears that the invasion may have frightened Amin sufficiently to make him
decide to get his house into what he conceives to be the proper
order, a society in which his tribe and its allies are in total
control.
6. The really puzzling thing is that Amin has been able to get away with the practice of
this philosophy for so long. If he has not already done so, he may
be able to consolidate his hold and keep it indefinitely. The
Acholi, with originally the greatest strength in the army and police
and, according to their claims, the greatest martial tradition of
any tribe in Uganda, have let themselves be selectively slaughtered
to the point that they will soon have no leadership left. The Lango
never had a chance; they had made themselves so thoroughly hated
during the Obote period that the other tribes were quite happy to
[Page 8] stand by and see
them cut to ribbons by the West Nilers. The Itesot are somewhat of
an enigma. There are still many of them in the army they have
apparently been so bemused by watching their ancient enemies the
Lango and the Acholi, get it in the neck, that it has not occurred
to them that they might be next. Except for the Baganda, none of the
other tribes appear to have enough strength to be a problem for
Amin, although the way the Samia are suffering they must have done
something wrong.
7. One could think of the Baganda as the Bengalis of Uganda,
traditionally using guile instead of guns, but even the Bengalis
produced the Mukti Bahini, East Pakistanʼs indigenous guerrillas who
formed an effective fighting force against the West Pakistanis. It
may be that the Baganda have become used to being trampled upon and
are putting hope for individual survival first, as all their
potential allies seem to be doing.
8. What is happening now in Uganda has nothing to do with
colonialism, nationalism, or East-West ideology. It is raw tribalism
at work, with the chief of a minor tribe (the Chaka-Zulu situation
again) on his way to subjugating and controlling the neighboring
tribes. Unlike Chaka, Amin
has the limitation of international boundaries with which to
contend. Since he once mooted the idea of extending his frontier
through northern Tanzania to include the port of Tanga, however,
perhaps the borders do not mean much to him.
[Page 9]
9. [text not declassified]
10. [text not declassified]
