228. Memorandum From Fernando E.
Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the
Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, October 10, 1972
SUBJECT:
As you recommended in your memorandum at Tab 2, the President agreed that
relations with Burundi should be minimal but he added: “K—also see the
Burundi Ambassador.” The purpose of this memorandum is to get those
instructions conveyed to State either orally, as we would suggest, or in
written form as provided for in Tab 1.
In addition to informing State about our minimal relationship, the
Department would be asked to call in the Burundi Ambassador and tell him
that as a result of the systematic killings which took place in his
country we cannot consider our relations to be normal. This line would
anger the Burundi Government but probably not lead to a break in
relations or to an ouster of our mission there. Such an ouster would not
be in our interest because of our desire (State and CIA feel strongly about this) to monitor
potential anti-Zairian activity in Burundi. (As African maps indicate,
Burundi is the back door to the traditionally most restive part of Zaire
(Congo). If the PRC or USSR wanted to
stir up trouble in Eastern Zaire, Burundi would be the ideal basing
point for rebels.) Otherwise, our interests in Burundi are minimal.
Some further thoughts on our future Burundi policy are contained in the
brief paper written by our Ambassador to Burundi at Tab 3. The
Ambassador agrees that we should have a minimal presence in Burundi but
wants to have the leeway to make small gestures to the Burundi
Government in order to: (1) encourage reconciliation, (2) lessen the
risk that Burundi will think the West is abandoning it—as Belgium slowly
reduces its presence—, and (3) maintain our ability to monitor PRC and
USSR activity, particularly if it
is directed against Zaire.
[Page 2]
We recommend that as outlined at Tab 1 the Presidentʼs instructions be
conveyed orally to the Department of State, preferably by General
Haig to Ted Eliot, to avoid
any possible leakage of the Presidentʼs feelings on this matter. If not,
questions might be asked about why it took us so long to convey our
outrage to Burundi. If you disagree, and want the record to show our
reaction, a memorandum for your signature to the Secretary of State is
at Tab 1.
RECOMMENDATION
That General Haig orally convey
the contents of the memorandum at Tab 1 to Ted Eliot.
Agree [checked]. [handwritten note]
Disagree, I will sign the memo at
Tab 1____.
[Page 3]
Tab 1
Draft Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers
Washington,
undated.
SUBJECT:
- United States Policy Toward Burundi
As a result of the mass murders which recently took place in Burundi,
the President has directed that official relations with that state
should be minimal. This is not meant to preclude our contributing to
humanitarian assistance efforts providing they reach all segments of
the population. Other forms of assistance (i.e., bilateral
aid/cultural exchange funds, self-help funds) should, however, be
discontinued.
The President has also directed that Burundiʼs Ambassador to the
United States be called in. The Department should inform the
Ambassador of the Presidentʼs strong sense of outrage at the recent
systematic killings in Burundi and indicate that American relations
with Burundi cannot be considered normal until there is a clear
change of policy with respect to human rights in that country.
[Page 4]
Tab 3
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State
(Eliot) to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)
Washington, October 7, 1972
Subject:
The attached memorandum to Assistant Secretary Newsom reflects the current views
of Ambassador Robert Yost on
our policy toward Burundi. Ambassador Yost is currently in
Washington on consultation.
The memorandum is forwarded to supplement the Departmentʼs memorandum
of September 24 and to assist further in the Presidentʼs
consideration of our future posture toward this country.
Theodore L. Eliot,
Jr.
Executive Secretary
[Page 5]
Attachment
Memorandum From the Ambassador to Burundi (Yost) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom)
Washington, October 6, 1972
SUBJECT:
- Developments Affecting US Policy on Burundi
In view of the considerable current interest in the U.S.
relationship with Burundi, I would like to make one or two
comments for the record. They are made in the light of events
since submission of Mr. Eliotʼs memorandum to Mr. Kissinger, dated September 24,
1972, and are of course purely personal.
1. Recent political developments in Burundi indicate a growth in
the strength of the more moderate of the Tutsi factions
comprising the cabinet. The Prime Minister can be said to head
this faction, although it appears to have the general support if
not guidance, of President Micombero. Such national
reconciliation as may be possible in the coming months will, I
believe, take place more easily under this group than under the
leadership of the Simbananiye-Shibura-Rwuri faction. The latter
is more radical both on foreign policy matters and on the
question of how to deal with the Hutu majority.
2. We have indications that the Belgians are seriously
considering terminating their military assistance to Burundi
over the next year or two. While multilateral and bilateral
economic assistance to Burundi may remain at roughly recent
levels, the prospect of losing Belgian military support is
likely to have a disproportionate effect on the insecure Tutsi
regime. In this atmosphere, any U.S. move vis.a.vis Burundi
would be examined closely for its implications for total Western
intentions toward that country. The GRB is lonely and will
certainly seek alternatives if it thinks the West is pulling
out.
[Page 6]
3. Chinese interest in economic [text illegible] in Burundi
continues. PRC willingness to help fill the potential military
gap cannot be ruled out, though a minority elitist government is
not the most comfortable bedfellow for the PRC or perhaps—in the
longer term—the most useful one. In any event, both the PRC and
President Mobutu
continue today to consider Burundi an important piece of real
estate at the vulnerable eastern door to Zaire. If the Zaire
rebels were given active support by a Burundi government,
including the use of sanctuary and supply lines, the Zaire
government would be faced with a substantially more serious
dissident problem in the East. [text not
declassified]
I therefore believe that it is in the interest of the U.S. to
retain the greatest possible flexibility in Burundi, continuing
our minimum presence during the current difficult period but
leaving us free to make selected gestures toward the GRB if
political and intertribal developments within Burundi make this
useful and feasible.
