The Secretaryʼs memorandum notes that the relief effort is running into
serious obstacles—the approach of the rainy season; the Nigerian
decision to delegate responsibility for relief from the Nigerian Red
Cross to the (less efficient) East-Central State government; the
(forced) departure of foreign relief and medical personnel; and the
aggravation of Nigerian sensitivities by U.S. press and Senatorial
criticism. The Secretary concludes that our ability to assist the relief
program in the next six months will be even more limited than in the
past, and warns that “a U.S. image of aggressive preoccupation with
short-term relief will be counter-productive and destroy whatever
chances we still have of influencing the relief program.”
The Secretary therefore urges (on p. 3) that our tactics with respect to
relief be low-key and indirect—namely, that we should work with the
Federal Government, the East-Central State government, and other groups
(UK, UNICEF, voluntary agencies) to
try to persuade them to accept further U.S. assistance. He also
recommends (on p. 4) that we raise our sights from relief to
reconstruction, in order to ease our relations with the Nigerians and to
contribute to the more promising efforts toward long-term recovery.
My own view is that the Secretaryʼs specific tactical recommendations
with respect to relief are unexceptionable; indeed, they are the sort of
thing the United States should be doing anyway. His recommendation that
we devote increasing effort to reconstruction is also useful. But there
is no need to subordinate relief to reconstruction, indeed it would be
unwise to do so during at least the next several months. I believe that
the obstacles confronting the relief program should be looked upon as
dramatizing the seriousness of the current relief needs, and not as a
reason for reducing our relief efforts.
At Tab A for your approval is a memorandum which I propose to send to the
Secretary indicating your approval of his specific operational
[Page 2]
recommendations but
cautioning against a let-up in our relief effort. It also reiterates
your view that there is no inherent incompatibility between good
relations with the Nigerian Government and a significant continuing U.S.
contribution to the relief effort.
That you approve the memorandum from me to the Secretary at Tab A, which
approves the Secretaryʼs operational proposals but cautions against a
let-up of the relief effort.
Approve memorandum _______ [checkmark here] Disapprove memorandum
________
Tab B
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President
Nixon
Washington, May
1, 1970
[Page 3]
Subject:
- Nigerian Relief Recommendation:
That you approve the course of action described in this memorandum
for U.S. policy in Nigeria.
Approve _______ Disapprove _______
Discussion:
Three months after the end of the civil war in Nigeria, the relief
program has reached a critical transition point. The time has come
to define what our own relationship to Nigerian relief should be in
the six months to come.
For humanitarian reasons and in response to domestic concerns, we
have, until now, undertaken to insure that a relief program adequate
by our standards is carried out in the former Biafran enclave. (A
summary of the current relief efforts is enclosed.) We have
undoubtedly played a major role, along with the British, in making
possible the minimal relief program which has been carried out; at
the same time, by so doing, we have created problems with the
Federal Military Government and have reduced our ability to provide
and monitor relief.
The Present Situation:
In the months ahead a number of things are likely to happen which
will lessen the effectiveness of the relief program, regardless of
what we do. The relief
[Page 4]
effort will be complicated by the rainy season beginning in May. The
Nigerians have made known their intention to shift responsibility
for relief in the most critical area from the Nigerian Red Cross to
the East-Central State Rehabilitation Commission, with an almost
certain loss of efficiency (recent indications are that the FMG will postpone the date of the shift
till the end of June). They are taking this course for internal
political reasons as well as because they are convinced the relief
requirement is largely concluded.
The Nigerians have not yet responded to a UNICEF recommendation that
additional food be immediately ordered. Expatriate relief personnel
have been leaving. The services of virtually all our Public Health
Service doctors have been terminated, and our chances of replacing
them are slim. Resistance in the rest of Nigeria to what seems to be
preferential treatment for the secessionist area will grow. Nigerian
sensitivities will undoubtedly be aggravated by such U.S. domestic
events as the request by Senator Kennedy for a GAO investigation of the relief effort
and the recent Washington Star story based on
disclosure of a confidential Nigerian nutritional survey.
This is not to suggest that, after the phase-out of the Nigerian Red
Cross, the relief effort will simply collapse. The Federal
authorities apparently have now decided to extend visas for
remaining expatriate relief personnel and are considering whether to
request additional food imports for relief. While agonizingly slow,
there is hope that the Nigerians will face up to the very real
continuing needs.
Overall, this situation clearly is anything but desirable. Although
local food is increasing, the end of the mass feeding problem will
not come for at least six months with the fall harvest and the
gradual resumption of normal commerce. Our best estimate is that
suffering will probably increase in view of the slowness of the
Nigerian response but that in the large the problem will be
contained and that mass deaths and starvation will be avoided.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that there will be
a new spate of unfavorable reports about conditions in eastern
Nigeria in the coming months.
[Page 5]
What We Can Do:
Our ability to improve and contribute to this relief program over the
next six months will be even more limited than in the past. The
people with whom we maintain influence at the national level and who
share our views on nutrition and relief needs will have little role
except in institutional relief. A U.S. image of aggressive
preoccupation with short-term relief will be counter-productive and
destroy whatever chances we still have of influencing the relief
program.
Our goals for relief must take this into account and our tactics
generally must be low-key and indirect:
1. We will continue to work with the Federal Ministry of Economic
Development and Reconstruction, to the extent that it retains
control and influence over future East-Central State relief
policies.
2. We will attempt to develop a useful role with the East-Central
State Government through our AID personnel and possibly through
USPHS doctors stationed in the area.
3. We will try to convince the East-Central State Government to
accept minimal nutritional requirements and to persuade it to order
additional shipments of food. We will try to get it to retain as
much of the existing apparatus—expatriate relief teams, transport
and logistics system—as possible. Whatever arrangements are worked
out will set the pattern for relief operations in the other
war-affected areas.
4. In all the above efforts we are attempting to enlist others to
play a similar role (e.g., the British, UNICEF, LICROSS and other
voluntary agencies).
5. We will continue through AID to
monitor the use of our relief material to the extent political
realities will permit. We will try to schedule the GAOʼs visit to
Nigeria after the Red Cross effort phases out.
6. We have made arrangements to divert food to Nigeria in order to
keep the pipeline full and hope that the Nigerians will accept
shipments when they arrive.
[Page 6]
Beyond these limited activities, we should now raise our sights from
relief to reconstruction which, by restoring normal life, is the
only real long-term solution. Such a development would contribute to
our longer range relations with Nigeria, which have suffered
considerably in recent years. Given the Nigerian shift in priorities
from relief to rehabilitation, we should show our readiness to talk
to them about how we can assist in the immediate and urgent task of
reconstruction and in longer range development. By participating in
reconstruction, which holds more promise than relief, we will be
contributing to a return to normal.
[Page 7]
Enclosure 1
Appendix
Status Report: Nigerian Relief
About 2.3–3 million people are getting full or partial feeding in
the Nigerian Red Cross (NRC) program conducted in the field by
teams headed by expatriate doctors and relief workers. The
program has distributed 3–4,000 tons of food per week, compared
to its target of 4,100 tons a week (although a realistic minimum
target based on the nutritional survey of early February in
which U.S. Public Health doctors participated, is probably
closer to 5,000 tons). The worst shortfall has occurred in the
area of most severe need, around Owerri, where deliveries have
averaged less than half the 1,600 ton weekly target. The
attached chart contains detailed figures on weekly food
distribution.
Our best estimate, based on the reports of USPHS doctors who have
been conducting relief operations, is that the relief effort has
been at least minimally adequate. Severe malnutrition has been
substantially reduced; hospital and sickbay populations have
declined. Medical facilities and care are improving. While
progress has been slower than we would wish, the nutritional
trend has until recently been upward. Malnutrition and suffering
persist but there has been, according to the consensus of the
USPHS doctors, no mass starvation or mass death.
The mass relief effort to date has operated on a precarious
margin. Progress has been achieved, however, by selective
feeding. Sickbay and hospital inmates and outpatients have
gotten full feeding. With inadequate total supplies, however,
the moderately malnourished and the plain hungry have received,
in the mass feeding program, less than they need.
