140. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Bureaucratic coordination on Nigeria/Biafra
As the President instructed, State is now preparing recommendations on further steps in the relief effort following the Biafran rejection of our recent initiative and the decision by the Red Cross to bow out of a direct operational role. Their position will probably boil down to (a) continued financial support for a nighttime airlift while (b) trying to lower the American profile (in planes and volunteer crews) to lessen the risk of a Federal shoot-down and the resulting diplomatic confrontation with Lagos. The paper is due at the opening of business Monday.
Meanwhile, on the political front, Under Secretary Richardson did use his European trip to broach a joint US-UK-French effort to spur peace negotiations, Londonʼs reaction was warm, and they are ready to start talking details at staff level. The Quai was more coy, but Schumann obviously has to consult the Elysee before responding. Once the French make up their minds, they too will probably keep the initiative alive.
Some time within the next two weeks, therefore, we will have to decide on the next step with both the British and the French. That will bring us to concrete issues such as the form of mediation, what we expect:London to say to Lagos, Paris to tell the Biafrans, etc.
Having begun this process, however, we now find ourselves at an impasse within the US Government. The Secretary of State—though he had signed off earlier on a Richardson recommendation to carry out the peace probe—has now decided on further thought that he is strenuously against any US political role to try to settle the war.
The result is that the machinery in State has come to a standstill. Newsom has been reprimanded by the Secretary for both relief and peace moves, and probably fears any further US initiatives will cost him his job. (The Secretary reportedly told Newsom this morning that we should be glad the Biafrans rejected our relief initiative, since he ((Secretary Rogers)) would have had to order the repudiation of our offer in any case).
[Page 2]We are, in short, stuck out on a limb in implementing the Presidentʼs September 9 decision, and specifically in following through with approaches already made (and presumably authorized) to the British and the French.
I see three alternatives:
(1) A written directive to State on the Presidentʼs decision to follow an even-handed and active probe of the negotiating possibilities;
(2) Yet another effort through Elliot Richardson to persuade the Secretary to take this course; or
(3) A direct discussion between you and Secretary Rogers.
My own judgment is that a written directive is no substitute in this case for a direct talk between Principals. And I do not believe Richardson, who has already tried in vain to sell the Secretary in a low-key, can be expected to take up another try. Richardsonʼs staff tells me that they will encourage him to try to clear the air, but he is in a delicate position to say the least.
I see only one clear remedy for this problem—that is for you to sort it out directly with Secretary Rogers.
Recommendation. That you discuss our policy toward Nigeria/Biafra with Secretary Rogers in order to arrive at operational coordination consistent with the Presidentʼs policy.
Iʼll talk to Secretary; draft talking points———
Prepare written
directive——
Iʼll handle with Elliot
Richardson
Speak to me———
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The option, “Iʼll handle it with Richardson,” was checked. A handwritten note on page one says, “Action Completed.”↩
- Morrisʼs memorandum on bureaucratic coordination outlined the policy conflict over Nigeria/Biafra among the President, the National Security Council, Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom. Morris recommended that Kissinger discuss the policy with Rogers, but Kissinger preferred to discuss it with Richardson.↩