Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969–1972

137. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to Anthony Lake of the National Security Council Staff¹ ²

Washington, November 7, 1969

SUBJECT:

• Biafra Initiatives

Following is pour memoire on our telcon just completed:

1. As regards proposed Presidential statement condemning Biafrans for failure our relief initiative, I understand that Secretary Rogers is against such statement. Am told he argues (a) undesirable have President admit failure in public, (b) statement unnecessary in light low-level domestic concern, and (c) statement merely another step in undesirable involvement in problem. Under Secretary Richardson said to feel strongly, however, that statement necessary both to appease Federals and pre-empt domestic critics, particularly in light recent Ojukwu speech, which Secretary may not have seen. In any case, my proposal for Richardson rather than Presidential statement is strictly internal staff. State continues to assume issue is yes or no on Presidential statement as they submitted it.

2. Regarding political probe, Richardson had received Secretaryʼs approval last weekend on memorandum recommending peace probe along lines discussed Richardson-Kissinger in accord Presidentʼs decision of September 12. You will recall that, for tactical reasons, Secretary never given directly Presidentʼs September 12 decision, and matter left for Richardson to handle internally at State. Secretary now reportedly concerned, despite his prior approval Richardsonʼs recommendations, that we are becoming “involved” in political matters.

3. Operational consequences this turn-around:

(a) Richardson to see British and French, but with diluted brief of no significance in pushing forward probe;

(b) State overnight cancelled Richardson meeting with Biafran number two man in London this weekend, at which we were to make serious high-level probe vital questions of Biafran negotiating position. Bureaucratically, despite Watts -Eliot directive of September 9 specifically asking White House clearance all Nigerian policy cables (and Colorado Springs directive), these operational instructions to Richardson went out without, repeat without, White House clearance.

Recommendation

That HAK discuss directly with Secretary Rogers the Presidentʼs

September 12 directive to pursue an active peace probe to help end Nigerian civil war.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 742, Country Files, Africa, Nigeria, Vol. I. Secret; Eyes Only; Highest Priority. The memorandum is marked “Sent by wire to K. B., 11/6” and “OK, W” and was initialed by Haig.
2. Morris outlined the ideological clash over Biafra among Secretary of State William Rogers, Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, and himself. Morris complained that State was not clearing Nigerian policy cables and recommended Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discuss with Rogers the Presidentʼs desire for an active peace probe.