As I alerted you at this morningʼs staff meeting, attached is a
package for the President conveying Stateʼs recommended statement
blaming the Biafrans for the failure of our initiative on daylight
flights.
I have recommended an alternative approach “a brief message to
General Gowon praising his
agreement to the proposal.
If the President decides against the statement, I think you should
personally break the news to Richardson by phone or eyes-only White House
cable.
That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.
Attachment
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Washington,
undated
Attachment
[Page 5]
SUBJECT:
- Status of Initiatives on Nigeria/Biafra
As you instructed, we have been moving along two lines in dealing
with the Biafran problem: (1) an initiative to break the current
relief impasse on Red Cross daytime flights, and (2) probing the
possibilities for negotiating a settlement of the war
itself.
The following summarizes where we stand on these initiatives,
with Stateʼs recommendation on the next step.
Relief
You will recall that the impasse on daylight flights stemmed from
the Biafran fear of a Federal violation of the airlift for a
sneak attack on the airfield which is Biafraʼs sole lifeline for
arms and food. This long-standing fear remained despite the
Federalsʼ general pledge to the Red Cross that they would
refrain from attacking the airfield during the day.
The Biafrans approached us through a private intermediary about
four weeks ago asking that the US provide some “guarantee” that
Nigeria would not abuse the daylight night route. There was no
question and the Biafrans seemed to understand this—of our
direct involvement in policing the airlift. But we did seize the
opportunity to offer them (a) a Presidential statement that we
took the inviolability of the airlift as a solemn commitment of
the Federal side, and (b) help in getting both communications
equipment and Canadian observers as practical safeguards.
Elliot Richardson
received a commitment on the inviolability of the airlift from
the Nigerian Foreign Minister when he was here recently.
Clyde Ferguson, our
Relief Coordinator, then carried our offer to West Africa to lay
it before the Biafrans.
What followed among Ojukwu and his colleagues is not clear. Our
intelligence [text not declassified]
suggests a major wrangle in the Biafran leadership between their
Foreign Ministry, whose people had floated the initiative with
us in the first place, and the Biafran military. In any case,
over the last two weeks it has become clear that the military
has prevailed and Ojukwu has turned down our initiative.
[Page 6]
There were probably two main grounds for the rejection: (1)
increasing use of the Biafran airfield by their mini-air force
during daylight hours, which the agreement would have
prohibited, and (2) a predictably hard-nosed conclusion by
Ojukwu that not
even a U.S. assurance and the threat of our opprobrium, short of
military intervention, would deter the Federal mercenary pilots
from trying a sneak attack that could have a decisive effect by
severing Biafraʼs arms supply. There is also the consideration,
real or imagined, that night relief flights provide some cover
for arms flights. A daytime agreement would probably have
tempted the religious relief agencies to give up their hazardous
night runs for the safer Red Cross route.
In the face of this rejection, State is now recommending that you
issue a statement revealing the secret initiative and condemning
the Biafran refusal. Their proposed statement is at Tab A. Under
Secretary Richardson
argues that the statement is needed to (1) protect our standing
with the Federals, who claim that we have never given them due
credit or the Biafrans due scorn on relief, and (2) generally to
show the Biafrans that we mean business when we go out of our
way to meet their position. State believes (and I think with
some justification) that Ojukwu has exploited relief for political
advantage. They want to get his “intransigence” on the
record.
The other side of the argument, however, is that a public
condemnation of the Biafrans at this point is unlikely to force
any change in their position. It might only harden the already
deep distrust and cynicism which lie behind their rejection.
These are people who see, themselves, rightly or wrongly, as
having gone it alone in a noble cause against great odds. Their
strong point “a fierce pride and independence” is precisely what
makes them tough to deal with. A public slap from you, adding to
their sense of isolation, could damage whatever chance we may
still have to play a useful role in trying to get a relief
arrangement.
It can also be argued that a statement of this kind might
reawaken the domestic debate in the Congress and elsewhere. Our
critics have been muted largely by the knowledge that we are
sticking with the problem in an even-handed way, despite the
frustration.
There is, moreover, an important consideration on the timing of
this statement in relation to our efforts on the political side
to probe the prospects of a negotiated settlement.
Political
The last few weeks have seen another flurry of African diplomatic
activity with Haile
Selassie and various parties trying to bring the
two sides together.
[Page 7]
The Africans made clear that they wanted no outside help on these
efforts.Thus, we stood on the sidelines, knowing little of the
backstage moves but trying to give them every chance to succeed.
It is now obvious, however, that these African efforts have
failed again— apparently for the usual reasons of poor
coordination and absence of real levervage.
Richardson feels—and I
agree—that the way is clear now for us to move ahead on the
peace probe you authorized earlier. Richardson plans to begin, while heʼs in Europe
for the NATO sub-Ministerial, with an approach to the British
and French this weekend.
The question is whether a Presidential condemnation of Biafra on
the relief problem helps or harms this political initiative.
State argues that a hard line on relief tells the Biafrans they
canʼt take advantage of us in a peace effort. But a stubborn
Biafran counter-reaction of the kind described above could
poison the atmosphere on political as well as relief matter. Our
peace probe will not go very far if Ojukwu and his wary advisers
believe we are looking for the first opportunity to tag them
with public exposure.
My own view is that Stateʼs proposed statement raises more
problems than it solves. I agree with Richardson that we need some
gesture with the Federals to keep them cooperative in both
relief and political matters. But that could be done with a
brief message from you to General Gowon (proposed draft at Tab B) which praises
his agreement to daylight flights without a public branding of
the Biafrans.
At some stage—either as a counter to domestic critics or a tactic
in negotiations—we may well have to reveal the record and assess
the blame in the Biafran problem. But a statement now seems to
me premature—and perhaps harmful to our beginning effort to spur
a negotiated settlement. I think we have to expect a lot of
frustration—and endure it quietly—if we hope to make a dent in
this bitter and complex problem.
Recommendation
That you approve the message to General Gowan (Tab B) instead of
the proposed statement on Biafraʼs rejection of our reiief
initiative (Tab A).
Approve——Disapprove—— See me———
