13. Telegram 3414 From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Embassy in Ireland1 2

For Carson or Levitsky, S/S only handle as Nodis


  • President Nixonʼs talks with President Tito: Advisers Meeting October 1.

1. Participants.

  • 1. President Nixon and President Tito met October 1 at 9:00 am for substantive talks in latterʼs office at Federal Executive Council building. Advisers were present throughout this meeting.
  • 2. On Yugoslav side: Mitja Ribicic, President to Federal Executive Council (Cabinet); Toma Granfil and Marko Bulc, members of Federal Executive Council; Mirko Tepavac, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs: Bogdan Crnobrnja, Yugoslav Ambassador to Washington; Ante Drndic, Asst State Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Marko Vrhunec, Acting Secretary General to President; Milos Melovski, Counselor to President of Republic for Foreign Political Questions; Miroslav Kreacic, Director of Office of American Affairs, State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs: Vela Tambaca, interpreter.
  • B. On US side: Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Leonhart, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Ziegler, Asst Secy Hillenbrand, Mr. Sonnenfeld, Mr. Mudd (Embassy Political Counselor), Mr. Akalovsky (interpreter).
  • C. Main topics covered were: bilateral relations, Middle East, black Africa, Vietnam, and Algeria. Following is uncleared memorandum of conversation.
[Page 2]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Africa.]

Part V -Black Africa

  • 35. The President said he would be interested in Titoʼs estimate of Sino-Soviet competition in black Africa. US knows little of state of play between these two super-powers in this area. Which did Tito think was ahead?
  • 36. Tito replied this hard to say. It was his impression that China presently taking flexible and shrewd approach, spending a lot of money, and careful to avoid offense to local people. They were constructing a 1,000 kilometer railroad from Tanzania to Zambia; their construction workers were living very modestly. It appeared to be Chinese policy to provide large economic assistance and to ask little in return. Long-term implications of [Page 3] this strategy are large. Soviet influence is greater in Arab world; in black Africa it is difficult to judge.
  • 37. The President responded that on basis of these comments he would conclude Chinese policy more clever and sophisticated than was Soviet. Tito commented Chinese have learned lesson from their own earlier expulsions. They profit from past mistakes and recognize that Africans have had bad experiences at hands former colonial powers and hence want no more of such domination. They want to be masters of their own houses and will not tolerate interference in their internal affairs by anyone. Chinese may also have learned from Yugoslav experience on a modest scale. Yugoslavia has supplied technical assistance to number African countries but has carefully abstained from any kind of interference in their internal affairs and their aid people have never been expelled anywhere.
  • 38. The President asked Tito what he thought black African attitude was toward US. Do Africans consider US imperialists, or US assistance a form of neo-colonialism?
  • 39. Tito answered that his impression was that black Africa is critical of US because most of its assistance goes to southern Africa and US seems to seek closer relations with South Africa and Portuguese colonies than with black Africa. They want US assistance but not at expense of interference in their internal affairs. (Secretary Tepavac intervened to say many African countries expect much of US during UN Second Development Decade.) Tito continued that one shouldnʼt be too impatient about results. Changing attitudes these countries is long-term process. Aid without interference will end well. Country that gives assistance not in egoistic way in long run will have greatest influence. Most of these countries are aware that economic assistance is two-way partnership. Economic development eventually means equal economic relations which promotes trade to benefit of donor nation.
  • 40. Tito said it is also quite unwise to regard any political change in black Africa as move towards socialism or communism. These countries are quite far away from communism and socialism. They wish make revolution in a constructive sense. They will deal with ideologies and systems in their own ways, adapting them to their needs. Kaunda of Zambia thinks that “humanism” is highest form of progress. Nyerere of Tanzania is gifted and capable man who seeks friendly relations with all countries. Kenyatta of Kenya is another African leader who believes in peaceful coexistence. Experience has shown that interference in internal affairs of these states doesnʼt pay very well and results never last very long. They are determined to be independent, but they require financial assistance. Concept of giving one percent of national income to developing countries has [Page 4] caught on with some European states, and there are better prospects of developing multilateral forms of assistance. Tito noted that USSR has not yet shown any interest in these proposals.

Part VI-Algeria

  • 41. The President asked Tito for his views on the attitudes and aspirations of the present Algerian Government, adding that do not know those people very well. What did President Tito think of Algeriaʼs role in world affairs? Is Algiers, for instance, interested in a larger role in the Mediterranean and, if so, how did it expect to play such a role?
  • 42. Tito said he enjoyed good relations with Boumediene as he had with his predecessor, Ben Bella. Algeria was most interested in its own economic development. In his extensive talks with both leaders this thread consistently ran through their conversations. Algeria also wished to consolidate its economic and political systems and, as one of the larger powers in the Mediterranean, to play an active and important role in that area. No doubt that there was some friction between Cairo and Algiers. Boumediene is a strong man but flexible within the possibilities that other Arab positions allow for flexibility. He does not hurry to take positions and is concerned not to lose the prestige he has. He does not favor Soviet side. Although on occasion he may appear to have adopted rigid positions, Yugoslavs believe he knows how to adjust himself to concrete situations and that he will shift according to requirements of situation.
  • 43. Meeting adjourned at 1145 hours.
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S Conference Files, 1966–1972, Entry 3051B, Box 518, President Nixonʼs Trip to Europe, 9/27–10/5/70, Schedule, Memcons, Public Statements, Vol. I of V. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to U.S. Office in Limerick.
  2. The Embassy reported on President Nixonʼs meeting with President Tito on October 1, during which the two men discussed “Black Africa” at some length. Tito commented that it was difficult to assess Sino-Soviet competition in black Africa but he was impressed by Chinese efforts. He agreed with Nixon that Chinaʼs policy was more clever and sophisticated than that of the Soviets. He advised that change in black Africa not be regarded as a move towards socialism or communism.