125. Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Peace Negotiations—the Need for Precision
With Bill Brubeckʼs conversation with Houphouet, we can begin to see at least the murky outline of a new diplomatic episode in the Nigerian civil war. It is not clear yet whether we have been kept in the dark through inadvertence or conscious design. But I feel strongly that we should move right away to try to establish some vital precision in the initiative, largely to protect ourselves from precisely the kind of ambivalence that overtook our policy on the daylight flight agreement. In short, we have an interest in correcting the sloppiness which could lead again, to a situation in which the US (and the Biafrans), on a close study of the equities, would not be able to endorse an apparently forthcoming position taken by Gowen. Specifically:
1. Because the Red Cross did some fast shuffling on major provisions of the daylight flight agreement (and because no-one caught them up in the process), we were faced with an agreement for which Gowan expended valuable capital in his own government, yet to which the Biafrans could still pose legitimate objections. The result is that we have neither daylight flights nor a clear field to fix the blame. If someone had ferreted out, and then thought through, the important discrepancies—the question of inviolability, the air route. the right of call-down, etc.—we would have saved both lives and energy. As it is now, the Feds are locked in, and weʼre going to have to make a major push with both sides before we can honestly say that we did our best. Thus my statement. the Canadian initiative, black boxes, etc.
I see exactly the same problem developing with the new OAU initiative. So far, the components of that action appear as follows:
—Cease fire: An appeal from HIM to Gowen to offer unilaterally a cease-fire for a temporary period in order to get talks started. Apparently, Cowan would [Page 2] do this on the understanding that (a) it would entail a legitimate stand-down in arms supply as well as ground fighting and (b) the Feds would have the right to police the cessation of arms flights into Biafra.
—No pre-conditions: According to Houphouet (HIM didnʼt mention this point), Cowan is also to offer talks without pre-conditions, which would be a major concession following the obvious battle he has been having with his hawks at Addis and afterward.
—The OAU role: Tanzanians and Ivorians are involved. But the initiative is also clearly stamped with the OAU in the presence of Diallo Telli. No-one seems to be looking ahead at the precise questions of (a) auspices for these talks, (b) third parties, if any, at the table or otherwise, and (c) matter, of agenda, context, relationship to OAU Resolution, etc.
3. On this basis, it may well be that Gowon could get his people to make the offer, calculating, that it would be just as shrewd and politically profitable (albeit unproductive) as the daylight flight agreement. But Ojukwu will have an easy escape—and we will be mired in our usual dilemma—unless someone beforehand answers the following questions:
—Does the arms stand-down also apply to the FMG? If so, who polices them?
—How does the FMG police the skies while Ojukwu is given safe passage out to the talks?
—Who verifies the cease-fire, and how?
—If Nigerian unity is not a pre-condition, does this mean the negotiations are not under the latest OAU resolution?
—If this is under OAU auspices, is it a warm-over of the Concom, or something new? Is the OAU prepared to change the Concom, if necessary, to include friends of Biafra?
[Page 3]—What if Addis or Monrovia are unacceptable to Biafra?
—Is Biafra being given a chance to react before a Fed pronouncement?
—Are all strings of negotiation being coordinated by someone?
—What role are the British and French playing?
—Does this have any relationship to relief? (Houphouet foresees “month”; a lot of kids are going to die during the “preliminaries”)
We have certainly learned two lessons by now: (1) Africans generally are slipshod in their peace initiatives, however well-intentioned. (2) the Biafrans are not; on the contrary, they probe the scenario with great care. Knowing, as we do so well, Ojukwoʼs standard objections to the OAU, a unilateral concession on arms supply, etc., we can readily expect a hard (and justifiable) Biafran rejection of the plot as we now know it.
To be sure, we may discover these bases are covered as we find out more about the action. (I very much doubt it.) But if they arenʼt, anyone who really wants the action to work (not to mention keeping the US unscathed) should flush out the answers.
I am persuaded, as you know, that there is no virtue (only some pain) in letting these things “take their course”. The comfort of non-involvement is illusive when our absence may only mean the war drags on.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Coordinator on Relief to Civilian Victims of the Nigerian Civil War, February 1969–June 1970, Lot 70 D 336, Box 517, Memorandum. Secret. Copies were sent to Ferguson and Ruser.↩
- Morris outlined new diplomatic efforts for ending the Biafran War. He believed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had done some fast shuffling with the daylight flight proposal so the Federal Military Government (FMG) was committed while Biafra was not. Morris felt that the next proposals must be precise.↩