121. Memorandum From Roger Morris of
the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, September 22, 1969
[Page 1]
FOR HAK:
Apropos your “supposition” at this morningʼs staff meeting that there
were some errant cables on Nigeria, I had a classic example this
morning.
Attached at Tab A is a recommendation from Lagos (telegram 8488) for the
arrival statement of our new Ambassador. Aside from the rather strained
historical analogy of the United States, the statement ends with a
ringing declaration altogether contrary to the Presidentʼs policy as I
understand it (passage underlined).
As per your instruction, I certainly intend to raise a red flag on this
with Newsom.
Incidentally, in the same vein, I have attached at Tab B a cable (Lagosʼs
8484) from Newsomʼs new Nigerian
Office Director, recommending that the President write a love letter to
Gowon. I intend to address
this cable with Newsom as
well.
Tab A
Telegram 8488 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of
State
Lagos, September 22, 1969,
1412Z
[Page 2]
Subject:
- Draft Arrival Statement for Ambassador Trueheart
Ref:
1. There follows suggested draft arrival statement for Ambassador
Trueheart.
Begin text: “It is customary for a new Ambassador arriving in a
country to issue a statement containing platitudes and generalities.
It is tempting for me to do so today. But you and I know the issues
facing Nigeria today and relations between Nigeria and the United
States will not permit avoidance of certain hard and troublesome
facts. It may be, however, that in facing these issues squarely
Nigerians and Americans can better understand one another.
“First, Nigerians are fighting Nigerians in a bitter civil war to
resolve whether this country can survive as an important, viable
national entity—or whether it may fragment as one ethnic group
attempts secession. My government and Americans understand this
tragic dilemma. Americaʼs survival as a nation was once so
threatened and we fought a four-year war to insure “one
nation…indivisible…
“Secondly, Nigeriaʼs problem of reconciliation of her diverse ethnic
groups could become a major problem at the conclusion of the war.
Again reconciliation of differing people because of race, religion,
and national origin has been a problem with which my country has
been seized for years and which
[Page 3]
now employs our fullest energies and
resources. America understands that this Nigerian problem is not
unique.
“Thirdly, because America is a federation of 50 proud and different
states, we appreciate the problems implicit in Nigeriaʼs new federal
vs. states relationships.
“Our countries are large and have great economic potential. More
importantly, both have great human talent. The extent to which we,
your nation and mine, successfully harness the tremendous human
resources with which we are both endowed may be the measure by which
we are judged.
“Finally, permit me to reiterate for the record that the Government
of the United States—repeated attempts by counterpropagandists to
the contrary—has made it clear that it supports the concept of “one
Nigeria.” My government is concerned about the innocent victims of
both sides of the war, but let no one confuse this concern with our
clear policy of support for the “one Nigeria” on which the Federal
Military Government and the Organisation of African Unity
insist.
“We understand the concern of the Ibo people for protection and
freedom of movement within the country. The Federal Military
Governmentʼs understanding of the concern is reflected clearly in
the far-reaching security guarantees it has offered.
“Mrs. Trueheart and I are
genuinely pleased to be here. We solicit your understanding as we
embark on our first days in a new country.” End text.
[Page 4]
Tab B
Telegram 8484 From the Embassy in Nigeria to the Department of
State
Lagos, September 21, 1969,
1125Z
For Newsom from Brubeck and Charge. Dept pass Addis for Brubeck.
1. On basis our extensive discussions here, including two hours with
General Gowon, believe following may be helpful in considering how
to launch Amb Trueheart here
in most auspicious climate.
2. In spite of their disappointment about cautious and limited
character of our support, resentment of pressures on them on relief
issues (they feel we make repeated demands on them while Biafran
intransigence is unchallenged) FMG
still remarkably well disposed toward U.S. They have natural
orientation to and admiration for U.S. and, in present glow of
satisfaction over their handling of ICRC problem, are particularly well disposed. At same
time, they feel they are given too little credit and Biafrans too
little blame in such cases as ICRC
lift. They wish also that U.S. strong humanitarian statements on
relief were more often balanced by clear statements of support for
qte one Nigeria unqte and negotiations to that end, to make clear
our relief interests do not put in question our political position.
What they really want from us is public vote of confidence in them
and the future of Nigeria. Finally, it is clear Gen Gowon feels
considerable warmth for President and would like to feel real
support exists.
3. Believe statements for Trueheart should reflect the
[Page 5]
above. Specifically, most valuable
would be Presidential letter for him to present conveying our
admiration (not appreciation) for Gowon handling of ICRC negotiations as Gowonʼs own
genuine concern and that of his govt. for their starving countrymen.
Should also restate clearly our support for reconciliation in
Nigeria (along lines UNSec July 17th statement which FMG welcomed.
4. Believe statement by Trueheart when presenting credentials should be
along same lines with perhaps some expression re confidence in
future of Nigerian economy and Nigeriaʼs important leadership role
in Africa.
5. Emb transmitting septel suggest text arrival statement.
