55. Memorandum NSC–U/DM–39A from the from the Chairman of the
National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Rush) to President Nixon1
2
Washington, April 26, 1974
Subject:
-
U.S. Policy on Antarctic Mineral
Resources
In early 1973, you directed that a review of United States policy on
Antarctic mineral resources be undertaken. A policy decision is needed
now to enable us to begin mustering support for the U.S. position prior to a meeting of
Antarctic Treaty nations in April 1975.
Since 1961, the Antarctic Treaty has provided a satisfactory framework
for activity in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty does not specifically
address mineral exploitation, but it is clear that this is a permitted
peaceful use. It is practically certain that there are mineral deposits
in Antarctica, but their extent is unknown.
There are at present no known mineral resources that can be extracted
economically in Antarctica and, with the possible exception of
petroleum, no mineral exploitation appears feasible in the foreseeable
future. There are also at present no known commercially-oriented
mineralogy activities or planning by any Treaty or non-Treaty
nation.
However, the subject of mineral resource exploration and exploitation was
actively discussed at the 1972 Consultative Meeting of the Treaty
parties and the issue will be on the agenda of the 1975 Consultative
Meeting.
Several policy options regarding commercial exploration for and
exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources have been examined in this
review, including:
- —adopting a unilateral approach without any agreement with
other countries in accordance with our legal right to engage in
peaceful uses of Antarctica;
- —entering into agreements with states claiming Antarctic
territory;
- —seeking an internationally agreed approach;
- —keeping options open by adopting no policy at this
time;
- —supporting a limited moratorium on mineral resources
activity.
Although some contentious issues would surely arise in the process of seeking an internationally agreed approach,
the Under Secretaries Committee, with the exception noted below,
believes this option would provide the U.S. with the best chance of gaining access to Antarctic
resources, of reducing the possibility of significant international
discord on this subject, and of protecting our security, political,
scientific and conservation interests in Antarctica.
Except for the Federal Energy Office, the members of the Under
Secretaries Committee recommend that you (1) authorize consultation with
the Treaty parties and possibly others to gain acceptance of the concept
that there should be an internationally agreed approach to the
commercial exploration for and exploitation of Antarctic mineral
resources, and (2) approve the policy statement attached to this
Memorandum. Further steps in the development of an international
approach will depend upon additional study within the U.S. Government, based in part upon the
consultations, which study gill be forwarded for your decision.
An Executive Summary, three memoranda setting forth the Federal Energy
Office position and a summary of agency inputs to the review are
attached.
[Page 3]
Attachment
U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTIC MINERAL
RESOURCES
Contents
- 1.
- Proposed U.S. Policy on
Antarctic Mineral Resources
- 2.
- Executive Summary
- 3.
- Scenario
- 4.
- Federal Energy Office Comments
- 5.
- Summary of Antarctic Mineral Resources Study
[Page 4]
Proposed U.S.
Policy on Antarctic Mineral Resources
- 1.
-
It is the objective of the United States
- —To ensure that, if undertaken, commercial
exploration and exploitation in Antarctica are
carried out in a manner that does not disrupt the
implementation of the Antarctic Treaty as long as it
is in effect, and does not become a cause for
significant international discord.
- —To ensure that any exploitation of Antarctic
mineral resources is compatible with environmental
considerations and with United States obligations
under the Antarctic Treaty.
- —To gain acceptance of the concept that there
should be an internationally agreed approach for any
commercial exploration and exploitation of Antarctic
mineral resources, which should at the same time (a)
permit free access by the U.S. and other nations for exploitation
purposes to any part of the Antarctic Treaty area
except those areas specifically designated for other
uses, (b) be without prejudice to and appropriately
compatible with United States law of the sea
interests, (c) provide for the protection of the
Antarctic environment, and (d) preserve the rights
under the Antarctic Treaty of scientific
research.
- 2.
- During the time that the United States is seeking an
international approach, the United States will oppose actions by
any nation with the purpose of commercial exploration and
exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources. At the sane time,
however, the United States will continue as feasible within the
present scientific program to determine the mineral resource
potential of Antarctica more accurately. (This position will
need to be reevaluated periodically in light of the progress of
any negotiations, actions by other countries, and continuing
economic and technological assessments of United States and
foreign capabilities to be provided by a subcommittee of the
Under Secretaries Committee.)
- 3.
- The United States will continue to maintain and be prepared to
augment as appropriate an active and influential presence in
Antarctica in keeping with its present and future scientific,
economic (including resource potential), political and security
interests in Antarctica.
[Page 6]
Executive Summary
Mineral resources exploration and exploitation in Antarctica became
an issue at the November 1972 Consultative Meeting of the parties to
the Antarctic Treaty. There was considerable pressure by several
countries for at least a limited moratorium on any mineral resource
exploration and exploitation activities in Antarctica. The U.S. urged and it was agreed that the
subject should be examined further and included on the agenda of the
1975 Consultative Meeting, for which preparations will begin later
this year. The subject is expected to become an even more active and
possibly contentious issue.
The Under Secretaries Committee review, has taken into account, as
directed by the President, U.S.
obligations under the Antarctic Treaty; pertinent technical,
economic, commercial, legal and political considerations; and
potential problems associated with resource development in the
Antarctic.
Discussions and Options
Since 1961, the Antarctic Treaty has provided a satisfactory
framework for all activity in Antarctica, defined as that area lying
south of 60 degrees South Latitude, and preserves the rights of
states under international law with regard to
[Page 7]
the high seas in this area. Seventeen
countries are party to this Treaty.*
Seven Parties claim sovereignty over Antarctic territory—Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United
Kingdom. Certain portions of Antarctic territory are unclaimed. Most
non-claimant parties, including the U.S. and the USSR, do
not recognize any claims and consider Antarctica as terra nullius.
The Antarctic Treaty does not specifically address mineral
exploitation, but it is clear that this is a permitted peaceful use.
There are at present no known mineral resources that can be
extracted economically in Antarctica and, with the possible
exception of petroleum, no mineral exploitation appears feasible in
the foreseeable future. These assessments could change in the next
few years—depending, for example, on developments in the world
energy situation—but no significant changes are expected in that
period. In any event, future economical exploitation in Antarctica
would require significant advances in mining techniques, petroleum
extraction technology, and transportation techniques.
[Page 8]
There are also at present no known commercially-oriented
mineralogical activities or planning by any Treaty or non-Treaty
nation. Although some claimant states have expressed interest in or
concern about the possibility of exploitation within their
territorial claims, claimant states generally have been willing to
withhold any unilateral action on issuing licenses for commercial
exploration until the Treaty parties have further considered agreed
procedures for such activities.
The United States has consistently provided leadership in Antarctic
affairs ever since the negotiation of the Treaty in 1959. The
conclusions and recommendations of this review have taken into
account this leadership role and the following U.S. policy objectives in the Antarctic
as announced by the President on October 13, 1970:
- 1.
- “To maintain the Antarctic Treaty and ensure that this
continent will continue to be used only for peaceful
purposes and shall not become an area or object of
international discord;
- 2.
- “To foster cooperative scientific research for the
solution of world-wide and regional problems, including
environmental monitoring and prediction and assessment of
resources;
- 3.
- “To protect the Antarctic environment and develop
appropriate measures to ensure the equitable and wise use of
living and non-living resources.”
[Page 9]
Several options regarding U.S. policy
toward Antarctic mineral resources have been examined in the Under
Secretaries Committee review. These include:
- —Adopt a policy of unilateral exploration and exploitation
of Antarctic resources if and when it were deemed desirable
without depending on any negotiations or agreement with
other countries and in accordance with our legal right to
engage in peaceful uses of Antarctica.
- —Adopt a policy of entering into bilateral or multilateral
agreements with claimant states, if and when it were deemed
desirable, to satisfy a particular claimant’s concerns
without depending on broader negotiations or agreement for
resource exploitation.
- —Seek an internationally agreed approach to the
exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources
which is consistent with our objectives and our obligations
under the Antarctic Treaty and which provides a basis for
U.S. access to Antarctic
resources. (An agreed formal mechanism, regime, or
arrangement or less formal understanding need not
necessarily, however, be within the framework of the
Antarctic Treaty.)
- —Adopt no policy now on Antarctic mineral resources, in
order to keep open the possibility of any of the above
options, and oppose any attempts by other countries to
establish either a moratorium or agreed international
procedures.
- —Support a moratorium on exploration and exploitation of
Antarctic mineral resources to last until the next Treaty
Consultative Meeting in 1977.
All of the above alternatives, with the exception of seeking an
internationally agreed approach, present serious drawbacks and their
effectiveness in enabling the U.S.
someday to exploit Antarctic mineral resources is subject to serious
doubt.
- —Unilateral U.S. commercial
exploration and exploitation or bilateral or multilateral
arrangements, which did not include all interested Antarctic
Treaty Parties, would create discord among the Parties, lead to
accusations that we were in violation of the Treaty, and prompt
claimant states to reassert their sovereign claims over
Antarctic territories and surrounding high seas. Such reactions
could result in serious disruption of the Antarctic Treaty which
has and continues to serve our political, security, and
scientific objectives in this part of the world.
- —Taking no policy decision now would seriously weaken our
leadership role in Antarctic affairs and our ability to assert
effectively an interest in potential Antarctic mineral
resources.
- —A limited moratorium would likely create momentum for
indefinite continuation of a moratorium on exploitation activity
and thereby exclude the Antarctic from possible United States
use.
[Page 11]
On the other hand, it is recognized that the remaining alternative of
seeking an internationally agreed approach might result in very protracted negotiations and delay
timely access to Antarctic mineral resources, when that becomes
feasible and desirable, and that some contentious issues would
surely arise in the process of future negotiations. Our proposed
policy would contemplate continued review to avoid any disadvantage
to the United States arising out of possibly protracted
negotiations.
On the positive side, however, in seeking an internationally agreed
approach the U.S. would stand the
best chance of gaining ready access (alone or in cooperative
ventures with others) to the potential Antarctic resources, of
reducing the possibility of significant international discord on
this issue, and of protecting our security, political, scientific,
and conservation interests in Antarctica.
[Page 12]
Scenario
In order to muster support for acceptance of the concept of an
internationally agreed solution, the United States should undertake
to consult in a timely manner with those Treaty Parties who are
known to be favorably disposed to some international solution.
Discussion should be exploratory in nature, and the U.S. should not give any indication of
finding any specific international approach or attribute thereof
more acceptable than any other. Informal discussions preparatory to
consideration of the subject at the Eighth Consultative Meeting in
Oslo in April 1975 should be confined to attaining acceptance of the
concept that there should be an international approach to
exploration for and exploitation of mineral resources in
Antarctica.
