34. Memorandum of Conversation1 2
SUBJECT:
- On Briefing the Secretary by LOS Delegation Team Leaders
PARTICIPANTS:
- The Secretary
- Deputy Under Secretary Carlyle E. Maw
- Winston Lord, S/P
- Ambassador T. Vincent Learson, S/AL
- Bernard H. Oxman, L/OES
- Admiral Minter, Department of State Consultant
- Leigh Ratiner, Department of the Interior
- Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Department of State, Consultant
- Terry Leitzell, L/OES (Notetaker)
- Steve Burton, L/OES
Ambassador Learson: Mr. Secretary, we want to use this opportunity for our committee representatives to brief you on their problems.
The Secretary: I want to stress the extreme importance of concluding a treaty compatible with our interests. A world without a Law of the Sea Treaty would be chaotic and would clearly undermine our interests in freedom of navigation and in deep seabed mining. Our mining companies will not go out and mine under an unsettled legal regime. I want to get a sense of the problems and then come back in two or three weeks to negotiate.
Mr. Ratiner: In Committee I our main objective has been to protect the revised text. Secondly, we are trying to create a climate to negotiate unfinished items such as voting and the composition of the Council. Our major difficulty is that the Group of 77 is being dominated by extremists.
[Page 2]The Secretary: What voting system are we supporting?
Mr. Ratiner: We and Treasury have agreed on a proposal based on weighted voting.
The Secretary: Is it saleable?
Mr. Ratiner: Only for critical decisions on serious economic issues. Our main problem is getting the moderates in the Group of 77 to assert themselves in the face of opposition from Algeria, India and Mexico. Our tactics are to reward the moderates and fight the extremists.
The Secretary: How are you rewarding the moderates?
Mr. Ratiner: Mostly through optics. We make public compliments on their proposals and work with them privately. The Group of 77 generally wants to deal with the U.S. and knows that they must do so to get a treaty. We must persuade the moderates to support us.
The Secretary: How?
Mr. Ratiner: We are reminding the moderates such as Peru and Brazil that they have to support the revised text that we negotiated. They are beginning to help by preventing Group of 77 consensus. If we could isolate the extremists then we could establish a small negotiating group in about a week. That group can begin by confirming that the issues negotiated in the last session, like the parallel system, are settled. We are trying to focus the negotiation on methods for making the Enterprise work. Then we could introduce our access amendments in a small group.
The Secretary: But conditions are not yet favorable for that?
Mr. Ratiner But it may be coming. The Group of 77 refused extremist proposals yesterday for Article 2. Mexico has been the major problem.
The Secretary: Why?
Mr. Ratiner: We are not sure. It may be Group 77 politics, or their desire to promote Echeverria’s candidacy for Secretary-General, or they may want to split off Committee II and III.
[Page 3]Winston Lord: Do they want a 200 mile economic zone?
Mr. Ratiner: They want international confirmation of the economic zone in their new legislation.
The Secretary: I will write to Echeverria.
Mr. Ratiner: Although Mexico moderated its position somewhat yesterday, we should express disappointment that they joined the secret Brazil Group and then attacked its work product. We should find out if Mexico has substantive reasons for their deep seabed position. We feel they should be willing to accept the banking system which you proposed last April.
The Secretary: After you accepted it on March 20! Why does Brazil benefit from the banking system?
Mr. Ratiner: They have had contacts with France and Iran to establish joint ventures.
The Secretary: Under the Enterprise?
Mr. Ratiner: No, and Mexico wants the Enterprise to get all of the banked sites and does not want them going to developing countries.
The Secretary: Other countries can get banked sites?
Mr. Ratiner: Developing countries can if the Enterprise refuses them. Mexico may feel that the Enterprise will locate processing plants in Mexico because of the closeness of prime mining sites in the Pacific.
The Secretary: What’s the advantage for Brazil in getting a banked site?
Mr. Ratiner: Free prospecting. India is a different problem. They were left out of the Brazil Group. Dr. Jagota has been very influential in the negotiations since 1969. He feels the Latin Americans sold out Third World interests to protect their copper interests in the revised text. Jagota used to be a moderate even during the last session, but now he has become very extreme in order to try to build up new parameters for negotiation to replace the revised text. In Delhi he gave us his proposal on a staggered access system which would require that the Enterprise get going on a contract before any private contracts could be let. Eventually under his proposal the Enterprise would do all exploitation. That would be after an initial 20 year period.
[Page 4]The Secretary: There would be no more private sites after 20 years?
Mr. Ratiner: That’s right. Also, Jagota was elected co-chairman of the working group over our opposition. We don’t know how he’s going to act as the chairman since the Group of 77 has been meeting on Committee I and has preempted the working group.
The Secretary: What should my approach be? What shall I say to him?
Mr. Ratiner: The best tactic is to encourage him to use his chairmanship for purposes of moderation.
The Secretary: That’s nonsense. It won’t work since we know he wants to polarize the Committee.
Mr. Ratiner: But we want to change his mind.
The Secretary: But with all due respect, what’s the point of asking?
Mr. Ratiner: We have nothing stronger.
Amb. Learson: Could the Secretary mention his interest in the Enterprise?
Mr. Ratiner: No, it’s too soon for that. Jagota and the Committee are not ready to hear ideas. We have to wait and give them ideas later when the Group of 77 is in a better mood.
The Secretary: I’ll make a judgment later.
Mr. Lord: Can the Secretary refer to the Brazil group?
Mr. Ratiner: No, except for Mexico. Kenya was also a member but their representative was Adede and the head of delegation Mjenga is prepared to repudiate their work.
The Secretary: If I go directly to Kenyatta, then the Kenyans’ delegation will get instructions. Kenyatta will make decisions based on our foreign relations with Kenya.
Mr. Ratiner: We want Kenya to be in the negotiating group and to be moderate. We would like it very much if Kenya were willing to be the black African in Committee I who was taking moderate stands.
[Page 5]Mr. Oxman: Another problem is that some developing countries feel that we are letting Mexico get away with a great deal and because of our close relations that must be an indication that we don’t really care very much about Committee I issues.
The Secretary: But why do you let Mexico get away with it? Why don’t you slash back at them? In any case, I’ll make a decision later. I don’t want to spend time fighting with second level people.
Mr. Ratiner: In your discussions with Egypt, we need to get them working actively for moderation within the Arab group.
The Secretary: We need to hit Sadat with a concrete proposal, not just a request for moderation. Leaders at that level don’t understand well enough to make decisions on technical issues. We can split the Arabs if Sadat knows what we want. In higher level discussions like this, we must forget tactics and make substantive proposals. I can get Sadat to support us in that respect, and he will split from Algeria if we give him a concrete proposal. Vin, I should send letters to Echeverria, Garcia-Robles, and Sadat with country proposals.
Ambassador Learson: We should probably go on with Committee II.
Ambassador Clingan: The only real problem we have that’s a major problem for the United States is the high seas status of the economic zone. The text must be changed on this issue.
The Secretary: Can we drop all references to high seas but obtain what we want in substance?
Ambassador Clingan: Yes.
The Secretary: I want to understand this. We can’t get everything. Could the Navy live with that kind of solution?
Adm. Minter: Yes, I think so, but you have to realize I don’t represent DOD. This is essentially a proposal put forward by Australia.
Ambassador Clingan: There is another problem linked to this which relates to the difficulties raised by the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states. They’re arguing for access to the sea, access to living resources, and revenue sharing from the continental margin.
[Page 6]The Secretary: Explain this broad margin problem.
Ambassador Clingan: About a dozen States in the conference want rights on the continental margin for mineral purposes to the outer edge of the continental margin which is several hundred miles at sea in some places. The group includes Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Norway, the UK, Ireland, Argentina, India and a few others.
The Secretary: On the nickel problem in Committee I, is Canada going to accept the six percent production limitation? MacEachen told me they would not. Is Canada presently satisfied with the outer margin solution? I really don’t expect them to accept the six percent.
Mr. Ratiner: They are isolated on that issue.
Ambassador Clingan: There are several groups operating that are important in Committee II. There’s a group of coastal states, a group of broad margin states, the Group of Five, and the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged group. Of the countries you are seeing today, India, Mexico, and Kenya are the most important ones in Committee II.
The Secretary: What does India want?
Ambassador Clingan: On the high seas status of the economic zone, they’re against us.
The Secretary: What about the margin?
Ambassador Clingan: They’re probably satisfied.
The Secretary: What happens to Bangladesh on this?
Mr. Oxman: They would have to split the margin in the Bay of Bengal with India.
The Secretary: Would there be a median line?
Ambassador Clingan: That’s not clear.
The Secretary: Will Bangladesh lose on this?
Mr. Oxman: It’s essentially a bilateral problem.
Ambassador Clingan: Another problem is that Aguilar, the Second Committee chairman, is coastally oriented.
[Page 7]The Secretary: What does that mean?
Ambassador Clingan: He is opposing us on the high seas status of the economic zone.
The Secretary: Can we possibly agree?
Ambassador Clingan: We cannot accept making the economic zone the functional equivalent of the territorial sea.
The Secretary: Please write up what we must have in each committee. I’m worried about where we’re going and want to know what our final positions must be.
Ambassador Clingan: I should note that we may be into serious negotiations on the economic zone status question next week since some of the moderates are already coming to us with specific proposals.
Ambassador Learson: Let’s go on to Committee III.
Mr. Leitzell: The major problem in Committee III is the general consent regime for marine scientific research. In fact and in practice, the present text would allow the coastal States to stop almost any scientific research. In structure the text has a general consent regime but then qualifies it with certain criteria for denying consent. The problem is that the criteria are very broad and vague and that the general consent part of the article would probably be used more in practice than the qualifications. Our main tactical problem is the Soviet Union which supported us in the past but deserted us in the last session. Their reasons are twofold. They’re more interested in controlling scientific research off their own coast than we are and they’re also willing to do clandestine research. We do a great deal of scientific research off the coasts of other countries and they do considerably less. Also, they have apparently decided to make this concession to the developing countries in hopes of protecting themselves on other issues and also to protect Chairman Yankov. Chairman Yankov, who’s from Bulgaria, was severely attacked by the developing countries after he wrote his first text a year ago and the Soviets needed to recover his credibility. The tactical problem is that in addition to the Soviet Union most of the developing countries have opposed us all along and many of our former allies in Europe seem to think the issue is lost and they’re falling off of it.
[Page 8]The Secretary: How do we make progress on this one?
Mr. Leitzell: We must get the Soviet Union to either support us or at least acquiesce in our movements. I think our objectives are acceptable to them in a substantive sense. Some of the developing countries are beginning to realize that the issue is important to us and to look for solutions. Hopefully, some of them will be able to take a moderate position.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820121–0558. Secret; Nodis. The “Brazil Group” or “Secret Brazil Group” included Brazil, Chile, France, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, the United States, and, after mid–1976, Jamaica. The group met privately to negotiate compromises when impasses arose in LOS negotiations, and then quietly used UNCLOS III officers or sympathetic delegations to introduce conciliatory language into the public debate.↩
- Kissinger discussed negotiating strategy with team leaders of the U.S. delegation to the August–September 1976 (New York) UNCLOS III session.↩