189. Minutes of the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Review Task Force1 2
SUBJECT:
- DOMESTIC COUNCIL DRUG REVIEW TASK FORCE MINUTES OF THE FEBRUARY 3, 1976 MEETING
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Cooke - Defense
- Mr. Bensinger -DEA
- Mr. Chapman - INS Ambassador Vance State
- Mr. Dow - FAA
- Admiral Perry - Coast Guard
- Mr. Acree - Customs
- Ms. Wagner - Justice Mr. Featherstone Treasury
- Mr. Horan - NSC
- Mr. Johnson - OMB/FDM
- Mr. Purcell - OMB/EG
- Mr. Smith - DEA
- Mr. Hann - Customs Special Assistant for Coordination CIA of Foreign Narcotics Information
The sixth meeting of the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force was called to order by Mr. Parsons at 3:10 p.m.
Mr. Parsons introduced Peter Bensinger, who had replaced Hank Dogin as Administrator of DEA, Ambassador Vance and Mr. Dow, both of whom had been represented by subordinates at the last meeting.
Mr. Parsons advised the task force to consider the material to be discussed in this meeting as preliminary. He said that the work group had experienced difficulty in finding conclusive data on the flow of drugs from Mexico; the charts to be discussed, therefore, represented only partial data. He emphasized the need to develop a more solid data base before making recommendations to the President, because that data base would significantly influence the recommendations.
Mr. Acree agreed with the importance of developing a better data base on which to make decisions, and suggested [Page 2] that all members of the task force help focus Congressional attention on this important requirement, in addition to simple arrest and seizure statistics. Mr. Bensinger said that he recognized DEA’s responsibility to develop strategic intelligence, for use by all drug program managers and said that it was one of his highest priorities.
Mr. Johnson summarized the approximate importance of drugs from Mexico as follows:
| Estimates annual quantity | Estimated % of U.S. | |
| - Heroin | 5 to 6 tons | 80–90% |
| - Marihuana | 2,000 tons | 70–80% |
| - Cocaine (transitted) | 4 to 5 tons | 35–40% |
| - Dangerous Drugs | 16 million dosage units | 35–40% |
Mr. Johnson outlined the work group’s preliminary analysis of the program within Mexico, highlighting the rapid buildup of U.S. aid and Mexican participation in the eradication campaign over the past several years. He said that the work group was evaluating several areas for improving the program within Mexico:
- - The photographic detection of growing areas and clandestine airfields.
- - Improved logistics management.
- - Interdiction program within Mexico.
- - Diplomatic initiatives to broaden Mexican participation (he said that in this connection, the high-level commission recently established by President Echeverria is a positive event).
- - Expanded use of the joint prosecutions.
Ambassador Vance said that improving logistics management was probably the key to making the eradication campaign more effective and pointed out that we were providing assistance to the Mexican government in this area. He pointed out that we were approaching a situation in which there were too many Americans active in the campaign and indicated that it would be difficult to send even more advisers down to work on this problem. Mr. Bensinger said that we should be sure to tap the [Page 3] expertise available in the Department of Defense in strengthening logistics management of the eradication program. (Paragraph SECRET)
Mr. Johnson discussed several constraints which the work group believes set an upper limit on the potential of the program within Mexico. They are:
- - Extensive growing region and rugged terrain.
- - The lack of permanent Federal government presence in the growing regions.
- - Poor economic prospects for compasinos in the near and mid-term future.
- - Widespread corruption. (Paragraph SECRET)
Ambassador Vance cautioned that these topics would be very embarrassing if leaked, and urged the group to treat this discussion as extremely sensitive. He suggested that “political acceptability of U.S. advice” was another important constraint. The CIA representative said that the fragmented nature of the information flowing from Mexico was another important constraint. Mr. Johnson agreed with both points, and reiterated his belief that one of the most important opportunities to improve our intelligence base was to more fully utilize information available from foreign service officers, DEA agents, and others in addition to the more traditional intelligence collectors. (Paragraph SECRET)
Mr. Johnson explained the work group’s rationale for viewing the specific method drugs enter the country as a critical factor in allocating resources and setting priorities among different improvement opportunities, and summarized the work group’s highly preliminary evaluation of those data which are available. The work group’s preliminary evaluation indicates that:
- - A vast majority of heroin enters through ports of entry, with most of that hidden in ground vehicles (automobiles, trucks, campers, vans).
- - The vast majority of cocaine enters through ports of entry, most aboard scheduled airlines concealed in luggage or cargo.
- - Most marihuana enters between ports of entry, with ground vehicles accounting for the largest share, but with significant amounts also entering by boat and illegal air flights.
Several members of the task force questioned the source of these assumptions, and Mr. Johnson explained that they were based on: (1) an analysis of Customs seizure data; (2) an analysis of specific DEA cases which attempted to trace drugs back to the border; and (3) the combined judgment of the work group.
Mr. Johnson outlined the alternatives being evaluated by the work group for improving our program in four areas: (1) at border ports of entry and airports; (2) land smuggling between ports of entry; (3) air smuggling; and (4) boat smuggling. In addition, he outlined alternatives being looked at which cut across all aspects of the problem and re-emphasized the importance of improving “post-arrest immobilization; as stressed in the white paper.
The CIA representative asked if the work group was perhaps misdirecting its efforts by concentrating on the border in light of the difficulty of detecting drugs amid the enormous volume of vehicles and persons crossing the border. Mr. Parsons acknowledged the difficulty of interdicting at the border, and said that the work group was attempting to develop recommendations dealing with all three parts of the system: within Mexico, at the border, and within the interior United States. Mr. Johnson said that the work group was particularly impressed by the inter-relationship of these three aspects, and was looking for ways to improve each so that the overall effort would be optimized.
In discussing the various improvements in “post-arrest immobilization”, Mr. Acree emphasized the need to make improvements in post-arrest debriefings. Mr. Johnson agreed and reminded the group that the white paper had recommended developing a better debriefing form or procedure to insure that information was gathered for all possible users.
Ambassador Vance expressed his concern about the use of seemingly precise statistics in areas where we had, at best, rough estimates. He pointed out that these overly precise statements (such as: “Mexico produces 5.7 tons of heroin”) caused severe problems overseas. Mr. Parsons agreed that the caution was a good one, and said that the work group would always attempt to use ranges and explanations where necessary.
[Page 5]Mr. Acree said that he wanted to be sure that the widespread misinterpretation of the white paper’s recommendations concerning marihuana be set straight. He said that the white paper had called for continued enforcement operations against major smugglers of large quantities of marihuana and reiterated his organization’s resolve to carry out that recommendation.
Mr. Parsons thanked the members of the task force for their participation and for that of various members of their organizations. He said that the President was extremely interested in the progress of the group, and has asked Jim Cannon for frequent progress reports. He said that the President had requested that Jim Cannon go to the Southwest border on a fact-finding mission, and announced that he (Mr. Parsons), Jim Cannon, Ed Johnson, Mike Acree, and Dan Casey (of DEA) would be leaving that evening.
The meeting was adjourned by Mr. Parsons at 4:45 p.m.