135. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence Bush to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn)1 2
Dear Jim:
You have received the joint NASA/DoD review, of the Space Shuttle Program, in which you invited CFI participation by your letter of 1 July 1976. The operational requirements of the Intelligence Community’s satellite collection programs have been represented by the National Reconnaissance Office. In addition, we have had a representative on the Study’s Steering Committee. I feel confident that the views and needs of the Intelligence Community have been incorporated into the study.
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with our rationale for the positions which we have supported within the study. With respect to the number of Orbiter vehicles required, we believe that a fleet size of five is appropriate for the projected utilization rate. When one considers attrition, which could at least temporarily reduce Orbiter availability, the initial adequacy of fleet size has a significant bearing on our ability to commit the National programs to the Shuttle launch vehicle with confidence.
A number of intelligence satellite programs require operations from polar orbit. Polar orbits for payloads of the size required for intelligence purposes cannot be achieved from Kennedy Space Center with the restrictions on high inclination launches necessary to maintain booster/tankage impact in the broad ocean areas. Consequently, the Intelligence Community must be able to depend on launches from Vandenberg, either by Shuttle, or by the expensive alternative of conventional boosters.
Our estimates of the cost of transitioning the ongoing intelligence satellite-programs to the Shuttle cause us some concern because they are quite high. We are addressing-this problem in two ways: (a) the establishment of a joint. NASA/NRO Payload Accommodations Working Group, which has allowed direct examination at the engineering level of many of the technical problems contributing to high transition costs for the existing program; (b) the DNRO has programmed Shuttle transition to coincide with already planned major system upgrades in as many instances as possible, alleviating the requirement to change our existing satellite designs solely to accommodate them to the Shuttle.
[Page 2]While these efforts have been successful in reducing our estimates of transition costs substantially, there will be additional costs associated with providing some number of conventional boosters as a backup during the Shuttle transition period. Air Force and NRO are working together to determine the minimum number of backup launch vehicles required. The total cost of this backup launch capability is not clear at this time, but it can be expected that it would at least partially offset the reductions achieved thus far in payload transition costs.
One of the major concerns that we in the Intelligence Community have had about the Shuttle as our sole launch capability centers on the question of vulnerability/survivability, and the unknown complicating factors associated with having a manned launch vehicle. These concerns have been discussed with NASA. In order to address these, NASA currently has under study both an unmanned, preprogrammed (fly-by-wire) launch mode for the Shuttle, and a short duration mission which does not overfly the Soviet Union, The development of these capabilities would go a long way toward alleviating our apprehensions in this area.
Another area of major concern to us is security. Our intelligence satellite programs are, critical to national security. These programs have operated for over a decade within a very tight and successful security system. NASA, on the other hand, has operated in a completely open environment since its inception. How these disparate operating philosophies are to be reconciled has yet to be worked out. We have encountered no lack of willingness on either side to confront this problem, and we have studies presently underway in the area of mission control center security and payload security. Satisfactory resolution of this complex issue remains of high priority to the Community.
For the future, after the transition period, it is clear that the Shuttle will offer the Intelligence Community a substantial opportunity to increase its satellite collection capabilities. We are not beyond the concept stage in development of intelligence payloads optimized for the Shuttle at this time. However, several areas appear very promising, including:
- - System Reusability. The possibility of recovering and refurbishing satellites for reuse could achieve significant savings, both from the standpoint of reducing the numbers of satellites necessary to procure, and the elimination of expensive redundancy now incorporated to assure long orbital lifetimes.
- - Store-on-Orbit. The Shuttle could place spares for certain classes of high value spacecraft on orbit to protect against gaps in coverage caused by untimely failure or hostile action. Some cost savings could be achieved by using the store-on-orbit concept to regularize launch schedules to coincide with procurement schedules.
- - Experiments. The Shuttle will provide greater, flexibility to conduct low-cost on-orbit experiments with new system concepts. Our current capability is limited to low orbit, and constrained in weight and power.
- - Erection of large structures in near-earth orbit. [text not declassified]
- - [text not declassified]
Current projections for cost of Shuttle launch are considerably below the cost of conventional boosters. While it will be some time before the costs to the NFIP of transition to the Shuttle are amortized, the savings in launch costs, if current projections hold, are attractive. We hope that these costs will not escalate.
In summary, we feel that the Shuttle Program will provide a significant increase in capability to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. To achieve this, the Shuttle Program must maintain an adequate launcher and facilities capability, and keep its user costs close to current projection. Satisfactory solutions to the problems of vulnerability and security must be mutually worked out between NASA and the Intelligence Community. The costs of transition to the NFIP are not insubstantial, but will, we feel, prove to be well spent in the long term.
Respectfully,
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79M00467A, Executive Registry Files (OPI 10), Space Policy Interface 64 010176–311276. Top Secret; Codeword.↩
- Bush discussed the need for continued access to expendable launch vehicles after the Space Shuttle became operational, and of the opportunities the Shuttle presented to enhance U.S. space-based intelligence collection capabilities.↩