122. Memorandum From David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1 2

SUBJECT:

  • John Eger’s Views on Aerosat

You will recall that John Eger was absent from the January 14 meeting on Aerosat. He has now provided you in writing with his views on this issue (Tab B).

His expressed concern is directed almost entirely to the question of whether Aerosat and INMARSAT should be converged into one system. He notes that he had recommended to the Secretary of State that the INMARSAT negotiations not be concluded until a joint system was considered (Tab C). He also urges that the U.S. commitment to Aerosat be coupled with a recommendation that future joint system planning be considered by all parties at the earliest opportunity.

Inasmuch as Aerosat and INMARSAT, at this stage, are different in their objectives, technical configurations, financing, and international institutional arrangements, it was agreed unanimously at your meeting that it was impractical to consider joining the two systems now— although this might be a reasonable long range objective.

You may simply want to take note of Eger’s message and file it. On the other hand, since he is giving State quite a bit of trouble and, according to his memorandum, is discussing this issue with DOT’s Appropriation Subcommittee Chairman (Representative McFall), it might be advisable to send him a “knock-it-off” note so that he doesn’t foul up Aerosat. Such a communication is at Tab A, including cc’s to the same people w o received copies of Eger’s memorandum to you.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you deem it appropriate, that you sign the memorandum to John Eger at Tab A.

[Page 2]

Tab A
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Acting Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (Eger)

SUBJECT:

  • Aerosat

Thank you for the summary of your views on Aerosat provided in your memorandum of January 20.

Your recommendation that separate international aeronautical and maritime satellite systems should be studied for possible convergence into one system was discussed at our meeting on January 14. There was no disagreement with this as a possible longer term objective, however, there was a unanimous view that the current Aerosat program—with its different program objectives, technical configuration, and financial and institutional arrangements—was not amenable to being merged with INMARSAT. Remembering that we spent two years of difficult negotiations in arriving at the Aerosat MOU, and are now well into the program, it seems likely that if we now interjected the issue of merging Aerosat with INMARSAT, the Aerosat cooperation would be ended by the Europeans with some very serious questioning of our credibility and good faith.

Following our meeting of the principals on January 14, the FAA was in a position to make clear the U.S. commitment to the program at the Aerosat Council meeting in Paris. Since we have made this commitment, we should support the program and proceed with the international air traffic control experiment embodied in Aerosat.

Brent Scowcroft
  1. Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files 1974–1977, Box 16, UT 1, 8/1/75–1/20/77. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies of Scowcroft’s letter were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Deputy Secretary of State. Attached but not published at Tab B is a January 20 memorandum from Egers to Scowcroft that advocated a joint administrative system for AEROSAT and INMARSAT. Attached but not published at Tab C is a January 9 memorandum from Egers to Kissinger that registered several objections to concluding AEROSAT and INMARSAT negotiations.
  2. Scowcroft accepted Elliott’s recommendation to send a letter to the Office of Telecommunications Policy to clarify administration policy about participation in AEROSAT.