Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

119. Memorandum From David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹ ²

Washington, December 16, 1975

SUBJECT:

• The GEOS-3 Satellite: Question on Public Release of Certain Data

An SRG meeting is scheduled for December 16 on the question of the disposition of GEOS-3 data. The purposes of the meeting are (1) to ascertain if the issues are adequately drawn in the Under Secretaries Committee study (Tab A), (2) to confirm agency positions contained in the Chairman’s memorandum to the President, and (3) to reach agreement that the decision can be put to the President in memorandum form and does not require airing at an NSC meeting.

GEOS-3 is a NASA scientific satellite, launched in April, which measures the local gravitation anomalies in the ocean areas. This information is of scientific interest, but it also could bear on the future development of a highly accurate submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and could provide some assistance in submarine navigation. DOD intends to use the GEOS-3 data for such purposes. Since, in DOD’s view, these data could be similarly used for Soviet submarines and future SLBMs, DOD has asked that the data be protected when taken in those areas where Soviet subs will operate (the North Atlantic and most of the North Pacific regions).

NASA has indicated its willingness to accommodate these DOD concerns. The Deputy Administrator of NASA wrote to you in March proposing to transfer to DOD the custody of these particular data and indicating DOD’s intention to classify the data and release only small portions to qualified civil researchers (Tab B).

Since this would be the first instance in which any data acquired in space by NASA for its own programs were classified, and because of serious reservations expressed by State, the Under. Secretaries Committee (USC) was directed to conduct a study of this proposal (Tab C).

The GEOS-3 problem contains three main questions:

• —Is the risk to national security created by open release of GEOS-3 data sufficiently great to dictate classification of certain of the data and DOD control of its release?
• —Would this alteration of NASA’s policy of open release of data to domestic and foreign scientists be expected to have any significant national or international repercussions?
• —Should DOD have authority to determine permitted areas of unclassified research by civil agencies?

The USC study indicates the following:

GEOS-3 type data could be useful in improving the guidance equations of inertially-guided SLBMs with accuracies in the neighborhood 0. 1 nautical mile. Today’s Soviet systems are far from that accuracy and there is no intelligence indicating they are working toward a highly-accurate sea-based strategic missile system. The Soviets would have to overcome a large number of severe technical hurdles to achieve such SLBM accuracy, requiring more than 10 years, and major expenditures.

The Soviets do not have a GEOS-3 type satellite in operation but could, in time, develop this type of satellite and tracking capability to acquire the same gravitational information. It is considered likely that were the Soviets to need these data for an advanced SLBM force, they would develop a GEOS type system rather than relying on data acquired from US sources as the basis for operation of one of their prime strategic systems.

GEOS-3 gravitational data could provide some assistance to submarine navigation in certain areas—[but this is a secondary matter and should not be a focus in the SRG.]

Outside of the international scientific community’s concern over being denied access to all of the GEOS-3 data, any prediction of other international reaction is difficult. We have emphasized in the UN Outer Space Committee our open data release policy and our willingness to share benefits coming from our earth observation program. This position has, thus far, successfully contained the problem of LDCs’ concerns that we are secretly gaining valuable economic information about their countries. Whether the change in our data release policy for GEOS-3 will become an issue in the UN circuit is unclear. If it did, it would be untimely since Brazil’s draft treaty to limit acquisition and data dissemination of space data is to be considered next spring.

There are two cases in the space program where a national security screen (but not data classification) has been applied in the past, but without public knowledge:

• —NASA’s earth observation program has been limited to ground resolutions greater than about 50 ft., so that (1) our best resolution capability [less than 1 line not declassified] is not revealed, and (2) other countries would not be irritated by publication of photos showing military or other sensitive facilities.
• —Before public release, the photographs taken from SKYLAB were examined by the CIA to be sure the contents did not reveal sensitive facilities (none were seen and all photos were released).

For the future, an important example of the impact of the proposed classification relates to the operational satellite program being planned by the Department of Commerce (who is also responsible for our weather satellite program) to monitor coastal upwelling and off-shore currents, promising fishing areas, and major ocean storms and sea surface conditions. Certain of these data (similar to those from GEOS-3) will be taken in waters under the jurisdiction of Canada, Central and South America, and other nations, and would require free data exchange. If a classification arrangement like that proposed for GEOS-3 were also applied to these data, it would significantly hinder, if not render unviable, this program.

Agency Views

DOD underscores the fact that GEOS-3 data has military significance, and unless some restriction is placed on the dissemination of the sensitive part of the data, the total product of the GEOS-3 program would be analyzed and reported by scientists to the world geodetic community. Once released, these data cannot be retrieved. DOD believes the arrangement they have developed with NASA is a good compromise between pursuit of scientific goals and the protection of our national security.

DOD has asked to be able to argue its case in an NSC meeting if there were a preliminary decision to disapprove the classification arrangement. I think this clearly is not an appropriate subject for an NSC, and hope that DOD will accept the airing in the SRG as a reasonable opportunity to state and reinforce their viewpoint.

Secretary Schlesinger had written to the President (Tab D) to emphasize the importance he attached to the protection of the GEOS-3 data and also to argue that State’s concerns over international repercussions were vague when compared to the reality of the national security concerns.

NASA takes the position that it cannot validate or comment on the DOD assertion of the military value of the GEOS-3 data, but is willing to transfer custody of that data to DOD and would collaborate with DOD in determining which portions of the data might be subsequently declassified to satisfy scientific requests.

[FYI. You should be aware that the NASA position was set personally by Jim Fletcher, over the objections of most of the rest of the organization which believes this to be a serious encroachment on NASA’s national and international standing and its ability to conduct research. In part, Fletcher’s position is attributed to his need to retain DOD’s support in completing the space shuttle project. Fletcher does not want to jeopardize that support by confronting DOD on the lesser matter of GEOS-3.]

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), one of the principal scientific users of the data, is opposed to classification since it would remove important areas from comprehensive study; can be expected to cause repercussions in the international scientific community to the extent of jeopardizing future international scientific programs utilizing U.S. satellites; and would set a precedent implying more stringent restrictions, imposed by the military, on subsequent civil satellites NOAA is planning for measuring ocean properties.

State regards DOD’s security concerns as unrealistic since the USSR would need to make major technical improvements across-the-board in its SLBMs before GEOS-3 data would become useful. If the Soviets were to make such an effort, the additional effort in obtaining GEOS-3 type data by independent means would be comparatively inconsequential.

State believes that the departure from NASA’s policy of openly disseminating U.S. civil space information could impair NASA’s international credibility (since foreign experimenters are involved in GEOS-3 and because of considerable interest in the results on the part of the international oceanic community); could cloud NASA’s reputation as an open civil activity; and could cast doubt as to the availability of data from future programs. State believes that issues such as those raised by DOD should be weighed before a program is initiated. (NASA, NOAA, and DOD had been planning GEOS-3 for three years; DOD’s concerns were raised shortly before launch, after a full complement of domestic and foreign scientists were already involved.)

Next Steps

The type of problem presented by GEOS-3 will be even more acute in the case of its much more sophisticated successor SEASAT. To address the SEASAT issue early in the satellite’s design phase, the NSC established the Space Policy Committee (as a standing subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee) to consider this and other questions related to the interplay between our civil and military space programs.

The purpose of the SRG is to get DOD to agree that their position on the GEOS question is adequately expressed in the USC report (and Schlesinger’s letter to the President), and that the issue can go forward to the President without requiring consideration in an NSC meeting. Your talking points are structured toward that end.

Program Analysis concurs.

Tab B

Washington, April 30, 1975

GEOS-3 DATA HANDLING

Under the terms of the NASA-DOD agreement, the following procedures are envisaged for handling the GEOS-3 radar altimetry data.

1. NASA will acquire global data on a continuing basis.

2. NASA will pre-process and reformat all data it acquires on a continuing basis, and distribute it according to the agreement.

3. NASA will select the “tracks”, from within the annulus of concern, on an equivalent 5° x 5° basis, for release to its investigators. These data are unclassified, as are all data outside the annulus.

4. NASA will also release without restriction all data from three predetermined areas of exception within the annulus required for specific geological investigations.

5. On a continuing basis, NASA will transfer all original data tapes and all processed data to DOD; NASA will retain copies only of the materials which are released and are unclassified.

6. DOD will protect, by appropriate classification, those data coming in from NASA which have not already been released. NASA will therefore not have classified GEOS-3 data in possession or custody.

7. Requests for data in addition to those already released to investigators will be jointly reviewed by DOD and NASA. As appropriate, the DOD will declassify the pertinent data set and it will be released to the requestor. If it is determined not to be in the national interest to meet a request for additional data, the data are exempt from FOIA because they are classified. Under this procedure, the agencies will have met their legal responsibilities of reviewing requested records and making an individual determination on what can and cannot be released.

8. In addition, the DOD may release by declassification data which it has analyzed and found to have no national security implications prior to any request for such data being received.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 15, SRG Meeting, GEOS–3 Data, December 16, 1975. Secret. Attached but not published at Tab A is an undated NSC Under Secretaries Committee Report of the Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group on Release of GEOS–3 Data. Tab C, attached but not published, circulated Tab A as NSC–U/DM–134, dated May 30. Tab B, the GEOS–3 Data Handling, is published here. Secret; Noforn.
2. Elliott outlined inter-agency disagreements to aid Scowcroft’s preparation for a Senior Review Group meeting concerning public release of certain GEOS–3 data.