Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

326. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 2, 1971, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Berlin
• Pertinent State traffic² has been repeated to you.

Soviets have stonewalled on changing Russian text but have agreed to oral statement by Western Ambassadors and Abrasimov at time of signing that texts are identical in substance and meaning. Rush’s theory in agreeing to this is that an agreed German language text which conforms to the English will avoid later controversy about the Russian/English discrepancies.

Germans, East and West, meanwhile, have resumed session in East Berlin to resolve the numerous divergences in East and West German versions. (You can tell from Berlin’s 1791³ how far apart the texts are and what the East is trying to do with its version.) At Bahr’s request our people told the Soviets that Bonn could not approve signature as long as East Germans maintained their version.

Further complication is that Ambassador Rush felt ill last night and went to hospital where high blood pressure was diagnosed and Ambassador told to go to residence and take medication and rest today. He is doing so and announcement⁴ is being made in Berlin that signature has been postponed probably until tomorrow due to Ambassador’s indisposition.⁵ (In fact, it is of course known in Berlin that there are other reasons as well for postponement.) From talking to Dave Klein I don’t believe there is reason for concern. He will keep us posted.⁶

Compromise on Russian text is no more than that and its effectiveness in preventing later disputes will depend importantly on what happens to German text. Although the French for some reason have become very eager to sign regardless of situation with respect to German text, I think we should hold out signature until this is settled. This apparently is Rush’s intention. There is I think fair chance that the more egregious East German divergences will be overcome by these tactics.⁷ If not, I do think we have a rather serious problem and you may want to consider intervening in another channel.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. IV. Secret. Haig initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it. According to a handwritten note, the memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger in San Clemente.
2. Not further identified.
3. Dated September 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)
4. The text of the announcement reads: “The signature of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin tentatively scheduled for 1300 hours, September 2 has had to be postponed, owing to the indisposition of Ambassador Rush, who has been confined to bed by his physician for the rest of the day.” (Telegram 1795 from Berlin, September 2; ibid.)
5. The President sent the following message to Rush on September 2: “I was very sorry to learn that you are not feeling well and want to assure you personally that you should not consider yourself under any time pressure to resolve the remaining problems leading to the signing of a Berlin Agreement. Your rapid recovery is the only priority matter of concern to me at this time.” (Memorandum from Haig to Eliot, September 2; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. IV) Rush replied on September 3: “Thank you very much for your considerate cablegram for which I am deeply grateful. The flare-up in my blood pressure, the first I have ever had, has subsided, and as a result I was able to sign the Berlin agreement today, along with the Ambassadors of the other three powers. After a stubborn fight, we were able to secure an agreed upon German translation almost entirely along the lines we desired. Thank you again for your invaluable guidance and support throughout these negotiations.” (Telegram 1805 from Berlin, September 3; ibid.)
6. In telegram 1803 from Berlin, September 3, the Mission flashed the following report: “Ambassador’s health has improved so that he can participate in signing today. The FRG and the GDR have agreed on all except for one outstanding point concerning ‘constituent part.’ It seems probable that this will be resolved in the next hour. We have informed Abrasimov that if this next point is resolved we are ready to begin initialing at 12:30 and will proceed to signature of the quadripartite agreement today at 1300, September 3.” (Ibid.)
7. In a telephone conversation that afternoon, Kissinger and Rogers discussed the translation issue. According to a transcript, the exchange was as follows: Rogers: “On the Rush thing, they are having translation problems.” Kissinger: “I think we should hold tough.” R: “We are better off not to rush it. I keep telling Ken. Two days.” K: “That was not our preference.” R: “It would have been better to take another week. Not a major problem.” K: “They are incurable bastards.” R: “They [omission in the source text]interpreted in E. German text and not in the [W. German?] text.” K: “And in the Russian text.” R: “Clever bastards.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)