Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, October 4, 1969, 1720Z.

13055. Subj: Voting Rights for Berlin Deputies—Bahr Trip.

1. FonOff Planning Chief Egon Bahr, a close Brandt adviser, informed us Oct 3 that he was flying to Washington this weekend to confer with administration officials on the possibility of a change in the US position on voting rights for Berlin Deputies in the Bundestag. The trip is obviously planned as a counterpart of Helmut Schmidt’s trip to London on the same mission.

2. As far as can be determined, the issue in these SPD efforts is not the vote for Chancellor but the subsequent legislative majority for an SPD–FDP coalition. The pending SPD–FDP coalition would have only a slim majority, and a fragile one at best. Giving Berlin Deputies the vote would bring a net increment of six additional votes to the new coalition. This would not add much to parliamentary stability even though the small gain involved could be vital for a workable government, as Schmidt and Bahr will doubtless argue, in painting a depressingly accurate picture of the disadvantages of an unstable Germany with a weak government. We are preparing an overall assessment of implications but the following are major ones:

3. As we are all aware, this issue is an intensely partisan one. It is still not yet definitely established that an SPD–FDP government will actually be formed; defection of some FDP Deputies in the vote for Chancellor is still possible before Oct 21. It is clear that if formed, such a government would be unstable and could fall and be replaced by a CDU dominated government within a short time. In such a situation, we would wish to the extent possible to maintain an even handed approach to both major parties even though we will, of course, enter on an effective working relationship with any government formed and will wish to make clear to Brandt that we are fully as willing to work with him as with CDU govts of the past.²

4. The voting status of Berlin Bundestag Deputies is linked intimately with the status of Berlin in the Bundesrat where the CDU has a majority of one vote. (Details in septel.)³ A change in the voting status of the Berlin Deputies in the Bundestag might well entail subsequent SPD pressure for a change in status of Berlin representation in the Bundesrat. In effect this would pose the issue of the status of Berlin as an eleventh Land of the FedRep and raise central issues related to the four-power status of Berlin and to US-Soviet relations.

5. Aside from these aspects, voting status for Berlin Deputies is a probable violation of Article 38 of the Federal Basic Law which provides that Deputies of the Bundestag shall be elected in universal, direct, free and secret election, and could readily be contested as manipulation of the entire German election system. This means that even if the Allies should after reelection agree to a change in status for Berlin Deputies if this were done without CDU agreement, the outcome might be nullified after a messy and divisive constitutional court suit.

6. It is vitally important that we remain in closest step with the British and French on this issue. Schmidt talks in London and the planned Bahr trip to Washington make it appear that there may be a deliberate effort to pick off the Allies singly, and it is essential to preserve Allied unity.

7. Believe these considerations indicate we should be very reserved during discussions with Bahr or other SPD leaders and to the extent possible limit ourselves to listening to his position. There is considerable possibility that given the present high temperature here, Bahr would misrepresent remarks made to him in a partisan way.

8. We will submit our recommendations on the overall subject of Berlin representation in the Bundestag in the near future.⁴

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, London, and Paris.
2. In telegram 13156 from Bonn, October 7, Rush elaborated on this point: “Although Brandt himself knows better through personal experience, the SPD as a party suffers from a complex, inflated by a liberal dose of imagination, that the US has one-sidedly favored the CDU through the 20 years of its power. This makes the problem the more difficult. We should therefore seek a solution to the Berlin deputy issue which will achieve the objectives of: (a) showing the SPD that we are prepared to be flexible and reasonable; (b) avoiding any action which will weaken the status of Berlin, and (c) avoiding any overtly partisan position which would stand between us and the CDU for the future; the prospective coalition has such a narrow base that the CDU could shortly return to power.” (Ibid.)
3. Not further identified.
4. In telegram 13156 from Bonn, Rush proposed the following: “If the Allies are actually approached by Brandt after his govt is established, we would tell him that we would be prepared to go along with voting rights for Berlin Deputies (a) if the three Allies first obtained from the Soviets a written statement that they have no objection to the change and that the change would in no way affect existing agreements with regard to Berlin, and (b) if constitutional and other legal objections to the Berlin Deputies’ voting either are not raised within a reasonable time or, if raised, are favorably resolved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 GER W) No response to this proposal has been found. When Rush subsequently raised the issue with Brandt, Brandt clarified that “he was in fact interested in increasing the voting rights of Berlin Deputies, but wanted any changes approached dispassionately and deliberately.” After restating the U.S. position, Rush explained that “our sole concern is the security of Berlin and our rights on which this is founded. We have no other concerns about how the matter goes. Brandt did not disagree with this statement.” (Telegram 14208 from Bonn, October 29; ibid.)