Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, August 13, 1971, 2131Z.

148742. Subj: Berlin Negotiations. Ref: Berlin 1600.² For the Ambassador From the Secretary.

1. I appreciated the referenced message. You were correct in anticipating that the current Ambassadorial sessions would be of critical, possibly decisive, importance. You may be sure that we will continue to give you all possible support, realizing of course that you will have to bear the major negotiating burden.

2. I am convinced by their actions that the Soviets want a Berlin agreement badly, though naturally on the most favorable terms possible from their point of view. In view of this Soviet interest it seems that a sound Berlin agreement may be within reach. As your current talks proceed the Western side should take full advantage of this Soviet interest to obtain the best possible terms as defined in the guidance which the President and the Department have provided. Apart from our own requirements, I am particularly concerned that any agreement which we sign shall be one which the German public will find worthwhile and which will not become the subject of major controversy. I believe it will be better to hold out long enough on each issue—even on each detail—to be sure we are achieving the maximum in improvements in the situation. No one can now seriously suspect the United States of holding back in the Berlin negotiations. Having come this far, the Western side will profit by taking the final steps with all due deliberation.

3. Looking to the future, the text which emerges from your current sessions will, because of its lasting importance, require careful examination in Washington. There may be few matters on which you will not be able to reach full agreement in Berlin. For our part, we may have suggestions which will require further quadripartite consultation in Berlin. Time will also be required for consultation in NATO. Taking this into consideration, it would, in my opinion, probably be best for the negotiations to be structured so that signature would take place after Labor Day.

4. I shall be awaiting the outcome of next week’s sessions with intense interest and wish you much luck in your good endeavors.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sutterlin; cleared by Hillenbrand; Miller, Downey; and approved by Rogers.
2. In telegram 1600 from Berlin, August 11, Rush sent the following personal message to Rogers: “Thank you for your support. I appreciate everything everyone has done to assist me in these negotiations.” (Ibid.)