Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

58. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, March 21, 1974, 4–5:30 p.m.

PRINCIPALS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
• Deputy Secretary of State Rush
• JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer
• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Walters
• Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Ikle

OTHER ATTENDEES

• State
• Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
• Defense
• Deputy Secretary Clements
• Mr. Paul Nitze (SALT Delegation)
• Treasury
• Secretary Shultz
• CIA
• Mr. Carl Duckett
• ACDA
• Mr. Sidney Graybeal, Chairman SALT Consultative Committee
• White House
• Assistant to the President Kissinger
• General Alexander M. Haig
• Major General Brent Scowcroft
• NSC
• Mr. Jan M. Lodal

President Nixon: Gentlemen, I am sorry to have held you up for an hour. I had to take care of some matters with Secretary Butz. Shall we start with the CIA briefing? Will you give it, General Walters?

General Walters: No sir, Carl Duckett will give it.

Mr. Duckett: I’d like to start with a quick review of the technical characteristics of the new Soviet ICBMs. (Shows chart illustrating new Soviet ICBMs.)² As I went over last time,³ they are developing four new systems—the SS–X–16, SS–X–17, SS–X–18, and SS–X–19. The SS–X–17 and SS–X–19 are medium size systems probably designed to replace the SS–11. The SS–X–18 is a large system designed to replace the SS–9. All three carry MIRVs. The SS–X–16 has not yet been tested with MIRV, although it appears to have such a capability.

I would now like to go on to talk about force projections over the next five years and show what some of the Soviet programs might look like, particularly what they might look like in the absence of a SALT agreement.

President Nixon: George (Shultz) and perhaps some of the others were not here last time, so feel free to go over once again any of the items you covered then.

Mr. Duckett: Thank you, sir. My first chart shows the number of delivery vehicles. As it shows, the Soviets could get up to 3500 with an all-out program by 1982. What we think is more likely is a program of about 2500, compared with a US programmed force of about 2200.

President Nixon: Let me ask a question about the total bang we are talking about. What’s the total bang of the [less than 1 line not declassified] versus what was used in Nagasaki?

Mr. Duckett: [3 lines not declassified]

President Nixon: [less than 1 line not declassified] I understand that decisions have been made by the US, by the Department of Defense for smaller missiles and warheads than the Soviets. But still, we need some perspective on the size of these weapons.

Mr. Duckett: I would now like to go to a chart on missile throw weight. As this shows, the Soviets could go as high as 16,000 pounds in an all-out program by 1982, compared to 4,000 pounds for the US program. Even in the more likely case, we would expect them to go to something like 11,000 pounds.

President Nixon: Once again, we have to keep this in perspective. [1 line not declassified] The numbers are different, particularly if we have precision as well as numbers.

Mr. Duckett: That’s right. Dropped on Washington, there is essentially no difference [less than 1 line not declassified]

President Nixon: And Manhattan is even smaller than Washington.

Mr. Duckett: This next chart shows the throw weight including an allowance for bombers. As it shows, when you include the bombers, we are ahead of the likely Soviet force.

President Nixon: You mean we are ahead in bombers? But I thought they were as obsolete as the battleship?

Mr. Duckett: Jim will have to speak on that.

President Nixon: I know every time you go to SAC, they say bombers are terribly important. But do the Soviets consider them important? Let me ask our chief negotiator.

Dr. Ikle: Yes, they are concerned about bombers and bomber armaments.

President Nixon: Is some of that negotiating leverage?

Dr. Ikle: Perhaps some of it, but they do seem to have some concern. While they don’t have a new strategic bomber, they are building a new medium bomber—the Backfire. This may be their choice for how to go on bombers.

Mr. Duckett: I should also point out that the Soviets continue to spend large sums of money on air defense. They have a vast air defense system and we often have trouble understanding why they keep adding to it. This is perhaps the most important indicator that they consider bombers serious.

President Nixon: They have lots of experience with air defense in Vietnam; we don’t have much experience.

Vice President Ford: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: [1 line not declassified]

Vice President Ford: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Duckett: No, the throw weight also includes the bus. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Mr. Clements: Carl, in your chart, did you include the B–1 in the bomber numbers?

Mr. Duckett: Yes, we have included it, phased in as presently programmed. I don’t know the exact numbers.

Secretary Schlesinger: Is the Backfire in for the Soviets?

Mr. Duckett: No, we have not included it.

President Nixon: I understand that the rationale for bombers is the flexibility they give us; but for a first strike, given the response time, isn’t the bomber irrelevant?

Admiral Moorer: If you are talking about a US surprise attack, yes. But you have to remember that the bomber was the first strategic weapon we had. We have gone with a “Triad” concept to guard against any technological breakthrough that might threaten one type of weapon system. Also, you can use the bomber in other manners. There are three main advantages to the bombers. First, you can launch them when you get strategic warning. Second, they can be recalled. Third, they carry a big load of accurate weapons. One could look upon bombers as air breathing MIRV vehicles.

Dr. Ikle: In a crisis, they could be put on airborne alert, increasing the forces available.

President Nixon: Yes, I understand that with the crisis we can put them on alert.

Secretary Schlesinger: A bomber is also recoverable. You can bring it back and reload it. It has a number of unique characteristics, and while we would not want to rely exclusively on bombers, as a component of our force, the bomber has a role to play in stabilizing the strategic balance.

Mr. Duckett: I would also like to point out that up to 1970, the Soviets planned only for a full strategic exchange. We now know that since 1970 they have been planning on selective use of nuclear weapons, at least in the theater. Aircraft have a big advantage in this kind of role.

President Nixon: Let me ask, what kind of missile warning time would we have if the Soviets attacked us?

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

President Nixon: And the bombers can get off in that time?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Secretary Schlesinger: They do have a capability to launch SLBMs on depressed trajectories which could hit our bomber bases in [less than 1 line not declassified] minutes, but we believe the bomber force we plan into the 1980s could still be flushed in that time.

President Nixon: We must also remember that our warning almost always comes diplomatically.

Mr. Clements: One other point about bombers—the B–1 also is the equivalent of 8 Minuteman missiles.

Secretary Shultz: What’s the probability the bombers will get through the defense?

Mr. Duckett: It’s hard to say. They have a sophisticated system and the bombers would have a rough ride.

Admiral Moorer: We would have the same experience as we did in North Vietnam. The first bombers would have heavy losses, but then their defense would be degraded.

Mr. Clements: I disagree with Carl. The ability of the bombers to penetrate will be high. The first then would have heavy losses but their overall ability would be high.

Mr. Rush: We could turn the argument around about their air defenses—they might give a response to our bombers.

Mr. Duckett: [5 lines not declassified]

Vice President Ford: How many warheads do they have on each missile?

Mr. Duckett: [4 lines not declassified]

Mr. Rush: Is there a relationship between accuracy and weight?

Mr. Duckett: Accuracy is much more important than throw weight when it comes to kill probability.

Mr. Clements: Within our budget, we are increasing our accuracy to twice its present level.

Mr. Duckett: I should also mention that the US is not locked into the program shown on these charts. This is only an illustrative program—the present plans.

President Nixon: Today, we have a substantial accuracy advantage. But they are gaining on us. With no agreement, on the accuracy side, will our advantage narrow or increase? I remember everyone jumping up and down about Sputnik, but we caught up and passed them.

Mr. Duckett: [5 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: Would they need a new warhead to achieve this accuracy?

Mr. Duckett: [less than 1 line not declassified]

President Nixon: In our SALT discussions, we’re not suggesting any restrictions on accuracy?

Dr. Ikle: That’s correct, we have not suggested any restrictions on accuracy.

President Nixon: Therefore, no matter what we do, they will get there—our accuracy advantage will narrow, correct?

Mr. Duckett: Yes.

Secretary Schlesinger: In the real world, no one can count on knowing accuracy exactly. We hope not to find out. We expect some operational degradation. The size of weapons reduces one’s dependence on accuracy, so there will always remain some advantage to bigger weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course we never have fired a missile from an operational silo.

Mr. Clements: But that’s why, at your suggestion, Henry, we now have the Operational Base Launch Program.

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, one of the purposes of this program is to see what kind of accuracy we get from operational silos, but we still have never fired a missile north. We can’t measure accuracy perfectly until there is an actual exchange.

President Nixon: Thank you, Carl. Now let’s turn to Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: Carl covered some of the points I’d like to make. Let me sum up where we stand, then go over some of the choices that will come up. In Geneva, we have presented four concepts based on essential equivalence. Equal aggregates at a level of about 2350; equal aggregate throw weight; a program of reductions; and qualitative controls through equivalence of MIRV throw weight. We have not received an enthusiastic response to our position. I believe we are not destined to receive a favorable response, for one overriding reason. Ten years ago, we decided deliberately to produce low throw weight missiles. The present disparity is a result of decisions made in the 1960s and it is very hard to redress these disparities through a SALT agreement now.

On the question of controlling MIRVs, we have gone through a number of phases. First, we favored limiting testing. But the SS–19 and probably the SS–17 is probably too far advanced, and we have no equivalent testing program to stop. We’ve also looked at the Soviet approach for equal numbers of MIRV launchers. [1 line not declassified] Their missiles have either [number not declassified] warheads.

Mr. Duckett: I might mention that they have recently had 2 SS–17 and 3 SS–18 long-range tests in the Pacific. They have previously tested the SS–19 so this means, except for the SS–16, that they have now tested all of their new missiles to full range.

Secretary Kissinger: On our overall program, I am pessimistic because we can’t get equality in throw weight and numbers unless they tear down heavy weapons or we start a new program to significantly build up our heavy weapons.

To try to cut off the Soviet MIRV programs, we developed a concept of limiting MIRVs on the basis of throw weight. Under this concept, we would have more missiles—the exact difference would depend on the particular missiles they choose to deploy—but we would have on the order of 2–1 in MIRVed missiles if the throw weight concept were accepted.

As Carl has pointed out, we have to look at the relative positions of the US and the Soviets if current programs are carried forward on both sides. In this case, the gap will increase against us.

The Soviets have also emphasized FBS, which we refrain to discuss out of consideration of our allies, and they have indicated that they require more missiles because of a threat we don’t face yet but which they do.

President Nixon: I presume you mean China.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Our basic problem is that our forces have been designed unilaterally in asymmetrical ways. We have chosen smaller ICBMs; the Soviets have no modern bomber force; and it’s hard to equate missiles and bombers in any event. You have to allow for air defense, bombers can be reloaded. I might say that we have not counted B–1s as 8 Minuteman in anything I have seen. I suspect we will never hear that number from OSD again.

Secretary Schlesinger: No, that’s not true. We count a bomber as approximately equivalent to an SS–9 or SS–18, and a Minuteman is counted as about ⅛ of an SS–9.

President Nixon: But these calculations presume only one use of the bomber? The Deputy Secretary made the point that the bomber can be reused.

Secretary Schlesinger: Their new missiles, the SS–17 and SS–19 (sic), use a pop-up technique. That means their missile silos can be reloaded also.

President Nixon: Isn’t that another reason not to bother with bombers? The argument that bombers can be used twice goes away if you can use missiles twice. In any event, let’s go ahead to a less esoteric discussion.

Secretary Schlesinger: That’s true with our currently programmed forces in 1975, but our new budget has the start of a new ICBM. It could allow us to deploy up to 6000 new RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but we would have to decide not only on the number of US forces needed by themselves, but also the Soviet reaction. The disparity can only be closed if we redesign our forces and deploy higher throw weight missiles.

President Nixon: We must be careful about any assumption that we will continue forward and they will stay where they are. If we goose up our programs, they will goose up their programs also.

Vice President Ford: Jim, if it turned out that no SALT agreement was possible, and you had “x” million dollars extra, would you put it into strategic forces or conventional forces?

Secretary Schlesinger: I would put about $2 billion in strategic forces.

President Nixon: We mustn’t kid ourselves. If we start running faster, they will start running faster. So double that number.

Secretary Schlesinger: We might not have to go that high. We would only have to do that if they were to break out of an agreement in a manner which threatens essential equivalence.

Secretary Kissinger: When could your new missile be available?

Secretary Schlesinger: By about 1979. Let me make it clear that we prefer to hold both sides at present levels; present levels are quite stable. But we have to get across the message to the Soviets that if they are interested in racing, we will match them, and therefore it is in the interest of both sides to put a cap on the forces.

Secretary Kissinger: We have had some recent conversations with Dobrynin. He indicated that the Soviets may be ready to consider limitations on MIRVs. They don’t like our idea of throw weight, but they may be willing to accept the disparity in the number of MIRV launchers. I think it is possible we can work out the practical equivalent of equal throw weight by expressing it numerically. The issue we have to face is what to do if they offer us an extension of the Interim Agreement and a MIRV deal—would we be prepared to go along? We have received no proposition from them on any numbers or what the mix of forces will be. Internally, we have always assumed that any missiles tested with MIRVs must count as MIRVed. Therefore, the SS–19 and the SS–17 would have to be considered as MIRVs. We might be able to slow down their deployment of these systems by tying this to some kind of codicil on the Interim Agreement which lasts during the same period. Then the US programs will put pressure on them during the continuing negotiations. We have to decide whether we want a MIRV agreement in the Interim Agreement or to push forward to a permanent agreement; if we do the latter, we have to decide how much time we will take and set a deadline for ourselves.

We can either slow down their rate or increase ours. To do nothing will produce a bigger gap, given the state of their deployments.

If the Soviet proposition is unacceptable, our practical choice will be to set an internal time limit and kick off development of Jim’s program. [1½ lines not declassified] They’ve got 1500 weapons with 6 to 8 MIRVs each. The disparity will increase. With SALT II, we may be able to slow down the rate and use Jim’s new systems for leverage; or we can set a cutoff point and hold out for a permanent agreement. The worst possible situation is to continue negotiating for a permanent agreement and continue with our present programs.

President Nixon: Are we talking about any limitations on R&D?

Secretary Kissinger: No, except for MIRV limitations. I told the Chiefs I will bring back any Soviet proposal before we agree to it.

President Nixon: But in the agreements we are talking about, R&D is not inhibited?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

President Nixon: Let’s keep the money in for the R&D. But we want to avoid the Navy, Army, and Air Force fighting about who has the most officers’ clubs and use the money for R&D.

Vice President Ford: In the 1950s and 1960s, we seemed always to reach a plateau of new systems. First we had the B–52, then ICBMs, and so forth. In our R&D programs, is there a plateau we see coming?

Secretary Schlesinger: No. We have cruise missiles and some new things.

President Nixon: Well, try to think about that hard, Jim.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets are worried about our cruise missiles, although we don’t have much of a program for them.

Mr. Clements: But, Henry, at your suggestion we now have a cruise missile program.

Dr. Ikle: There’s a third option we might take with respect to relating a MIRV agreement to an overall agreement. We might negotiate a separate limit on MIRVs and agree that it is the first step in an overall agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make it clear that the hint I received from the Soviets must not be fed back into Geneva.

Vice President Ford: Let me ask about the China threat that allegedly only the Soviets face. One of Secretary McNamara’s early rationalizations for the ABM was for use against third countries.

President Nixon: In my first or second press conference, I made the point that the ABM was quite useful against minor nuclear powers, and I’ve had to live with that ever since.⁴ Henry gave me that advice.

Secretary Kissinger: Once China has the missile force that the Soviets have today, that’s when we have a very dangerous situation. Then whichever side they choose to go with has the advantage.

Mr. Rush: I have some concern that reaching an Interim Agreement on MIRVs, we might be giving up some of our bargaining leverage for an overall agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: This is where we stand—there is no prospect of a comprehensive agreement this year because of FBS and comparability problems. It may be possible to get a MIRV deal.

President Nixon: I think we want to keep this exclusively in this room.

Secretary Kissinger: They’ve implored me not to mention their openings.

President Nixon: Also, we don’t want to let it out that there is no chance for a comprehensive agreement, and that we might be looking toward a MIRV agreement as a codicil. We don’t want any source stories out that we have no chance for a comprehensive agreement—we don’t want to throw that away yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m only concerned that if we keep building expectations for a comprehensive agreement, (Senator) Jackson will accuse us of selling out when we don’t get it.

President Nixon: There have been too many source stories on these topics; they have to stop. Among ourselves, we can be clear—if we can’t get a comprehensive agreement, that’s just tough, but we have to be careful about what we say. We’re talking about cooperation, space, environment, trade, and cancer research; but on this issue, each country is talking about its basic survival and its position in the world. We have to speak with one voice.

Secretary Kissinger: If we slow the rate of deployment of the Soviet MIRVs, we would also slow down the rate of deployment of the new missiles, given our present understanding that they can’t MIRV their existing missiles.

Secretary Schlesinger: They could deploy the new missiles with single RVs.

Secretary Kissinger: No, not unless they stop flight testing. Under our concept, once the missile has been tested as MIRVed, any deployment has to be counted as a MIRVed missile, regardless of its warheads. We will count all –18s and –17s as MIRVs. If we can slow down the rate of deployment of their new –18s, this will also degrade the worth of their existing SS–9 force.

President Nixon: Our main concern is about R&D. We have a tendency to get wedded to a particular system. We’ve got Polaris, Poseidon, and what’s it called—Trident, but I can’t emphasize too strongly we have to get this research going. Give it to Rand or some eggheads—no, they don’t want to do it—all they want to do is work on the environment. But if we can find some smart ones around, have them think about this—think about new weapons systems. Our Navy has been out in front on this.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, sir; we’re a technological service.

President Nixon: I’m a complete layman at this, but I do understand history. The great weakness of any major power is to become frozen in its forces. The French, before WWII, thought they had the best army in the world.

Gen. Walters: The Maginot Line was supposed to be the ultimate weapon.

President Nixon: The Soviets and the Chinese are very good in this area of new ideas.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe I saw an assessment that indicated that in starting from a zero base, the Chinese had done the best in nuclear weapons development.

President Nixon: The Soviets do have a problem with the Chinese. I remember saying to Brezhnev that in 20 years they would become a major power; he said no, that it would be ten years—we talked about this last time.

Secretary Kissinger: Both could be right—the threat could be against the Soviets in ten years, but not against us for 20.

Mr. Duckett: My main concern is that the Soviets might make some breakthrough in defense efforts such as a high energy laser ABM.

President Nixon: Are we doing that?

Secretary Schlesinger: No.

President Nixon: How much would it cost to do that?

Secretary Schlesinger: Probably about 60 million.

President Nixon: Give us a recommendation. I want to see that. It’s extremely important. But whatever we’re doing, double it again if it can be well spent and make sure it’s an add-on—don’t take the money away from any place else.

Secretary Schlesinger: Our problem is with Senator McIntyre.⁵

President Nixon: That’s why I have to strongly urge you, Jim—you have great credibility on the Hill—they see you as an outer-space-type-thinker—to use your efforts to get these through and don’t short change R&D.

Vice President Ford: We have some leverage on McIntyre—he will be in bad trouble in November if he keeps this up.

President Nixon: New Hampshire is a hawk state.

Mr. Clements: They have cut our R&D program.

President Nixon: We get a lot of criticism like what are we doing sending men around and around in space. What you learn is a by-product not just what you find out while you’re up there. On Sputnik, Paul Nitze was probably here, and we were all scared to death. We got the briefing from the chief scientist—what was his name?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Kistiakowsky.

President Nixon: Yes, why does everyone have to be from Harvard? (Laughter) In any event, he was a good man. He came down to tell us what we could learn from satellites. He told us about weather, science, etc. At the end, he turned to President Eisenhower, I was sitting across the table there, and said, Mr. President, I’m sure the most important thing we will learn from this program is not on the chart. That’s why I’m an R&D man. Henry, will you get us a proposal on the lasers? Do you have further comments?

Secretary Kissinger: No, Mr. President. To sum up, there is nothing in range in Geneva, and nothing in your channel except what I have mentioned. I think they are having a very hard time.

President Nixon: Jim, I understand that DOD could and should only take the position that we have to have equivalence and I know you’re not taking this position just to be a hard-liner, to look good if something should go wrong. What is your advice on how we should proceed?

Secretary Schlesinger: I think it is an advantage to both sides to restrain any breakouts in aggregates and throw weight. We have to convince the Soviets that we will match them in these areas. They will come around to the view that we should match each other somewhere between our present level and their level.

President Nixon: Well, let’s not state it publicly now that we have given up on this. We have an increase in our budget in the works.

Secretary Kissinger: The increased budget has already had an important impact; without B–1 and Trident, we wouldn’t even have the bites we have now.

President Nixon: Jim is right. It has to be clearly understood that if they want to race, we’re ready. On the other hand, we’re prepared to negotiate, but not into an inferior position. It’s going to be a very tough negotiation. I have sympathy for the Defense position. I know the JCS is concerned that we will give away the store. We will make a deal only if it is in our own interest. I might add that if they think it’s not in their interest, they won’t agree either. We have to look at what’s in our interest, and what we can get, and then bargain to get it. They will be more brutal, starting out with outrageous positions.

We shouldn’t lightly say that if they don’t want a deal, we’re ready and it will only cost us 2 billion dollars a year. That doesn’t mean we’ll get a deal for a deal’s sake.

Secretary Schlesinger: Let me say one more thing about the DOD position. I think it would be tragic if we cannot get a SALT agreement that ultimately leads to comprehensive equality. But we endorse a MIRV agreement, but more as a way-station on the road to permanent agreement providing essential equivalence. Adding a MIRV agreement to an Interim Agreement may be beneficial. In the long run, throw-weight is important but in the short run, it’s not so important since they cannot exploit it. There is no risk before 1980 that the Soviet Union could obtain a measurable advantage. In the longer run they could have a measurable degree of superiority. Today, their throw-weight advantage is only 2 to 1, and we can live with that. But it could get up to 6 to 1 and we could not tolerate that. We don’t want to mirror image their forces. But your successors might not feel that they’re in a position to stand up to Soviet diplomatic pressures if they had a 6 to 1 advantage. I have two charts I would like to show you if it’s all right.⁶

President Nixon: Go ahead.

Vice President Ford: If Congress doesn’t go along with your supplemental and new budget, we will have trouble. It’s crucial that we get the budget through.

Secretary Schlesinger: As this chart shows, they already have about a two-to-one throw weight advantage, but it’s not exploitable—they don’t have the re-entry vehicles, accuracy or MIRV capability. But this position will erode. Their new ICBMs represent a threefold to fourfold increase in throw weight. By 1982, they could increase their advantage to sixfold. With equal weight RVs, they could have 20,000 to 3,000 for us. [6 lines not declassified]

We don’t have to match them number for number, but with a 6 to 1 advantage, their robustness in diplomatic negotiations will be such that your successor might not be able to stand up to them.

Secretary Kissinger: This is why it is highly desirable to slow down MIRVs to the greatest extent possible. If we can slow down MIRVs, we can slow down these new missiles.

President Nixon: A Soviet decision to reduce the gap would be quite difficult. They would have to destroy how much?

Secretary Schlesinger: Hopefully we can get them to avoid replacing existing systems with new ones. It will cost them 15 billion dollars to replace the SS–9 with the SS–18. If we can keep the SS–18 out, we will have helped considerably. The question is how do we achieve essential equivalence taking into account bombers and SLBMs at the same time? If we propose a program to significantly limit deployments, we can be taking the high ground and wearing a white hat.

President Nixon: This has been a helpful meeting. Now we have the feel out; this will be followed by the crunch, like it was leading up to the Summit two years ago. I want to say that I understand that reasonable men will disagree. I can recall many tough decisions on Vietnam. My advisors disagreed, and some of them even put their disagreement in writing so that if the decision turned out to be wrong, they would be okay. That’s perfectly understandable. But I want to make it clear that in the end, I take the responsibility. First, we must get an agreement that does not put us in an inferior position. We will probably find that, as in SALT I and with the Interim Agreement, concern will be expressed. But we have to make hard choices.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–110, NSC Meeting Minutes, Originals, 1971 thru 6–20–74 [3 of 5]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.
2. The CIA charts were not found.
3. See Document 47.
4. Nixon is referring to his press conference on March 14, 1969. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 208–216.
5. Senator Thomas J. McIntyre (D–New Hampshire) was on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
6. The charts were not found. According to a March 20 briefing memorandum from Lodal to Kissinger, Schlesinger prepared three briefing charts for this NSC meeting: 1) the Geneva positions of the U.S. focus on equal aggregates, reductions, and MIRVs and the Soviet emphasis on FBS; 2) a separate MIRV deal prejudicing the terms of a permanent agreement on aggregates and suggesting that high levels of unMIRVed missile throw weight were undesirable because of the verification risk; 3) U.S. and Soviet ICBM force levels at present and in 10 years. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–33, NSC Meetings, SALT, 3/21/74)