Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

42. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger ¹

Washington, October 23, 1973.

SUBJECT

• SALT

We are getting rolled by a combination of State-Defense-JCS on the matter of tabling a tough US counterdraft in Geneva. Alex Johnson has sent Ralph Earle back to explain the draft which the delegation has worked out and which he wants the VPWG to examine.²

I just want to register my position: I am totally opposed to our tabling a counterdraft. The theory seems to be that since the Soviets tabled an unacceptable draft we should put in one of our own to show how tough we are. But plainly if there is ever going to be an agreement it will be a compromise and I can see absolutely no reason to provide a score card that will enable Administration critics, in and out, to show how much we “give away” from our original position. Moreover, it is senseless to get into a mammoth argument in the VP now on a counter-proposal which has no real bearing on what will be negotiated. The Soviets have our proposal; you have told them we will make no further proposal until we have heard from them following their current “review.” Our failure to table a counterproposal is the equivalent of tabling an unacceptable one since we have already made clear that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable.

We need your authority to stop this exercise and to keep the VP working on real problems rather than posturing.

This will take direct orders from you to (1) Weiss and (2) Ikle; calls from you to (1) Schlesinger and (2) Moorer, telling them that the VP is to continue its examination of issues and not to be diverted to drafting a formal proposal. You can tell them the Soviets know full well that their proposal is unacceptable and that they are going to have to come up with a more reasonable one.

If you do not want to be peremptory, you should convene a brief VP—hard as that may be on your schedule right now—to hear the arguments pro and con (there won’t be any of the latter unless you get Ikle to make them) and then issue a directive turning off the counterproposal idea.

We will do an analysis of the Johnson draft, but you need to slow him down and answer his message of Monday (Tab B).³

A draft reply is at Tab A.⁴

Recommendation:

That you send the message to Ambassador Johnson at Tab A.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 890, SALT, SALT TWO–I–Geneva, Sept. 1973. Secret; Personal; Exclusively Eyes Only; Outside the System. Sent for urgent action. A note by Scowcroft on the memorandum indicates it was seen by Kissinger and that the message to Johnson was on Kissinger’s desk for signature on October 26.
2. The U.S. counterdraft to the Soviet draft treaty tabled on October 9 (see Document 40) is in telegram 5598 from USDEL SALT TWO Geneva, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3. Tab B, attached but not printed, is a copy of backchannel message 978 from Johnson to Scowcroft, October 22, in which Johnson informed Kissinger that he was sending Ralph Earle back to Washington to explain the delegation’s proposed counterdraft. Johnson admitted that the delegation draft was “hard line,” but argued that it was the best response for the present time. Johnson stated he had built into the draft “negotiating elbow room” and that it was not a final position, just a negotiating position.
4. The handwritten note “Aaron has seen” follows this sentence. Tab A was not attached.
5. Kissinger did not indicate his approval or disapproval of this recommendation.