28. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

SUBJECT

  • SALT Developments

This memo provides a summary of developments in SALT, both in Geneva and in the Verification Panel Working Group since your Moscow trip. Briefly,

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The U.S. Delegation has been unfolding our SALT position as contained in NSDMs 213 and 216. 2

The Soviets have continued to play on nuances of their FBS theme; they have given no clear response to the U.S. proposals.

—We have tasked the bureaucracy with additional work in a number of areas including the development of our non-circumvention approach on FBS, detailed formulation of the ICBM MIRV freeze and other issues that have arisen in interpreting current guidance (e.g., composition of the 2350 aggregate on each side).

These points are elaborated below.

Events in Geneva

The U.S. Delegation has been unfolding the U.S. SALT position. The Delegation opened with a presentation on equal aggregates at the 2350 level and other elements of the basic U.S. position. At subsequent meetings Johnson has outlined the U.S. proposal for a provisional agreement freezing MRV/MIRVs on ICBMs and our non-circumvention proposal for FBS.3

The Soviets have provided little indication of their reaction to the U.S. proposals.

Semenov has confined his formal statements to largely non-substantive discussions of principles and to repeating the Soviet position on FBS. However, his most recent formal statement (May 22) all but rejected the U.S. proposal for equal aggregates of central systems in a permanent agreement.4 Privately, he has added little except to acknowledge that the U.S. proposals are important and are receiving careful study in Moscow. He recently voiced to Johnson the thought that Brezhnev could not concentrate his attention on SALT until his return from Bonn on May 22.

Other members of the Soviet Delegation have been a little more forthcoming, seeking elaboration of the U.S. proposals and hinting at some areas of possible agreement or disagreement with U.S. views.

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Equal Aggregates

The Soviet Delegation has been most negative on the U.S. proposal for equal aggregates of 2350 central systems. Semenov stated that the principle of equal security “cannot be embodied in an agreement in the form of an elementary arithmetical equality for some portion of strategic offensive weapons . . .” Semenov’s May 22 formal statement said the permanent agreement “must include the principal provisions of the Interim Agreement in the form in which they were agreed between the sides.”

Trusov has asked how U.S. plans to take account of geographic factors, FBS, aircraft carriers and allied SLBMs in establishing levels for each side. Shchukin commented to Nitze that the sides should have unequal aggregates to take account of the factors enumerated by Trusov.

MIRVs

There has been little Soviet comment reported on the ICBM MIRV freeze proposed by the U.S. Trusov commented that the proposal is not verifiable (you will recall Brezhnev said the same thing). Shchukin has indicated he thinks limitations on SLBM MIRVs should be included in the discussions. (Brezhnev said Soviet SLBM MIRVs were a long way off.)

SSBN Standoff and Forward Basing

Shchukin has pressed Nitze on the idea of deploying SSBNs out of range of the territory of the other side. Nitze raised the Soviets 4000 nm SS–N–8 SLBM saying it was virtually impossible to deploy such a missile out of range of the U.S. Shchukin responded by saying the Soviets had not deployed any long range missiles on operational submarines and would be prepared to agree not to deploy them for an extended number of years. Shchukin concluded by saying it would be important to discuss restriction of deployment areas more fully in the near future. Nitze believes Shchukin may have in mind a softening of Soviet FBS line in return for restrictions on SSBN deployment. (Presumably it would also involve elimination of the SSBN forward bases since U.S. SSBNs are in range of Soviet targets from these bases.) In his most recent private discussion with Johnson, Semenov devoted considerable attention to the Soviet proposal that U.S. withdraw from SSBN overseas bases as “first step” toward solution of FBS.

In related probing Smolin asked Graybeal about the U.S. response to the Soviet proposed “phased withdrawal” of FBS, the first phase of which involves U.S. withdrawal from SSBN overseas bases. Smolin pointed out this first phase dealt only with “central systems.” Smolin seemed to be hinting that this phase might be separable from the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. FBS.

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Semenov in his formal statements has reiterated the Soviet April 12 proposal for phased withdrawal of SSBN overseas bases and all U.S. FBS and liquidation of their bases and requested that the U.S. “again consider (it) with all seriousness.”5 Belitsky said non-circumvention was not in accord with the principle of equal security since it didn’t take into account FBS systems already deployed.

Standing Consultative Commission

The SCC will hold its first meeting May 24. Johnson is the acting U.S. Commissioner, and he is drawing on the SALT Delegation for staff support. The first meeting will be limited to discussion and adoption of the regulations for operating the SCC.

At the second SCC meeting, the U.S. will present its views on the notification, replacement and dismantling issues.

Verification Panel Working Group

We have asked the bureaucracy for a number of papers to help flesh out aspects of the U.S. proposal:

FBS–Non-circumvention Policy. This fleshes out the U.S. non-circumvention policy including an examination of what kinds of assurances we might give the Soviets, their impact on our deployments and options and our approach to consultation with the Allies.

Composition of the Aggregate. This paper examines the issues relating to composition of the 2350 aggregate for both sides, asymmetries within the framework of the current U.S. proposal (e.g., the Soviets would retain their ICBM throw weight advantage), freedom-to-mix provisions and sublimits.

All Other NSDM-related Issues. This paper is largely concerned with reviewing past analysis on provisions such as those banning strategic systems on ships other than submarines, and from territorial waters and inland waterways as well as addressing minor definitional issues (e.g., defining an inter-continental cruise missile).

In addition to this new work, we have ongoing papers examining our SALT leverage, a political assessment of the FBS issue, a comparison of missile and bomber throw weight, and the practicability and problem of ICBM counterforce attacks on silos (i.e., fratricide problem).

We will forward summaries of these papers when they are complete.6

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 889, SALT, SALT TWO–I–Geneva, April 1973. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.
  2. Documents 23 and 25.
  3. The U.S. position on equal aggregates was presented on May 8, the provisional agreement to freeze MIRVs on ICBMs was tabled on May 11, and the non-circumvention proposal on May 15. (Telegrams 179, May 8; 184, May 11; and 191, May 15, from USDEL SALT II; all in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Johnson apprised Kissinger of the presentations in backchannel messages 100 and 102 from Geneva, May 7 and 11. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages–1973/74–SALT–Geneva)
  4. A translation of Semenov’s statement is in telegram 207 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, May 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
  5. The April 12 Soviet proposal was reported in telegram 158 from USDEL SALT II Geneva, April 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
  6. Summaries of the papers have not been found; drafts of the Verification Panel Working Group papers are ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box H–15, Verification Panel Meeting, SALT, 7/19/73.